The 6th Conference of the Central and East European Society for Phenomenology

Phenomenology and Sociality

Abstracts

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and

Sociality

Andrej Božič (*Ed.*)

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Ljubljana 2021

INR | INSTITUTE NOVA REVIJA
FOR THE HUMANITIES

Phenomenology and Sociality

The phenomenological movement, to which authors from extremely diverse traditions and of utmost heterogeneous provenances—directly or indirectly—can be counted, has since its foundation at the beginning of the 20th century developed into one of the central currents of contemporary philosophy that entails not only fundamental considerations regarding, for instance, epistemology or ontology, but also critically and crucially touches upon (all) other fields of human agency. Phenomenology has, from its initial predominantly methodological reflections, through constant confrontation with opposing standpoints, evolved into a stringent, comprehensive inter- and trans-disciplinary philosophical theory capable of offering invaluable insights into phenomena concerning both science as well as religion, both technology as well as arts, etc. However, it should not be overlooked that—beyond all the transformations—one of the principal problem realms of phenomenological research has been, and is, the exploration and elaboration of the various dimensions of sociality, which—through time tracing (out) always shifting accents and evermore discerning nuances— connect its inception with the 21st century and, thus, co-constitute its entire history. Yet, beside by purely theoretical deliberations on sociality, the movement of phenomenology is also essentially defined, as the destinies of certain personalities—with paradoxically manifold, sometimes tragical outcomes—demonstrate, by attempts at their practical and even political implementation.

The phenomenological discussions of sociality, precisely because of the immense variety of approaches, conclusions, and consequences, deserve—perhaps expressly with regard to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic that seems, with its exigencies, to threaten the fragile fabric of co-existence amongst human beings—a specific attention and focused elucidation, which could, linking—through the present—the past with the future, ensure not only subsequent advancement of phenomenology, but contribute to society of humanity as such.

The *Institute Nova Revija for the Humanities* and the *Journal of Phenomenology and Hermeneutics Phainomena* in collaboration with the *Central and East European Society for Phenomenology*, therefore, decided to organize an international conference dedicated to the problematic of "Phenomenology and Sociality." The thematic scope of the conference taking place in Ljubljana December 2–4, 2021, includes the following topics:

- the phenomenological conceptualization and understanding of sociality;
- sociality, intersubjectivity, and the experience of alterity;
- phenomenology and social communication (information technology, media, culture, academia, science, education, religion, etc.);
- social violence and conflict resolution: a phenomenological perspective;
- the phenomenological account of plural subject theory: the question of collective intentionality and shared emotions;
- the naturalization of the phenomenology of sociality;
- phenomenological authors in confrontation with political totalitarianisms and authoritarianisms with special emphasis on philosophers from the Central and East European region (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Patočka, Walther, Kolnai, Stein, Noica, Tischner, Veber, etc.);
- social perspectives in Europe after the crisis of the COVID-19 outbreak: a phenomenological re-consideration.

The 6th Conference of the Central and East European Society for Phenomenology aims to deliberate upon the outlined thematic scope and therewith inherently interlinked issues in the openness of a dialogical discussion proving, thus, not only the theoretical topicality, but also the practical pertinence and the social salience of the contemporary phenomenologically oriented philosophical thought.

The Program of the Conference

The 6ᵗʰ Conference of the Central and East European Society for Phenomenology

Phenomenology and Sociality

December 2–4, 2021
Ljubljana, Slovenia

Organizing Committee:
Andrej Božič | Branko Klun | Dean Komel | Witold Płotka | Tomaž Zalaznik

program

Day I
Thursday, December 2, 2021

10.30–11.30	*ZOOM 1*	**The Opening of the Conference and Initial Addresses** Tomaž Zalaznik (INR) Andrej Božič (INR, *Phainomena*) Witold Płotka (CEESP)	
11.30–13.30	*Parallel Sessions*		
	ZOOM 1	**Historical Developments** (Chair: Andrej Božič)	
	Liana Kryshevska: *The Notion of Social World by Gustav Shpet*	Daniel Neumann: *Sharing a Realistic Future. Early Phenomenology and Sociality*	Maria Gołębiewska: *Paul Amselek's Phenomenology of Law and the Intersubjective Context of Legal Interpretation*
	ZOOM 2	**From Solitarity to Solidarity** (Chair: Paolo Furia)	
	Sigurd Nøstberg Hovd: *Constitutivism and Phenomenology. On Sociality as a Ground for Moral Necessitation*	Lucia Angelino: *The Role of the Third in the Genesis of a We-Perspective*	Tatiana Shchyttsova: *"The Solidarity of the Shaken." Revisiting Patočka's and Havel's Ideas from the Perspective of the Belarussian Protest Movement 2020–2021*
	ZOOM 3	**The Threat of Totalitarianism** (Chair: Dragan Prole)	
	Dean Komel: *On the Totalitarium*	Fabián Portillo Palma: *Isolation and Loneliness as Categories of Social Being. Arendt and the Origin of Totalitarian Movements*	Ruth Rebecca Tietjen: *Fear, Fanaticism, and Fragile Identities*
13.30–15.00	*Lunch Break*		

		Parallel Sessions		
15.00–17.40	**ZOOM 1**	**Positions in Discussion** (Chair: Peter Andras Varga)		
	Ugo Vlaisavljević: *Husserl's Theory of Socialization and the Unrealized Prospects of a Transcendentally Grounded History of Mankind*	Ion Copoeru: *Meaning Production and Interactive Situation. From Intersubjectivity to the "Organization of Action"*	Nicolai Knudsen: *Heidegger on Social Cognition*	Branko Klun: *The Otherness of the Other between Knowledge and Acknowledgement*
	ZOOM 2	**Husserl's Thought** (Chair: Jan Straßheim)		
	Noam Cohen: *The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl's Theory of Intersubjectivity*	Ka-yu Hui: *The Double Expressivity of a Person in Husserl's Social Phenomenology. From Subjective Spirit to Cultural Spiritual Shape*	Fabio Rovigo: *Husserl's Phenomenology of Sociality. From Social Acts to Communities*	Zixuan Liu: *What is the Irreality of Social Reality? Higher Visibility Transcendental Intentionality*
	ZOOM 3	**Experiencing Imagistic Violence** (Chair: Irina Poleshchuk)		
	Remus Breazu: *The Neutralization of Violence in Images through Aestheticization*	Cristian Ciocan: *The Imagistic Experience of Violence and the Phenomenology of Body*	Christian Ferencz-Flatz: *The Afterlife of Film Violence. A Genetic Phenomenological Approach*	Paul Marinescu: *Blurring the Unbearable. Limits and Excesses of Displaying Violence*
17.40–18.00	*Break*			
18.00–19.00	**ZOOM 1**	**Issues**: Journals and International Collaborations		
19.00–20.00		**Challenges and Perspectives of Phenomenology** Between Yesterday and Today: "How Do Historical Horizons of the Phenomenological Movement Contribute to an Understanding of the Contemporary World?"		

	Parallel Sessions		
	ZOOM 1 **Inter-Subjectivities** (Chair: Māra Grīnfelde)		
	Filip Borek: Schwingung *at the Heart of Phenomenon. Anonymity, Pre-personality, and Intersubjectivity*	Jan Straßheim: *The Other within Myself. Schutz, Husserl, and Nishida on Intersubjectivity*	Anthony Longo: *Intersubjectivity, Mirror Neurons, and the Limits of Naturalism*
	ZOOM 2 **Forms and Levels of Dis/Agreement** (New Contributions to a Phenomenology of Common Life) (Chair: Fabio Rovigo)		
9.00–11.00	Markus Seethaler: *The Epistemology of Disagreement and Moral Disputes*	Antonia Veitschegger: *Art Experience and Disagreement*	Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl: *Love and Disagreement*
	ZOOM 3 **Violence and Its Repercussions** (Chair: Tatiana Shchyttsova)		
	Sergio Pérez-Gatica: *Violence as a Form of Social Interaction. Intentional Analysis of the Abuse of Power as a Phenomenon of Practical-Intersubjective Consciousness*	Paulina Sosnowska: *The Wounds of War and the Scars of Culture. Simone Weil and René Girard on Sociality of Violence*	Manca Erzetič: *The Hermeneutics of Testimony in the Context of Social Mediation*
11.00–11.30	*Break*		

		Parallel Sessions	
	ZOOM 1	Husserl's Successors (Chair: Alexandru Bejinariu)	
	Daniele Nuccilli: Mitverstrickung. *Wilhelm Schapp on the Narratological Structure of Intersubjectivity*	Andrzej Gniazdowski *The Total versus the Corporate State. The Political Phenomenology of Aurel Kolnai*	Witold Płotka: *Body, Empathy, and Joint Experiences. On Blaustein's Contribution to the Phenomenology of Sociality*
	ZOOM 2	Disputations (Chair: Uldis Vēgners)	
11.30–13.30	Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz: *The Political and Educational Importance of Phenomenological Reduction in the Light of the Dispute between Paul Natorp and Edmund Husserl*	Jaroslava Vydrová: *The Encountering of Husserl and Plessner. A Reconsideration of Sociality*	Marco Russo: *Social Phenomenology of Eccentricity*
	ZOOM 3	Heidegger's Politics (Chair: Dean Komel)	
	Guelfo Carbone: *A Way out of Nazism? Heidegger and the "Shepherd of Being"*	Alexey Savin: *Is the National-Socialist State the Truth of Heidegger's Philosophy? The Transformation of the Interpretation of Heidegger's Philosophy in the Soviet Marxism*	Dario Vuger: *Circumlocution as Method. Heidegger and the Possibility of Philosophy as Praxis*
13.30–15.00	Lunch Break		

	Parallel Sessions		
	ZOOM 1 **Re-Considerations of Ontological Queries** (Chair: Branko Klun)		
	Nerijus Stasiulis: *The Ontology of Sociality*	Marco di Feo: *Ontology of Collective Intentionality from a Phenomenological Point of View*	Michael Staudigl: *A Phenomenology of Negative Sociality*
	ZOOM 2 **Literary Worlds** (Chair: Fabio Tommy Pellizzer)		
15.00–17.00	Evgeniya A. Shestova: *Phenomenology of Reading. Communication in the Text Space*	Małgorzata Hołda: *Being-with, Growing Apart, Dispersing. Virginia Woolf and Collective Consciousness*	Andrej Božič: *"Mitsammen." Paul Celan's Poetry in the "In-Between" of (Cultural) World(s)*
	ZOOM 3 **Political Implications** (Chair: Daniele De Santis)		
	Dragan Prole: *Sociality in the Husserlian Cave*	Michal Zvarík: *Socrates and Polis in the Thought of Hannah Arendt and Jan Patočka*	Zachary S. Daus: *On Mutual Vulnerability and Autonomy in* The Human Condition
17.00–17.30	Break		
17.30–18.30	**ZOOM 1** **Issues**: Business Meeting of the Central and East European Society for Phenomenology (CEESP)		
18.30–19.30	**Challenges and Perspectives of Phenomenology** Today: "How Does Phenomenology Address Contemporary (Societal, Medical, Economic, Ecologic, Humanitarian, etc.) Crises?"		

Day III
Saturday, December 4, 2021

	Parallel Sessions		
	ZOOM 1	**Collectivity and Community** (Chair: Guelfo Carbone)	
	Delia Popa: *Phenomenology between Community and History*	Igor Cvejić: *Anticipatory Emotions, Engaged Acts, and Collective Agency*	Silvia Pierosara: *Managing the Absent. On the Role of Nostalgia in Individual and Social Relations*
	ZOOM 2	**Life during COVID-19** (Chair: Paul Marinescu)	
9.00–11.00	Uldis Vēgners: *The Displaced Appearance of the Coronavirus. The Future in the Present*	Paolo Furia: *Space, Place, and Uncanniness. Notes on Spatial Experience during the COVID-19 Pandemic*	Ginta Vēja: *Constraints and Connections. Phenomenological Notes on the "Bo(u)nd Body" in the Times of the Pandemic*
	ZOOM 3	**At Second Sight** (Chair: Filip Borek)	
	Daniele De Santis: *"Good Europeans." A Nietzschean Concept in Husserl's Thought?*	Peter Andras Varga: *The Phenomenological Gathering in 1929. A Social Episode from the History of Phenomenology and Its Lessons for Contemporary Phenomenologists*	Iaan Reynolds: *Distance and Detachment in Phenomenology and the Sociology of Intellectuals*
11.00–11.30	Break		

	*Parallel Sessions*		
	ZOOM 1	**Expressivity between Singularity and Universality** (Chair: Ion Copoeru)		
	Anna Yampolskaya: *"Now is the Night." Deixis in Hegel and Maldiney*	Alexandru Bejinariu: *The Intentionality of Gestures and Their Role in Monologic Thinking*	Fabio Tommy Pellizzer: *The Things that Make Us. Thinking Sociality through a Phenomenology of Artefacts*
	ZOOM 2	**Pandemic Reverberations** (Chair: Witold Płotka)		
11.30–13.30	Velga Vevere: *Social Geometry and Social Distancing*	Natalia Artemenko: *Self-Alienation vs. Alienation from the Others. A Phenomenological Sketch of the Alienation Theory in the Light of the COVID-19 Outbreak*	Māra Grīnfelde: *The Role of Embodiment in Being with the Doctor Online. A Phenomenological Perspective on Patient Experience of Teleconsultation*
	ZOOM 3	**Society and Modes of Transcendence** (Chair: Sigurd Nøstberg Hovd)		
	Karol Tarnowski: *Individuality and Community. Phenomenological Considerations*	Krzysztof Mech: *Community and Otherness. Józef Tischner's Ethics of Solidarity*	Tomasz Niezgoda: *Society and Experiences of Transcendence. Eric Voegelin on the Diagnosis of Disorder*
13.30–15.00	*Lunch Break*		

	Parallel Sessions
	ZOOM 1 **Embodied Experience** (Chair: Christian Ferencz-Flatz)
15.00–17.00	Joaquim Braga: *The "Background Relations" in Don Ihde's Phenomenology of Technology* Irina Poleshchuk: *The Social Dimension of Chronic Pain. Despair, Guilt, and Suffering* Janko Nešić: *Predictive Processing and Phenomenology of Autism*
	ZOOM 2 **The Human in Question** (Chair: Marco Russo)
	Mintautas Gutauskas: *Being with the Nonhuman. Two Phenomenological Approaches to Animal Life* Max Schaefer: *Inhuman Ethics. Dancing in the Strange Beauty of Life with Clarice Lispector and Michel Henry* Žarko Paić: *The Body and the Technosphere. Beyond Phenomenology and Its Conceptual Matrix*
	ZOOM 3 **At the Borders of Phenomenology** (Chair: Cristian Ciocan)
	Mark Losoncz: *Marx's Phenomenology of Capitalism and Blindness* René Dentz: *Forgiveness, Memory, and Hermeneutics. A Theological Perspective from Ricoeur* Gintautas Mažeikis: *Faustian Hope for Alterity. Bataille, Adorno, and Levinas*
17.00–17.30	*Break*
17.30–18.30	**ZOOM 1** **Challenges and Perspectives of Phenomenology** Between Today and Tomorrow: "How Does the Situation of Contemporary Society Co-Constitute the Stance and the Outlooks of the Phenomenological Approach?"
18.30–19.00	**The Conclusion of the Conference**

Lucia Angelino

The Role of the Third in the Genesis of a We-Perspective

The philosophical problem I address in this talk is centered on the question how can the conditions of the emergence of a "we-perspective" in a group made up of *many* be best conceived of. Should one prioritize the concrete face-to-face encounter between *self* and *other*, and highlight the importance of the *I-You* relation—as a *key* to the proper understanding of the foundations of a "we-perspective"—, or should one rather focus on the much more complex social configurations involving the figure and the function of the Third (*le tiers*)?

My thesis is that in order to account for the genesis of a "we-perspective" in large-scale and polyadic configurations of the "we," one needs to shift the theoretical focus from the *You* to the *Third*; from dyadic face-to-face (*immediate*) relations of reciprocity between *I* and *You*, *self* and *other* to ternary relations of "*mediated* reciprocity" involving the figure and the function of a third party, who is at the same time an *Other* for the *I* and a representative of the *symbolic order*.

The decisive point to be retained in this context is that the Third (*le tiers*) is to be understood as a person (e.g., an external *observer*, a witness, or a third *in*-group agent) rather than as a realm of being (e.g., a shared object or a common project). In this sense, as Fischer has clearly pointed out, "The third […] means 'another' whose functions are different from the 'first other' (the simple *alter ego*)." In other words, the third is to be seen as a third *in*-group agent who might give rise to complex social configurations, which cannot be fully explained with

reference to the dyadic model of *ego* and *alter ego*. This line of reasoning (which I call the "Turn to the Third" in social theory, initiated by Simmel and Freud) is familiar in the social sciences. In contemporary German social philosophy and sociological theory (Berger and Luckmann), one finds critical reflections on the Third as a key to understanding the emergence of complex social configurations—such as political and media institutions—, which cannot be fully explained with reference to the dyadic model of *ego* and *alter ego*. Rarely, however, one finds principled reflections on the function of the third within philosophical debates on the "we." So far, these two debates have developed in isolation from each other, with the unfortunate consequence that several opportunities for the deepening of our understanding of the "we" in its multiple facets have been lost. That the intervention of a third redefines dyadic relationships (between *ego* and *alter ego*), and at the same time also plays an important role in the transition from small groups (group of *two* or *dyadic* group) to larger social units (group made up of *many* or *plural* group), as well as from interactions to institutions, is an unquestioned point in the social theory debate. I argue that it also has an

important role to play in the process of group identification and, therefore, in the transition from the first-person *singular* ("I-perspective") to the first-person *plural* perspective (a "we-perspective").

In the first section of the talk, I consider the dyadic model, focused on the importance of the *I-You* relation, which is typically applied to account for the emergence of a "we-perspective," and I highlight the limitations of such a model. In the second section, I outline an alternative framework centered on the Third by drawing inspiration from Sartre's account of the genesis of groups in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, and by focusing on the ideas of Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* that enrich and clarify the Sartrean alternative model. In a final move, I explore the epistemological and heuristic potentials of this alternative framework centered on the Third (*le tiers*) in contemporary research on the "we," particularly as applied to account for the emergence of a "we-perspective" in groups made up of *many*. In so doing, I intend to show that the Third has an important role to play in the constitution of large-scale, polyadic, and mediated configurations of the "we," which go beyond the here and now and involve the plural positions of *you* and *they*.

Dr. **Lucia Angelino** is a researcher at the Archives Husserl (UMR 8547 – Pays Germaniques; Centre national de la recherche scientifique and École normale supérieure de Paris). She is a specialist in phenomenology working at the intersection of social philosophy and social psychology. Her most recent publications focus on collective intentionality, the relationship between the I and the We, and more specifically on the role of the Third in the Genesis of a We-perspective. As a scholar of contemporary philosophy, she is also interested in German and French philosophical anthropology and the way they contribute to a rethinking of the social phenomena, such as community building and community disruptions in a global age.

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Natalia Artemenko

Self-Alienation vs. Alienation from the Others

A Phenomenological Sketch of the Alienation Theory in the Light of the COVID-19 Outbreak

Despite the fact that we are living in the age of incredible technological progress, social opportunities, and material well-being, people are not getting happier. On the contrary, the suicide rate remains steadily high, the number of depression sufferers is ever-growing, people are tormented by a feeling of spiritual emptiness, and are striving to find at least that little something, which would make their lives meaningful. In no small measure, human relationships are also causing concern, as they are becoming indifferent, utilitarian, mechanical. A man of today is alienated, and the situation of lockdowns and pandemic has revealed this social (and not only social) phenomenon even more distinctly.

Since the 19th century, philosophers and psychologists have constantly been raising the topic of alienation in their works, and it has also become the subject of research for academic specialists; however, every one of them generally manages to cover just one of the aspects of alienation. Actually, the integration of approaches to alienation in the current studies still often reveals just one of the alienation models. The approach to alienation inherent to phenomenology can be considered the least elaborated in modern research literature, and this circumstance guides our search for the opportunity of an additional thematization of this phenomenon in the direction of phenomenology.

It would seem that it is important to make the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" alienation. Subjective alienation is directly linked to the way a person perceives themselves, whether they feel alienated, strange,

whether they consider their life as not belonging to them or as meaningless, whether they are aware of their existential situation. Objective alienation is associated with the "external" elements, which in reality interfere with the personal self-fulfillment, hinder the development and implementation of "the essential human qualities;" moreover, in this situation, a person might not even be aware of their alienation. It must be noted that "subjective alienation," acutely perceived or manifesting itself as a kind of vague, barely differentiable feeling, often turns into a reference point for psychologists, psychotherapists, and psychiatrists in their studies of alienation. Complaints of patients (clients) about anxiety, about feelings of helplessness or estrangement from oneself, as well as about sense of meaninglessness of life induce specialists to look for reasons and answers in their real correlations with the world and the others, in the objective conditions of their life activities, and, thus, lead to the idea of what might be called "objective alienation," as well as to the need for resorting to philosophical concepts in order to advance their understanding.

In this respect, we are facing a kind of a circle: "alienation" goes from a philosophical concept to a pressing question, posed by psychological counseling and psychotherapeutic practice, ethics, and, at least in part, politics, and the attempts to resolve this question bring it back to the philosophical plane.

We will try to dwell upon alienation as a modern spiritual and social problem ("disease")—it is, however, not limited solely to modernity—, upon the aspects and manifestations of alienation, which we face in everyday life, especially during the period of a pandemic. For the sake of convenience, we will divide the examination of the issue into two parts: in the first instance, we will discuss what might be called "alienation from oneself," and then proceed to "alienation from others." In actual fact, the correlation between "alienation from self" and "alienation from others" is, of course, a more complex and not one-sided causation. Regarding feasible directions for the future work in this field, we see the opportunity for interdisciplinary research concerning the question of alienation, which will not only combine Hegelian, Marxist, existential, and phenomenological approaches, but will be able to take into consideration the data in connection with the problems of alienation, loss of meaning and empathy provided by sociology, psychology, and neuroscience, and put it to its proper use.

Prof. Dr. **Natalia Artemenko**—Ph.D. in philosophy—teaches at the Institute of Philosophy of the St. Petersburg State University. She is the Editor-in-Chief of the journal *Horizon. Studies in Phenomenology*. She is also head of the Master's Program "Phenomenological Philosophy and Contemporary Human Sciences" at the Russian State Pedagogical University. Her publications include several works on Husserl and Heidegger.

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Alexandru Bejinariu

The Intentionality of Gestures and Their Role in Monologic Thinking

We usually think of gestures as pertaining to our day-to-day social situations of communication, playing a vital role for the clarity and precision of our speech. However, gestures are also abundantly present in our uncommunicative, solitary behavior, for instance, when, although alone, we try to dismiss a worrying thought with a wave of the hand, or when we smile seeing a photo of someone dear to us. Moreover, imagined gestures or facial expressions of others are also present in our thought processes of moral reasoning or decision-making. Given the pervasiveness of different types of gestures and their complex roles in our solitary life, as well as the recent advances in gesture studies concerning their uncommunicative aspects (Kendon), the phenomenological approach can both shed light upon their monologic uses, as well as benefit by gaining new insights valuable for its theory of meaning and its main challenges.

In view of this, my general goal is to lay out the foundations for an analysis of what can be called the monologic or solitary use of gestures. For this, I resort to Husserl's account of expressions in the *First Logical Investigation* and to his observations in some of the later texts for the reworking of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. Of special interest here is Husserl's theory of the double function of expressions, namely their *communicative* or *intimating* function (*Kundgebung*)—as indications of inner experiences or mental acts of the speaker—and their *expressive* function—conveying their respective meaning or sense. Gestures can also be considered in light

of this distinction, as I try to show by interpreting Husserl's discussion of *mimetic signs* (*mimische Zeichen*) in his text from 1914. There, Husserl analyses especially a class of depictive gestures, namely the ones that mimic or imitate (*nachahmen*) inner experiences, as well as outer processes. Their intentional structure is also double, as they function both as depictions, e.g., of a certain mental act, like anger, as well as signs, referring to the real presence in the inner life of the other of that mental act of anger. Thus, like expressions, gestures can also be seen as being communicative and expressive. However, it is well known that, for Husserl, expressions, in the case of which expressive and communicative functions do not overlap (as they do in the case of orders, wishes, etc.), can function in our solitary inner life in a purely *monological* way, i.e., lacking their communicative function—since there is no reason for them to indicate our own inner experiences as if they belonged to someone else—while fully preserving their expressive character.

Does this exclusion of the communicative side also hold true in the case of our solitary use of gestures? Can we conceive of the gestures that accompany our soliloquies as lacking *all* communicative feats or rather as functioning in a modified way (as expressions function in imagined speech)? In this context, I explore the hypothesis that by determining and considering the role gestures play in our monologic thinking, we can gain a better understanding of the way, in which communicative functions are still at work, deeply engrained in our individual processes of reasoning. The elaboration of this questions offers a new perspective for the Husserlian theory of meaning by identifying a way to open the solitary inner mental life to the social, bodily constitution of meaning through the gestural medium.

Dr. **Alexandru Bejinariu** earned his Ph.D. at the University of Bucharest in 2016. His main interests concern the phenomenological methodology in its Heideggerian and Husserlian design, the connection of phenomenological conceptuality in its development with ancient Greek and Christian traditions, Brentanian empirical and descriptive psychology, the phenomenology of animality, and the role of embodied experience in the phenomenological investigation. He is currently working as a

research assistant in the project "Structures of Bodily Interactions. Phenomenological Contributions to Gesture Studies" at the Romanian Society for Phenomenology. Other focus areas of his work include ancient philosophy, philosophy of religion, psychology, and critical thinking.

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Filip Borek

Schwingung at the Heart of Phenomenon
Anonymity, Pre-personality, and Intersubjectivity

Relying on the requirement of radicalized transcendental phenomenology, namely to think phenomenon as "nothing-but-phenomenon" (Richir), the presented paper argues against three different ways of understanding intersubjectivity, providing at the same time a positive contribution to the phenomenological problem of the *alter ego*. Firstly, it criticizes an attempt to reduce the *alter ego* to a mere *Spiegelung* of my own *ego*, pointing out that it ultimately deprives the Other of its transcendence. Secondly, it shows, on the other hand, that ascribing to the *alter ego* the character of "absolute transcendence" must necessarily make any *inter*subjective relation impossible. Thirdly, it argues against Fink's—and also partially Scheler's—proposal of solving the problem of intersubjectivity (which he ascribes to late Husserl) by postulating the absolute anonymous *Urleben*, in which there is no prior difference between *ego* and *alter ego*. In comparison with the mentioned attempts, the presented paper argues that (1) the phenomenon-as-nothing-but-phenomenon implies the irreducible "original plurality," (2) which is not yet a plurality of *determined* subjects (insofar as the transcendental phenomenological field remains "impersonal"; Sartre). To think the essence of intersubjectivity properly, one must adhere to two conditions: preserving the *transcendence* of the *alter ego*, as well as ascribing to it a form of *presence for ego*, without which no form of intersubjective relation would ultimately be impossible. I argue that the "deduction" of intersubjectivity from phenomenon-as-nothing-but-phenomenon follows these requirements.

The starting point of my elucidations is Husserl's thesis, according to which the *transcendent* object as an identical pole must necessarily be fixed as a correlate of intersubjective experience. Only through the intersubjective communication the objectivity can be established and retained in its stability. If a phenomenon can lift itself up to the level of objectivity as harmoniously given *center* of regards, then the possibility of such a "centralization" (which has both discursive and prediscursive sense) requires the counterpoint in the shape of "decentralization" or *ekstasis* of phenomenon, which *is* nothing *but* this decentralization. I characterize the double movement of centralization and decentralization with a German word *Schwingung*, "oscilation" or "vibration." The presented paper argues that this "vibration" has "anonymous" or "pre-personal" (Merleau Ponty) character. It designates not the sphere devoid of any difference between *ego* and *alter ego*, but rather a *dynamic* aspect of subjectivity that, on one hand, emerges through *limitation* and *differentiation*, and yet, on the other hand, preserves in itself that *what is limited*. I argue that the pre-personality in question is a *trace* (in the Derridean sense) of the primordial indeterminacy of phenomenon at the level of intentional experience, being nothing but the *divergence* or *écart* of phenomenon itself. It will be shown that phenomenon—as long as it decentralizes "itself" into manifold of perspectives—is that what constitutes the unbreakable *asymmetry* between perspectives, and—as long as it "concentrates" the multitude of perspectives— enables at the same time relationality between subjects.

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Filip Borek is a department member of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw and a Ph.D. student at the Charles University in Prague.

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Andrej Božič

"Mitsammen"
Paul Celan's Poetry in the "In-Between" of (Cultural) World(s)

The enigmatic poetic work of Paul Celan (1920–1970), which attracted—
and continues to attract—(also) the attention of numerous philosophers—
it has, for instance, provoked responses from such diverse, even divergent
thinkers as Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jacques Derrida—, is fundamentally
denoted by dialogicality: whilst the (German) language—without erasing
borders and boundaries—"incorporates" in(to) Celan's "own" poems words,
phrases, or idioms from different—oftentimes completely "foreign" and utterly
"estranged"—cultural realms, dis-owning thus poetry for the acceptance of
the other, the alien, it nonetheless opens (up) the "in-between" of mutual
understanding and cohabitation. The inter-weaving of (cultural) world(s)
in the language(s) of Celan's creativity, wherein the experience of existential
uprootal—the heritage of fateful cataclysmic conflicts of the 20th century—
gives rise to the dis-heartened search for sense in the embodied permeation
of the fragments of (Eastern-, Central-, and Western-)European (German,
Jewish, French, Russian, etc.) cultural—not only linguistic and literary, but
also historical as well as political and social—dimensions. The confounding
complexity of Celan's lyric oeuvre—the intricate texture of original, originary
creation as well as of in-direct quotations, allusions to various traditions—,
therefore, re-presents a specific, unique hermeneutic challenge: a challenging
of hermeneutics—of its very im-possibility—as such in the encounter with
the alterity of poetry. The intended paper wishes to address certain questions
related with the notion of inter-culturality, which—as (also) the writings

of Bernhard Waldenfels dedicated to responsive phenomenology strive to demonstrate—necessarily exhorts to a re-defining of hermeneutic endeavors in the confrontation with radical, irreducible forms of alienness, through the attempt at an interpretation of Celan's poem "Anabasis" from the collection *Die Niemandsrose* (1963).

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Joaquim Braga

The "Background Relations" in Don Ihde's Phenomenology of Technology

In the multiple spectrums of human-technology relationships, Don Ihde introduces a unique form of mediation, through which the technological devices themselves create the empirical context of human experiences. Namely, in *Technics and Praxis: A Philosophy of Technology* (1978) and *Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth* (1990), Ihde designates this phenomenon as *background relations*, since, unlike other mediated relations, they do not imply a specific and direct involvement with the devices that support them. It is, rather, the very materiality of devices—such as, for instance, that of lighting, heating, and cooling systems—that involves beings, and regardless of the use given to them.

Ihde describes this kind of invisibility of devices in the same way phenomenological analyses characterize the ambiguous ontological status of pictures—technology is, here, a "present absence," in the sense that it couples with the environment and is no more able to be fully individuated by human attention. Because they have such a bipolar nature (presence and absence), background relations transform, with greater subtlety, the ways we perceive and act in the world. In our era, the growing automation of technological devices means that human intervention in their use is not continuous, and, therefore, there is also no fully conscious attention to the effects they may produce. Sometimes, it is only due to situations, in which technologies or their energy sources collapse, that we have a real perception of their inscription in our environment.

Furthermore, in *Existential Technics* (1983), Ihde asserts that "for a technology to function well, it must itself become a kind of barely noticed background effect. It must itself be 'withdrawn' so that human action which is embodied through technology can stand out." The elimination of noise caused by the presence of the artifact increases, according to Ihde, the "transparency" effect of technology, since, as with communication technologies, "the better it functions, the more likely it becomes that we may simply grow used to its functions and 'forget' that it is there and that it is a significant element in our mediated communication situation."

Now, although current technologies try to be more transparent—that is, materially less visible—, background relations continue to be part of our empirical social contexts and influence the spheres of sociality. It is important, therefore, to think about how these technological dynamics are carried out and how they are inscribed in our social relations. Since what is implicit in the background relations is the possibility of decentralizing technology from the individual sphere and extending it to the social sphere. They are, therefore, technological relationships that go beyond the private use we make of artifacts, and that condition the environment and the atmosphere of the environment, as well as determine the constitution of public spaces for social interaction.

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sobre o Pensamento de Ernst Cassirer (Porto Alegre, 2017), *Conceiving Virtuality: From Art to Technology* (Cham, 2019), *Teoria das Formas Imagéticas. Ensaios sobre Arte, Estética, Tecnologia* (Coimbra, 2020).

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Remus Breazu

The Neutralization of Violence in Images through Aestheticization

The aim of my talk is to give a phenomenological account of the way, in which the experience of violence is modified through the aesthetic image. More precisely, I focus on the subject's affectivity and its modifications. Thus, the theme of my paper is at the intersection of four different topics: violence, affectivity, image-consciousness, and aesthetics. The phenomenological framework, in which I place my analysis, is primarily given by Husserl's understanding of phenomenology, paying special attention to his so-called static method. Thus, I draw on his rich analyses of aesthetic attitude, affectivity, and especially his account of image-consciousness. Furthermore, I make use of the contemporary developments in the phenomenology of violence. First, by building on Husserl's mature conception, after a brief presentation of the structure of image-consciousness, I will show how the aesthetic attitude modifies the normal image-consciousness, emphasising the difference between apparently three different kinds of neutrality modification: the neutrality proper to image-consciousness, the one proper to the aesthetic attitude, and the one proper to the aesthetic image-consciousness. At stake here is to show that, when it comes to the neutrality modification specific to the aesthetic attitude, there is no difference between the aesthetic attitude in the perceptual consciousness and in the image-consciousness. Second, I will briefly address the problem of imagistic violence, that is, the structural changes that the experience of violence yields in the case of image-consciousness. In image-consciousness, violence is especially experienced from the point of view

of the third (the viewer), who affectively experiences violence in its own way—the viewer feels revolted, indignation, etc. Last, I will connect the analyses of aesthetic image-consciousness with the violence depicted in images, thus showing how violence is neutralized in aesthetic images. Using the rich literature on aestheticization of violence from image studies, I will show how the aesthetic image-consciousness neutralizes the normal imagistic violence, i.e., on the one hand, from the point of view of the act, the emotions of a viewer are modified in aesthetic pleasure, and, on the other hand, from the point of view of the object, violence is modified in beauty. More precisely, violence and its noetic affective character are "incapacitated" by the neutralizing power of beauty and its noetic affective character. What is crucial here is the fact that violence does not disappear as such, but is preserved in a neutralized form, the relation to violence being thus kept, but in a modified way. The undertaken analyses will be constantly exemplified through different imagistic media.

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Guelfo Carbone

A Way out of Nazism?
Heidegger and the "Shepherd of Being"

Heidegger's involvement with the Nazi movement in the early thirties of the 20th century is a renowned as well as an extensively debated topic, which has been recently addressed anew in the light of the publications of the *Black Notebooks* raising new questions for a long-established issue. Besides the discussions centered upon Heidegger's active participation in the politics of the National Socialist Workers' Party during his 1933–1934 rectorship at the University of Freiburg and the ones regarding the controversial charge of anti-Semitism, the philosophical theme that comes to the foreground in reading the *Überlegungen* (*Ponderings*) and the *Anmerkungen* (*Notes*) from the *Schwarze Hefte* is that Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* with Nazism, namely, his critical confrontation with National Socialism as a prominent epiphenomenon of late "machinational" outburst of Modernity, lasts way beyond his "short-lived, though concerted, partisanship for Hitler's regime" (Löwith). Moreover, what strikes a philosophical, non-ideologically oriented interpretation of the whole "Heidegger Affair," is that the experiences of both the "error" of the rectorship and of the consequences of the denazification process, which he had to face immediately after the war, merge into a single meditation marked by "despair," which, as we read in the 1947–1948 *Anmerkungen IV*, affects Heidegger's "thinking of being" all along the second half of the forties. In this context, the paper addresses the topic of the "shepherd of being" putting to test the hypothesis that the latter represents a key figure of a philosophical way out of Nazism, concerning not only Heidegger's own involvement, but also those peculiar transformations of political power brought

about by totalitarianisms, which are still recognizable in our present time, as both Foucault and Agamben have pointed out. Methodologically, the paper relies on a combined reading of Heidegger's 1946 *Letter on "Humanism,"* where the figure of the shepherd of being famously appears, and the *Black Notebooks* from roughly the same period. Indeed, before the *Schwarze Hefte* were released, we knew the figure of the shepherd of being only *via* some important, but rather sporadic and scattered mentions in Heidegger's published, whereas it gains a central role in the 1947–1948 *Anmerkungen III*, *IV*, and *V*. In the first part, the paper will outline the essential features of the figure of the shepherd, claiming that, rather than a metaphor, this key *Denkfigur* depicts the role of the human being as a mortal in the overcoming of metaphysics, as Heidegger intended and attempted in the late forties and in the fifties. In the second part, against the interpretations that take the shepherd as a *dux gregis*, that is, a model for guiding and leadership, and those that tend to include it in Heidegger's alleged inclination for idealized agrarian past, the paper points out how the shepherd has nothing to do neither with "bucolic idylls" nor with "nature mysticism," and that the shepherd is not related to any flock whatsoever; rather, it is "essential poverty" as well as mortality that define the "shepherd of being." Accordingly, the paper argues that this crucial figure of post-metaphysical thinking cannot be understood as a model of leadership or *Führerschaft*, which might cast new perspectives on Heidegger's own frail and tentative way out of Nazism, as well as on the enduring resistance against authoritarianisms of all times.

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Cristian Ciocan

The Imagistic Experience of Violence and the Phenomenology of Body

In this talk, my aim is to analyze the multifarious modifications of the *embodied* experience in relation to *imagistic* violence. The way, in which the embodied subject lives the imagistic experience of violence, is to be contrasted with the real experience of violence, engaging not only one's own body, but also the givenness of the body of the other. I will argue that, in order to understand this topic, one should consider two distinct "shifts" in the experience of embodiment. On the one hand, there is already a primary shift from the "normal" bodily lived experience (in one's own "I can") to the peculiar experience of one's own bodily involvement in a violent situation. The modification from a non-violent to a violent situation is, therefore, to be questioned specifically in respect to the embodied dimensions of the experience, considering the plurality of subjective instances belonging to the phenomenon of violence: either as the agent of violence (bodily self-empowerment, weaponizing one's own body, aimed as invulnerable and impenetrable) or, contrariwise, as the subject enduring violence, for which one's own body is lived as exposure, vulnerability, and fragility. In each of these cases, the otherness of the other, understood as adversity, receives specific particularities: the body of the other is given either in its weakness, with the aim of dominating the other's own "I can," or as a malignant otherness, overwhelming the subject with its insuperable materiality. On the other hand, with the secondary "shift" from the actual experience of violence to its imagistic experience, these bodily markers undergo additional major modifications. My intention is to explore in detail

how each of these ways of living one's own body (in relation to the body of the other) involves peculiar variations when the experience of violence is switched from the actual and real event "given in the flesh" to the imagistic givenness.

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Noam Cohen

The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl's Theory of Intersubjectivity

It is well-known that in the fifth of his *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl puts forth a theory of intersubjectivity. Most commentators of Husserl have read his *Cartesian Meditations* as presenting a theory of intersubjectivity whose basis is empathy, in the form of a process of constituting the sense of "other" in one's own experience, as the primary origin of the intersubjective layer of experience. In this paper, I claim that the structure of intersubjectivity as Husserl presents it in the *Cartesian Meditations* is articulated as being governed by a logic of parts and wholes rather than that of a phenomenology of empathy, and that the articulation of this logic demonstrates that the transcendental ego is intrinsically intersubjective. My main philosophical claim in this regard is that the way Husserl's account of transcendental empathy unfolds in the *Cartesian Meditations* implies a prior fundamental mereological structure, of which the individual transcendental ego is only a part. That is, the transcendental ego has an eidetic a-priori intersubjective structure, in the sense of being a moment of an intersubjectively structured transcendental whole. In this sense, rather than being a *singulare tantum*, it is more fitting to say that transcendental subjectivity is actually a *plurale tantum*.

My paper proceeds as follows. After a brief review of Husserl's main claims regarding parts and wholes in the third of the *Logical Investigations*, I proceed to demonstrate how this conception of mereology applies to the realm of intersubjectivity presented in the *Cartesian Meditations*. In this framework, I first present an analysis of the essential relations between parts and wholes,

which condition the process of recognizing other egos, that is, the mereological necessity, which makes possible and is manifested by I-thou relations. In Husserl's terms, here the analysis focuses on the process, by which the other is originarily given in the ego's "sphere of ownness," through an "analogizing apprehension" on the basis of "pairing." In this regard, I demonstrate that, given what we know about the a-priori laws of mereology, the passive synthesis of pairing itself already presupposes a unity of similarity in a plurality. Building on this conclusion, I then demonstrate that not only the consciousness of alter egos, but also the structure of transcendental intersubjectivity as such, Husserl's "community of monads," manifests a primordial mereological structure that is an essential and necessary condition for individual transcendental subjectivity as such. I conclude the paper by discussing the implications of such a view for our understanding of the sense, in which the transcendental ego is absolute and singular.

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Ion Copoeru

Meaning Production and Interactive Situation
From Intersubjectivity to the "Organization of Action"

Edmund Husserl's phenomenology influenced two major schools of sociology, namely those of Alfred Schütz and Harold Garfinkel. They both extended and deepened Husserl's conception of social action by integrating empirical methodologies in their view of social action.

In my paper, I will show not only how these studies fit the phenomenological conception of action and sociality, but also how recent developments of these methodologies succeed in capturing essential aspects of embodied action. In the 1940s, for instance, Garfinkel underlined the importance of the organization of practical actions, through which intersubjectivity is achieved. Later on, this organization was described by Scheglof as "sequentiality," which provides the basis for understanding meaning as arising moment by moment.

In the second part of my paper, I will present some ongoing investigations inspired by the conversational analysis, in which the meaning production is strongly associated with the "organization of action." Relying on Goodwin's ethnographic study of conversation, Gallagher proposes a fuller description of the interactive situation as "a shared agentive situation," "a shared context within which <agents> encounter each other." Goodwin's interactionist model manages to capture not only the entirety of the situation, but also its dynamics.

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Igor Cvejić

Anticipatory Emotions, Engaged Acts, and Collective Agency

The efforts to integrate emotions in theories of collective intentionality as well as to explain their significance for the constitution and preservation of a group have been recently widely pursued (Helm, Salmela, Schmid, Szanto, Zahavi, etc). Most of them are focused on variations of a present sense of belonging. However, not many accounts emphasize the role of future-oriented emotions.

I choose the term "anticipatory," among similar notions of "forward-looking" (Kenny, Gordon) or "prospective" (McCosh), to mark the phenomenological feature of emotions. Anticipatory emotions are, of course, related to a situation, in the sense that they disclose what the situation affords in terms of potential happenings, doings, or interactions (Slaby). Nevertheless, their most notable phenomenological feature is that they are (at least partially) unfulfilled, or more technically that they are, more or less, empty intentions, that an object, to which they are directed, is not apparent to me.

The significance of the so-called forward-looking emotions in existing social relations have been partially addressed in literature, particularly trust (Helm). However, it seems that the most paradigmatic case of the importance of anticipatory emotions for human sociality is in situations where collectivity or relations are not already present but anticipated. Such are situations when someone is entering in interactions with the other (e.g., flirting, introductions, etc.) or when (even potential) others are invited or called for interactions or group action (for example: conference/workshop calls, political appeals etc.).

In these cases, emotions could be characterized by disclosing only potential collective relations, but also in some cases relevant import could be ascribed to a group (most simple case is that I could become frustrated in the name of an anticipated political group, even if the group had never existed and will never exist). Moreover, those emotional experiences seem to lie at the heart of engaged acts, here narrowly understood as acts undertaken in interacting with the other or others, through which first-person singular shifts to first-person plural (Zahavi, Loidolt). Engaged acts, thus described, neither relate to a kind of existing collective commitment, nor are they roughly individual, but rather relate to an anticipated communality, whereby communal experience is not apparent to me (commonly followed by a (pre)reflective awareness that this communality is not fulfilled—that "me" and "you" are not together, and such an awareness could be a reason for undertaking engaged acts). In the final part of the presentation, the theoretical insight is applied to negative empirical cases, particularly to the experience of social anxiety, which is by itself an anticipatory emotional experience, in which engaged interactions with others are colored by a negative valence, as well as to other emotional malfunctioning, in which engaged social interaction can be suspended, like clinical depression (Slaby, Stephan, Paskaleva) or schizophrenia (Froese, Krueger).

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Zachary S. Daus

On Mutual Vulnerability and Autonomy in *The Human Condition*

In *Action and Interaction*, Shaun Gallagher phenomenologically locates the experience of human autonomy in human interaction. Crucial to the development of Gallagher's argument is his analysis of Hannah Arendt's conception of the relationship between autonomy and forgiveness, which Gallagher situates in contradistinction to a Hegelian conception of autonomy. Although Hegel, like Arendt, likewise locates human autonomy in human interaction, for Hegel the achievement of autonomy is the result of a prolonged struggle for recognition. That is, one achieves autonomy only when one succeeds in the struggle of moving out of a period of "undifferentiated" interaction with another and into a period of interaction, in which the other recognizes oneself as autonomous. Arendt, according to Gallagher, locates our experience of autonomy not in a struggle for recognition between interacting parties, however, but in our experience of being given the "gift" of forgiveness, which frees us from being "infinitely" bound to the consequences of our (mis-) actions.

Although Gallagher is correct in recognizing the relationship between autonomy and forgiveness in Arendt's thought, I will nonetheless argue that we can come to a fuller understanding of Arendt's conception of autonomy through an analysis of her conception of promise. According to Arendt, the failure to fulfill a promise can only be forgiven when both parties of the promise are mutually vulnerable to the risk of the promise's failure. While the *promisee* is vulnerable to the risk of the promise's failure vis-a-vis the benefits

of the promise should it be fulfilled, the *promiser* is vulnerable to the risk of the promise's failure vis-a-vis her or his identity. As Arendt writes in *The Human Condition*: "Without being bound to the fulfillment of promises, we would never be able to keep our identities; we would be condemned to wander helplessly and without direction in the darkness of each man's lonely heart, caught in its contradictions and equivocalities." In other words, the promisee and promiser are equally vulnerable to the risk of the promise's failure, but for different reasons: the *promisee* for the sake of the promise's benefits; the *promiser* for the sake of her or his self-identity.

Once the phenomenon of mutual vulnerability is understood as foundational to Arendt's conception of promise, a fuller account of Arendt's conception of autonomy can be developed. When two individuals are mutually vulnerable to the same risk, their experience of autonomy is not merely a consequence of being forgiven. Rather, when two individuals are mutually vulnerable, they grant each other greater freedom to act unconventionally or unpredictably. This is for the reason that mutually vulnerable individuals will be confident that one individual (in spite of their potentially unconventional or unpredictable behavior) will not willingly put the other individuals at risk, precisely because to put the others at risk would be to put oneself at risk. In conclusion, I will argue that it is not the phenomenon of forgiveness that is central to Arendt's account of autonomy, but the phenomenon of mutual vulnerability.

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Daniele De Santis

"Good Europeans"
A Nietzschean Concept in Husserl's Thought?

The paper will discuss the manner, in which Husserl employs the Nietzschean expression of "Good European(s)" in some of his late writings on Europe to criticize the rampant "nationalism," of which he himself was a victim. Besides asking the preliminary question to what extent Husserl was aware of the "Nietzschean" origin and implications of that concept (the question is far from being merely rhetorical, as Husserl owned a copy of F. Nietzsche's *Gesamtausgabe*), the present paper will tackle two questions—one of historical and another of systematic nature.

In the first place, we will claim that the introduction of the notion of "Good Europeans" serves to express, within the wider framework of Husserl's reflection on the nature of Europe, a conception of (political) community epitomized by what Husserl had already labeled "community of love" (in German: *Liebesgemeinschaft*). The latter, we will further argue, was first framed and developed by Husserl after he had read Arnold Metzger's manuscript *Phänomenologie der Revolution*. In other words, Husserl borrows from Metzger the idea of a "community of love" (Metzger himself speaks of *liebende Gemeinschaft*), upon which he will later expand in his manuscripts on the many possible forms and types of community. Hence, the Nietzschean sounding expression "Good European(s)" is eventually introduced in his latest reflections to designate, at the level of the contemporary history of Europe, the idea of a community that stands opposite to all nationalisms.

At this point, this being the second question that we would like to address, a discussion of what Husserl means by the turn of the phrase "Good European(s)" will be provided. We will explain that what Husserl has mostly in mind is a "multi-language" sort of community or, better: a community whose boundaries and identity are neither dictated nor determined by the sharing of one language. The presentation will be brought to a conclusion by showing, on the basis of Husserl's letters to T. G. Masaryk, that what Husserl had concretely in mind, when he spoke of "Good European(s)," is the Czechoslovakian First Republic founded by his former university peer.

The paper will be, hence, divided into three parts. After the first, quick introduction of the Nietzschean notion of "Good Europeans," the second part will elaborate upon the Husserl-Metzger relation. Finally, the political implications for the concept of community will be drawn on the basis of what Husserl means to designate by "Good Europeans"-"community of love."

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René Dentz

Forgiveness, Memory, and Hermeneutics
A Theological Perspective from Ricoeur

It is possible to state beforehand that we can elucidate Ricoeurean thought from theological inspirations. Perhaps it is even more accurate to affirm that we will establish a dialogue with theological themes. Ricoeur himself has always refused the label of a Christian philosopher, seeking to keep his confession of faith and philosophical procedure at a mutual distance. In this way, the great foundation of the Ricoeurean reflection is philosophy, although theology, especially through his studies of biblical exegesis, also occupies a respectable place in his research. Some themes "border" on the two knowledges, particularly the topic of evil, hope, and forgiveness. The latter is seen by him as a synthesis between history, memory, and forgetfulness. However, it cannot be thought of without evil and hope either. In other words, although the author did not elaborate a "theological aspect" of his studies on forgiveness (perhaps he has not expounded upon it explicitly, but this aspect is present indirectly in such works as *Amour et Justice* and *Penser la Bible*), as he did in relation to evil and hope, it is not possible to study the theme without taking into consideration his inspiration and theological approach.

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Manca Erzetič

The Hermeneutics of Testimony in the Context of Social Mediation

In order to concretely delineate the scientific significance, validity, and relevance of the conceptualization of the hermeneutics of testimony in the framework of contemporary philosophy and the humanities, we should, first, establish what scientific and social role philosophy and the humanities play today. On the one hand, we are faced with the circumstance that, in the current predominance of information technologies and social networks, they seem completely useless, while, on the other hand, we hear from different directions that philosophy and the humanities should provide the ethical, humane, and social proposals, which would contribute to the overcoming of the crisis of one's own self-perception and interhuman communication, the deep social divides, and planetary pollution. In this regard, the hermeneutics of testimony can contribute to the basic findings that individual philosophical disciplines from ontology to ethics and aesthetics push to the sidelines. Through their mutual conceptual referencing, the hermeneutics of testimony opens the question of understanding humanity and communicating human meaning, the question of individuality and personality in relation to a given historical situation, and the question of the critique of ideological and other violence against humanity. We should also mention the broadness of testimonial sources, which consist not only of written and pictorial documents, and thus trigger the question of the constitution of a testimonial archive. Insofar as we do not want to subordinate it to the historical archive in advance, we initially need to conceptualize the field of testimony. We can say that the hermeneutics of testimony lies between

conceptual reflection and digitalization, and can therefore play the role of a mediator.

The problems of conceptualizing testimony are intertwined, which is why we cannot examine them in isolation within an individual disciplinary field, but have to take into account the inter-relations of philosophy, literary science, and historiography, as well as the fields of law, theology, sociology, and political sciences. In view of methodology, we primarily rely on hermeneutics while taking into account certain elements of phenomenological, structuralist, psychoanalytical, and socio-critical orientations in contemporary philosophy.

Asst. Prof. Dr. **Manca Erzetič** obtained her Ph.D. at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ljubljana in 2018 with the dissertation entitled *Witnessing in Philosophy and Literature within the Historical Situation of the 20th Century*. Beside her research activity at the Institute Nova Revija for the Humanities, she lectures at the Faculty for Slovenian and International Studies of the New University (Ljubljana, Slovenia). She writes scientific, expert, and critical articles, and participates in discussions about Slovenian language and culture. She is also an engaged ecologist.

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Marco di Feo

Ontology of Collective Intentionality from a Phenomenological Point of View

The Husserlian notion of intentionality expresses the fundamental correlation between the subject and the experienced object. Everything exists as a perceptible, knowable, thinkable, intuitable, appreciable (or deplorable), and predictable phenomenon by means of this correlation. In a realistic framework, intentionality lets conscious subjectivity be in the presence of the thing itself through several kinds of acts (perceptive, cognitive, linguistic, intuitive, etc.). In every intentional act we find a fundamental structure, which is composed of three intrinsically connected parts: the *noetic pole* (the subject), the *intentional modality* (the act), and the *noematic pole* (the object). In general, the notion of collective intentionality imposes the following question: what kind of consciousness occupies the place of the subject? Through a preliminary analysis and comparison between different types of intentionality (individual, intersubjective, and collective), I intend to demonstrate that collective intentionality can belong to individual subjects to the extent, to which they are members of a collective. The basic ontological argument shows that the status of a member is rooted in a normative web (obligations and rights) that places subjects in a mutual non-independence condition. The condition of social non-independence configures a real ontological positioning (*status*) that, in turn, motivates and establishes a particular and corresponding intentional positioning. We-intentions are not mere psycho-physical or mental faculties, merely subjective and arbitrary, but modes of correlation with reality that are rooted in the ontological-social positioning of the subject.

The "we" (pronounced, experienced, felt, etc., by two or more subjects) that, for example, intends the content "to go to the cinema together" is not the result of concordant, but disjointed intentional acts. On the contrary, it is the result of co-dependent intentional acts, which are such in accordance with the co-dependent ontological relationships between the members of the collective. In summary: if there is a correlation between the ontological condition of the subject and his/her intentional attitude, and if the social bonds establish a particular ontological-social positioning, then collective intentionality can be conceived of as a particular intentional modality, which only belongs to a subject that is really (ontologically) part of a collective. Therefore, if, on the one hand, it is right to maintain that collectives do not really have the ability to think, feel, and act, it is, on the other hand, ontologically legitimate to affirm that *we-intentions*, *we-feelings*, *we-acts* take a position in the world by means of collective subjects. Therefore, the constitution of collective noetic poles does not depend on noematic poles or particular modal configurations that intentional acts can receive in different situations. Everything we think, desire, feel, etc., in the intentional form of the "we" is properly and originally given to us as such, because there is an ontologically founded "we" that intends it.

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CHRISTIAN FERENCZ-FLATZ

THE AFTERLIFE OF FILM VIOLENCE
A GENETIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

Ever since the 1960s, media and communication studies have abounded in heated debates concerning the psychological effects of film violence. While Berger and Luckman already in the 1960s argued that our perception of reality is influenced not only by our real past experiences, but also by our fictional medial ones, this observation was later on vividly defended specifically with regard to film violence and its effect in cultivating either fear or aggressive tendencies among its viewership (see, for instance, the works of Freedman). Subsequent empirical research has found some evidence to substantiate this, but my presentation here does not aim to settle the question of fact: whether or not medial experiences indeed engender real emotional dispositions. Instead, it brings into play the resources of genetic phenomenology, in order to ask how the formation of such dispositions would be generally possible. To this extent, I will depart from several recent papers, which engage the question of fictional emotions from a phenomenological perspective (Cavallaro, Summa, Vendrell Ferran, Ferencz-Flatz). In contrast to these papers, which try to work out an essential difference between real and fictional emotions by determining whether or not fictional emotion can be voluntarily reproduced or whether or not they need to draw from our prior actual experience, the present paper aims to further the discussion by overtly employing the framework of Husserl's later genetic phenomenology to the field of emotional experience. In doing so, it poses questions with regard to how fictional emotional experiences nonetheless contribute to the formation of apperceptions and to the specificities of emotional sedimentation.

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Paolo Furia

Space, Place, and Uncanniness
Notes on Spatial Experience during the COVID-19 Pandemic

My paper deals with three major characteristics of our experience of space and places during the COVID-19 pandemic from a phenomenological point of view.

First: the contrast between the unprecedented availability and diffusion of digital representations of elsewhere at the global level and the lockdown, connected with social distancing and confinement. Digital technologies plunge the subjects into multiple visual worlds that cannot be reached. While in ordinary situations digital representations anticipate and predetermine bodily experience of places, also producing some degree of standardization of the travelers' gazes and expectations, confinement generates a hiatus between the imaginary and reality. I argue that the condition of confinement fosters what Mumford called "utopias of escape," strengthened by technologically enhanced imaginaries of places.

Second: the unique correspondence between the subjective impossibility to visit places and the objective unavailability of places to be visited. Confinement usually depends on private conditions, such as being ill or prisoner. With globalization, people got used to consider almost every place in the world to be accessible in principle. On condition of universal accessibility, the subject virtually widens its spatial experiences to the entire globe and, in turn, a huge number of places are materially set up to receive larger amounts of visitors of all sorts (tourists, workers, migrants, refugees). The interruption of the universal accessibility of places challenges our usual understandings of mobility and connections.

Third: the restriction of the "homeworld" correspondingly widens the "alienworld" (Waldenfels) and subverts usual perceptions of both. Phenomenology has often considered home to be the first dimension of our being-in-the-world. This claim is based on a positive experience of home that is far from being universal. The estranging character of home is revealed in isolation, confinement, or constraints, which, albeit perfectly normal in ordinary spatial practices and usually depending on the socio-economic conditions of people, have been generalized during the pandemic.

In the conclusion, I argue that "uncanniness" (the existential mode of not-being-at-home, discussed by Heidegger in the 40th paragraph of *Being and Time*) represents the *fil rouge* of the three presented characteristics. After COVID-19, our familiar world cannot be taken for granted anymore. "Uncanniness" shows the true nature of the world itself, inherently exposed to crisis and open to change. Therefore, it represents an opportunity to rise criticism towards some taken-for-granted spatial features of the lifeworld, such as: wild urbanization and overbuilding, high population density, irrational land use, lack in food safety standards at the global level, and territorial inequalities.

Dr. **Paolo Furia** obtained his Ph.D. in 2017 at the University of Turin with a thesis on Ricoeur's ideas on recognition and identity. Since then, he has been dealing with questions connected with spatial issues from a phenomenological and aesthetic perspective. In the framework of the Italian-funded project "Industrial Landscape Biella," he was trained in empirical research. At a post-doctoral level his current research at the University of Turin focuses primarily on the connections between the landscape and media.

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Andrzej Gniazdowski

The Total versus the Corporate State
The Political Phenomenology of Aurel Kolnai

This paper is conceived as a part of the broader research project *The Political Applications of Phenomenology* granted by the Institute for the Human Sciences in Vienna (October 1, 2021– February 28, 2022). The project objectives consist, on the one hand, in the reconstruction of the political philosophies developed by the chosen early phenomenologists, that is Edmund Husserl, Moritz Geiger, Max Scheler, Adolf Reinach, Edith Stein, Arnold Metzger, Adolf Grimme, Kurt Stavenhagen, Gerhart Husserl, Aurel Kolnai, and Gerda Walther. On the other hand, they concern the "critique of political phenomenology," i.e., the attempt to distinguish the phenomenological "substance" of those approaches from their mere world-view "accidentality." The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the relationship between Kolnai's criticism of the total state, the embodiments of which were, according to him, both the national-socialist as well as the communist state, and his philosophical apology of the corporate state and also the social hierarchy presented in the pre-war articles published in *Der Christliche Standesstaat* as well as post-war articles published, e.g., in *The Thomist*. The aim of this critique and reconstruction is to contribute to both history of the phenomenological movement as well as to theory of the state by a systematic reconstruction of Kolnai's phenomenology of the state as an unjustly unacknowledged position within the twentieth-century political theory.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. **Andrzej Gniazdowski** is a philosopher, translator, and historian of ideas. His areas of competence are history of the phenomenological movement, political philosophy in Germany, methodology of the Warsaw School of the history of ideas, and history of the political as well as the philosophical radicalism. As Senior Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, where he is currently working on the project *The Political Applications of Phenomenology*, and as associate professor at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences he focuses his research on the project *The Phenomenology of the State. The Critical-Historical Introduction* (supported by the Polish National Science Centre 2021–2025). He has published papers, e.g., in *Phainomena*, *Horizon*, and *Les Études Philosophiques*.

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Maria Gołębiewska

Paul Amselek's Phenomenology of Law and the Intersubjective Context of Legal Interpretation

Paul Amselek—a lawyer and a philosopher by education—is above all the author of works in the field of theory and philosophy of law. To a lesser degree, he deals with analyzing specific legal cases and discussing particular legal determinations, reached in certain specialized fields of law. In his philosophical reflection, Amselek focuses on methodological (among other things, the methodology of legal proceedings, law-making, and case description) and epistemological matters (among other things, recognition of the rules of law, the limits of their application, clarification of the status of norms, sanctions, and facts) by making ontological assumptions, both the implied and the explicitly declared ones. His examination of the philosophy of law falls within the context of three research traditions in the humanities and the social sciences: 1) phenomenology, 2) legal hermeneutics, and 3) legal language analyses, which go beyond hermeneutics, as they recognize both the provisions of law and passed verdicts based thereupon as specific speech acts.

The aim of the presentation is to characterize and analyze Paul Amselek's research approach (philosophical as well as legal-theoretical) to legal interpretation, and to attempt a further clarification of the said standpoint in the context of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. The paper provides an outline of Amselek's assumptions and theses about legal interpretation, considered in the broad context of phenomenological theses pertaining to intersubjectivity and intersubjective objectification.

It should be underscored that Amselek attempts to harmonize the theses of Edmund Husserl's essentialist, idealist phenomenology with the theses posited by Adolf Reinach in his realist phenomenology by predominantly drawing from the late works of Husserl, created in the 1930s. From these works, he adopted the concept of intersubjectivity, conceived of as *Lebenswelt* (lifeworld)—the cultural horizon of meanings and senses specific for human communities, allowing the objectivization of achievements and cognitive results of individuals. He also refers to John L. Austin's theory of speech acts, which he considers to be a development of Reinach's concept of language-based legal acts. This evocation of a pragmatic notion of linguistic meaning enables Amselek to blend the theses of phenomenology with those of hermeneutics, which opens language-based legal acts to interpretation.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. **Maria Gołębiewska** is a philosopher and philologist currently working at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. She completed her doctoral studies at the Graduate School for Social Research of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (1992–1996) and at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris (1996–1997). She obtained her Ph.D. in 1997 at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences on the basis of the work *The Problem of Rationality in Contemporary French Philosophy of Discourse*. In 2010, she obtained her habilitation in philosophy, on the basis of her scientific achievements, at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, where she works as an associate professor. Her research focuses predominantly on contemporary philosophy (phenomenology, philosophy of existence, structuralism, and post-structuralism), modern sources of contemporary philosophy, as well as epistemological, linguistic, and axiological questions; nowadays, her studies concern the topics of receptivity and performativity, considered in the phenomenological context.

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Māra Grīnfelde

The Role of Embodiment in Being with the Doctor Online
A Phenomenological Perspective on Patient Experience of Teleconsultation

The global crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic has considerably accelerated the use of teleconsultation (consultation between the patient and the doctor *via* video platforms). While it is clear that video-based online clinical encounter has certainly taken away many possibilities for action accessible to both the patient and the doctor, such as, for example, the possibility to touch the other person, it is not clear how the absence of the physical body has modified the interaction between the physician and the patient. The aim of my paper is to find out how the patient experiences being with the doctor online and what is the role of embodiment in this experience? This question is motivated by two things. Firstly, by insights expressed within phenomenology of medicine regarding the nature of clinical encounter (Edmund Pellegrino, Kay Toombs), namely, that the clinical encounter contains a face-to-face relationship between the patient and the doctor, ensuring a successful healing process, which among other things presupposes patient's experience of "intimacy, closeness, expression, emotion and contact" (Dolezal) with the doctor. Secondly, the question is motivated by the suspicion expressed by contemporary phenomenologists (Hubert Dreyfus, Tomas Fuchs, Havi Carel, Luna Dolezal) regarding the nature of online video-based interaction, namely, that it differs significantly from the embodied face-to-face contact. For example, with reference to the concepts of embodiment and intercorporeality, found in the works of Merleau-Ponty, Dolezal argues that a video encounter will always fall short of the on-site encounter due to the lack of embodied proximity to the

other person. I will approach the issue from the perspective of phenomenology, including both insights from the phenomenological philosophy and the results from the phenomenologically informed qualitative research study about patient experience of teleconsultation, which I have conducted. Firstly, I will show that based on the results of the qualitative research study, patients do experience emotions, expression, closeness, and contact with the doctor, which in some cases is even higher than in on-site face-to-face consultations. Secondly, I will argue, that this has less to do with the embodied nature of the interaction and more to do with 1) the lack of the clinical environment (lack of the doctor's office, waiting room, etc.); 2) the particularities of the online environment (such as the undivided attention from the doctor); and 3) the previous relationship between the patient and the doctor. Thus, I will argue that the on-site embodied interaction is not a necessary condition for a successful healing process.

Asst. Prof. Dr. **Māra Grīnfelde** is senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Latvia and assistant professor at the Rīga Stradiņš University. Her research interests include phenomenology of embodiment, phenomenology of medicine, French phenomenology, and the use of phenomenological philosophy in qualitative research. She has published a monograph on the possibility of absolute phenomena in Jean-Luc Marion's philosophy and a number of research papers in the field of the phenomenology of medicine. Currently, she is working on the postdoctoral research project *Healing at a Distance: Phenomenological Analysis of Patient Experience of Clinical Encounter in Telemedicine* (1.1.1.2/VIAA/4/20/622) funded by the European Regional Development Fund and University of Latvia (http://telepheno.com/en). She is one of the founding members and currently a board member of The Central and East European Society for Phenomenology (CEESP).

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Mintautas Gutauskas

Being with the Nonhuman
Two Phenomenological Approaches to Animal Life

Until the 21st century, sociality was discussed only in the dimension of inter-human relations. But the crisis of the Anthropocene forces us to reflect how humanity, sociality, and self-awareness are constituted in the relation to nature and animals. Jacques Derrida and other critics of anthropocentrism convincingly exposed how the constitution of the human depends on violence against nonhuman animals. But there remain many questions about new possibilities of being-with nonhuman animals. There are significant, but also problematic approaches. Derrida dissolves humans and animals in heterogeneity, Peter Singer's and Tom Regan's ethics humanize animals, posthumanism overestimates the possibilities of overcoming the anthropocentrism.

Phenomenology takes a moderate position. First, we must answer the questions about anthropocentricity of our experience, about conditions and possibilities to understand nonhuman animals, and what subjectivity and strata of experience can be acknowledged as common or divided by Heidegger's and Derrida's *Abgrund*. Here, two phenomenological approaches can be denoted.

Xavier San Martín and Maria Pintos refer to Husserl's insights in the *Ideen II* and propose to treat nonhuman animals as egoic subjects, also giving "a new sense to the transcendental" and drawing the guidelines towards the "ontology of nonhuman animals." Appealing to the structures of *Körper-Leib* and emotions with 11 arguments, they show what is common for the human

and the nonhuman animal life. But their approach foregrounds too strongly the identical structures of the *ego*, and leaves the questions about heterogeneity of humans and animals unanswered.

The second phenomenological approach solves these questions. Natalie Depraz refers to Husserl's theory of normality/abnormality and discusses the approach to animal life upon this basis. She states that normality does not "produce the hierarchy of values" and is only a descriptive category. Reflection upon the human subject as a norm for understanding liminal subjects helps us to answer the question to what extent we can overcome anthropocentrism as human exceptionalism, and to what extent our experience is unavoidably anthropocentric. Depraz offers an interpretation of "four different and complementary stages of empathy," which helps to identify to what extent liminal subjects are accessible to the normal. She reveals the intertwining of *Paarung*, intercorporeity, "imaginative self-transposal," and ethical responsibility. Depraz does not emphasize the same egoic structure, but differences and ethical response. Her interpretation of empathy reveals an interdependence of empathy and ethical responsibility.

We can treat these two phenomenological accounts as being complementary. While the first one reveals the common ground of life, the second one shows the significance of differences. Thus, we can discuss life and being with the nonhuman with respect to affinity and differences, and reflect upon our centricity when facing the nonhuman others.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. **Mintautas Gutauskas** is a professor and researcher at the Vilnius University. Since defending his Ph.D., in 2002, on the notion of dialogue in the philosophical hermeneutics, his research interests have included the issues of language, dialogue, and intersubjectivity with a focus on Husserl, Gadamer, Levinas, Buber, and Waldenfels. His current research interest are liminal subjects, animality, eco-phenomenology, critique of anthropocentrism, anthropological difference, and the Anthropocene with a focus on Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Fink, Derrida, and Agamben. He is the author of monographs *Space of Dialogue: A Phenomenological Approach* (Vilnius University Press, 2010, in Lithuanian) and *Human and Animal: Anthropological Difference in the Phenomenological Hermeneutical Philosophy* (Vilnius University Press, 2021, in Lithuanian), as well as the co-author of a collective monograph *Transformations of Nature: Modernity and the Anthropocene* (with Gianluca Cuozzo,

Danutė Bacevičiūtė, and Vaiva Daraškevičiūtė, forthcoming, Vilnius University Press, 2021, in Lithuanian).

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Wojciech Hanuszkiewicz

The Political and Educational Importance of Phenomenological Reduction
in the Light of the Dispute between Paul Natorp and Edmund Husserl

The exchange of ideas between Edmund Husserl and Paul Natorp, as Iso Kern showed in his classical study, had a very strong influence on the development of phenomenology. Despite incessant mutual criticism, Husserl gradually approached the solutions proposed by Natorp in his analyses. However, the whole controversy can also be viewed from the reverse perspective. Natorp also took up (in his later works) some important motifs from Husserl's phenomenology and created, what was hardly recognized, his own variant of the phenomenological reduction, which largely focuses on the political dimension of community life. Natorp examines the problem of community life, which was also of great importance for Husserl's analyses, from the perspective of the working and educational community, because, in his opinion, both work and education constitute original forms of human activity. The main purpose of the presentation is a detailed exposure of this topic.

One of the main points of contention between the two authors is the method of reduction. In his introduction to psychology, Natorp emphasizes that the task of psychology consists in "reducing the mental representation, which has always somehow been objectified, to the immediate nature of consciousness." The Marburg philosopher understands this reduction to mean the reconstruction of the immediate life of consciousness from the already objectified cultural products (creations). Husserl, on the other hand, tries to switch off the objectified world through phenomenological reduction and to make the life of consciousness accessible as intuitively

given. The phenomenologists work—as Husserl wrote in his letter to Natorp dated March 18, 1909—"from below up." In his review of the *Ideas*, Natorp criticized the phenomenological category of being-given very sharply. For Natorp, every act of thinking and intuitive perception is an element of the continuous process of objectivation. As a result, the act of intuitive giving—contrary to Husserl's point of view—is always also the act of objectification.

In his later works, Natorp did not forego the method of reconstruction. However, he approaches the position of Husserl by exposing the role of the individuated ethos of spontaneous self-education and self-creation within the fraternal working and educational community—especially in *Social-Idealism*, *Lectures on Practical Philosophy*, and *Philosophical Systematics*. This ethos cannot be reconstructed from the objectified laws that are characteristic of the ethics of the ought. Fraternity (solidarity) as an individualized mode of being cannot be carried out from the objectivations of cultural and socio-political life; nevertheless, it can only be grasped in the act of objectification, as a non-objectifiable overall disposition that, as it were, "from below" the rigid objectivations of the social life fulfilled and transformed. The preservation of access to such an overall disposition can be treated as a variant of the phenomenological reduction. The latter is based above all on the change in attitude, in which, as Husserl emphasizes in his *Ideas II*, "the educational aspect of the phenomenological reduction" also takes place. The educational significance of this change of attitude is that, thanks to it, we learn to grasp the constant transition from the objectifying to the non-objectifying overall disposition to our environment. Only this constant change in our attitudes enables the renewal and reshaping—for the sake of the working and educational community—of the objectivations of economic and socio-political world. From this point of view, we must also explain the educational aspect of phenomenological reduction for the political.

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Małgorzata Hołda

Being-with, Growing Apart, Dispersing
Virginia Woolf and Collective Consciousness

As members of a society, we are continually called to engage energies that go further than our finite and imperfect selves, in order to courageously seek the possibility of a fruitful experiencing of the almost impossible oneness with others. At the same time, our sense of a primordial unity is often violated by external forces: wars, conflicts, pandemics, and various forms of oppression on both the individual as well as the communal level. Written in the time between the two world wars, Virginia Woolf's final novel *Between the Acts* explores a human being's search for connectivity and a deeper meaning of human existence, which being-with can engender. A powerful thinker, Woolf voices here—but also in *Three Guineas* and her other writings—a deep concern with the threat of totalitarianism. In a surprising (re)turn in her fiction to the subject matter of collective rather than individual consciousness addressed in her earlier fictions, Woolf sensitizes us to various dualisms and divides whose seeming innocuousness may lead to a devastating separateness, dispersion, and a failure in executing the positivity of a communal life. Featuring a pageant play with its possible (mis)hearings/(mis)understandings, the narrative thematizes a human being's capacity of understanding but also the inevitable (mis) understanding, which ensues from our finite, conditioned, and provisional being-in-the-world. A prompt for a deep delving into the problematic of disunity and oneness, the collective and the individual, *Between the Acts* encourages us to view understanding/interpretation and misunderstanding/ misinterpretation not only as interweaving but as profoundly expressive of

our human condition. Drawing on the intersections between Woolf's and Heidegger's kindred understandings of temporality, historicity, and human *Dasein*, this paper proposes a hermeneutic-phenomenological investigation of the dialectic of individuality and collectivity focusing on the interlocking character of social (outer) and personal (inner) sense of dispersion, encapsulated in Woolf's laconic but potent statement in *Between the Acts*: "Dispersed are we."

Asst. Prof. Dr. Dr. **Małgorzata Hołda** teaches at the Institute of English Studies of the University of Łódż (Poland). She earned a Ph.D. in British literature with the dissertation *Between Liberal Humanism and Postmodernist Fun: The Fiction of Malcolm Bradbury* (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń) and a Ph.D. in philosophy with distinction for the dissertation *Paul Ricoeur's Concept of Subjectivity and the Postmodern Claim of the Death of the Subject* (The Pontifical University of John Paul II in Krakow); the latter was also published by Ignatianum University Press (2018). Recently, she published the monograph *On Beauty and Being: Hans-Georg Gadamer's and Virginia Woolf's Hermeneutics of the Beautiful* (Peter Lang, 2021). She is Junior Associate Fellow of the International Institute for Hermeneutics, and member of the Virginia Woolf Society of Great Britain as well as of the The European Society for Aesthetics. She is the associate editor of *Text Matters: A Journal in Literature, Theory and Culture*. She conducts interdisciplinary research in Anglophone literature and philosophy. Her published work explores topics within modern and postmodern novel, philological and philosophical hermeneutics (with special emphasis on Ricoeur's hermeneutics of the self as *l'homme capable* and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics), phenomenology, and postmodern philosophy. Her publications foster understanding as a mode of being in the world.

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SIGURD NØSTBERG HOVD

CONSTITUTIVISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY
ON SOCIALITY AS A GROUND FOR MORAL NECESSITATION

Constitutivism is a metaethical view claiming that we are subject to moral norms in virtue of the particular kind of beings we are. Within contemporary analytical ethics, both Aristotelian virtue ethical approaches of Anscombe, LeBar, and Millgram, as well as the Kantian approach to ethics espoused by Korsgaard are considered constitutive theories. Both approaches argue that, respectively, virtue or the categorical imperative are prescriptive of what it means to be the particular kind of rational agent that we are. These norms are intersubjectively valid for all human beings, and we are always already implicitly committed to them by being the kind of beings we are. Despite clear differences in the moral psychology underpinning these approaches, they notably share a common assumption: that if moral norms are constitutive, they are so in virtue of our rational agency. In this article, I challenge this assumption. Leaning on the distinction between reflexive and pre-reflexive self-awareness, so fundamental to the phenomenological tradition as a whole, as well as the analyses of personalistic reflective selfhood, of Husserl, Stein, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, I argue that an alternative constitutive account of moral norms can be developed; an account that grounds the necessitation of these norms in our reflexive self-conception rather than our volitional acts. The constitutive role played by acts of mutual empathy in founding such a reflexive self-conception entails that, according to this account, we should see our ability to be motivated by moral norms as far more closely connected to our social nature, than to our capacity for practical reasoning.

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Ka-yu Hui

The Double Expressivity of a Person in Husserl's Social Phenomenology
From Subjective Spirit to Cultural Spiritual Shape

This paper explicates the systematic importance of the concept of expression in Husserl's social phenomenology. We argue that the structure of expression prevails in Husserl's analyses of interpersonal relationships, cultural objects in the surrounding world, and the different levels of community and culture. Three interrelated claims will be made: First, expression indicates the peculiar manner of constitution of a person as a spiritual subject, in contrast with the constitution of a person as a unity of body and soul. Second, there is an essential relationship between a person and her surrounding world, and hence not only is a person always given as a system of expressions, but also is a cultural object given as such. In other words, spirit is expressed in the system "person-surrounding world." Third, the system "person-surrounding world," i.e., the unity of subjective spirit and objective spirits, can also be an expression of communal spiritual life and culture—what Husserl calls "higher order personal unities"—once they are constituted through appropriate communal acts. Hence, it belongs to the essential structure of a person to be doubly expressive of subjective spirit and cultural spirit.

With a robust concept of expression, we can better clarify the distinction between different approaches in the study of a human person. While the natural scientific approach takes the person as a real unity, the human scientific approach sheds light on the person as a multilevel expressive system.

Our exposition will focus on *Ideas II*, which we take to be the major site, in which Husserl formulates his technical and robust conception of expression

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vis-à-vis the problem of the structure of the person and cultural objects. Remarks from other works, including the Vienna lecture and *Experience and Judgment* will also be orchestrated at appropriate junctures to support our reconstruction.

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Branko Klun

The Otherness of the Other between Knowledge and Acknowledgement

It is probably the principal merit of Levinas that the question of otherness or alterity has been radicalized in a new and hitherto unthought way. Levinas's approach, however, leads to an epistemological and even logical paradox. The radical otherness, which transcends knowledge and reason, should somehow "affect" the knowing subject, but in this act, it risks losing its transcendent status. If otherness becomes known, it is no longer totally other, and if it is not known (in all possible versions of knowledge, including the practical one), it has no meaning at all. Levinas wants to overcome this theoretical impasse by showing its positive ethical meaning: the logical paradox of absolute otherness is the source of a never-ending ethical call, which transforms the very understanding of philosophy and pleads for its original ethical vocation (*qua* responsibility for the other). In this paper, I suggest another approach to the question of otherness: the act of knowing (or intentionality) implies a distinct but inseparable act of "will" ("intention"), which is not determined by theoretical necessity, but by subject's practical freedom. Kant was perfectly aware that we cannot approach another person purely by his/her theoretically and transcendentally constituted meaning, but we have to adopt the attitude of "*Achtung*" (respect), which grants the other person his/her transcendent status within the phenomenal world. Similarly, the act of knowing the other implies the decision of an "acknowledgment" of his/her otherness. We could even speak of a voluntary "belief" (not to use the word "faith")

inherent to every knowledge. Is such an explanation compatible with Levinas's approach or does it betray his original motives?

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NICOLAI KNUDSEN

HEIDEGGER ON SOCIAL COGNITION

This paper aims to clarify, contextualize, and reassess Heidegger's ambiguous and polemical account of social cognition. First, I consider Heidegger's rejection of the idea of empathy. Commentators often assume that this rejection is pretty straightforward, but a closer look reveals that Heidegger makes several seemingly incoherent claims about the nature of empathy. Therefore, it is no way clear, which type of empathy or social cognition Heidegger actually opposes. To clarify this, I identify six different arguments that Heidegger puts forth against empathy and then reassess who (among both historical and contemporary contenders) are, in fact, targeted by these arguments. My analysis shows a surprising degree of continuity with the phenomenological empathy theories put forth by for instance Husserl, Scheler, Stein, and, more recently, Zahavi and Gallagher, which Heidegger is often taken to oppose. What they have in common is that they take social cognition to (i) be immediate or quasi-perceptual, (ii) require a robust self-other distinction, and (iii) explain our basic experiential distinction between minded and non-minded creatures.

Second, I draw on the conception of "transposedness" from *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* to spell out Heidegger's own positive account of social cognition. This account possesses the mentioned similarities with the phenomenological empathy theories, but differs insofar as it understands the other as exhibiting a practical comportment that constitutively depends on a shared environment, which the traditional phenomenologies of empathy take

to be a higher-order phenomenon enabled by empathy. What emerges from Heidegger's reflections on social cognition is, I conclude, a quasi-perceptual, practically oriented, and triadic approach to interpersonal encounters.

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Dean Komel

On the Totalitarium

In contemporary philosophy, as well as in the wider field of social and cultural studies, and also media communication in general, conceptions, such as "global society," "knowledge society," "post-industrial society," "information society," "risk society," "the society of the spectacle," in addition to the old ones, such as "capitalist society," "socialist society," "mass society", "consumer society," etc., have become well-established in the recent decades. Therein, "society" is in different respects, but nonetheless uniformly, addressed as the subject of an all-encompassing world process, without explicit definition of the subjectivity of society as a processor.

Peter L. Berger, whose study *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge,* published in 1966 with Thomas Luckmann, is considered one of the central works of phenomenologically oriented sociology, founded by Alfred Schütz, defined society as "… a human product, and nothing but a human product, that yet continuously acts upon its producers." (Berger, *The Scared Canopy, Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, 1967) This Berger's characterization of society as a product and a producer of man at the same time could also be somewhat refined. Are we today not made to bear witness to society acting as total production with and beyond man, placing the latter, as "human resource" or "human capital"—together with all the "natural resources"—, in the function of its own empowerment? The total (re) production of society as the unconditional subjectivity establishes power over Being as a whole, i.e., over—*the world*, which is being, whilst the horizons of worldliness are erased, produced into the *totalitarium*.

The world does not exist as a universe anymore, but functions as a *totalitarium*. If we take into account that the worldliness of the world forms a distinguished theme of phenomenology, this, therefore, dictates a consideration of the totalitarian structure, which is not only marked by the peculiarities of the so-called "social world," but concerns the world as a whole. The term "totalitarium" connotates a direct connection with what we are used to label as the social phenomenon of "totalitarianisms," which historically defined the 20th century. However, between totalitarianism as a social phenomenon and the totalization of social subjectivity over the world a difference emerges that requires its own description and interpretation. Referencing the current theories of totalitarianisms and the social ideologies behind them can thus be very useful, but at the same time also insufficient to define the totalization of the subjectivity of society itself, which does not have to rely specifically on ideological or any other terror, insofar as technology and capital are sufficient to maintain its power, under which everything, and also nothing, functions.

Of course, I do not in any way intend to deny the different social forms of violence today or the various psychopathologies of desubjectification and deobjectification that accompany them. I also do not want to diminish the relevance of civil society efforts for social change, but it is necessary to consider what dictates the conditions of the possibilities, within which such efforts are actualized. What characterizes the unconditional activation and actuality of the *totalitarium* itself?

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Liana Kryshevska

The Notion of Social World by Gustav Shpet

The notion of the social world is one of the key elements of Gustav Shpet's philosophy, but it still remains an insufficiently researched topic. The logic of Shpet's philosophy allows an interpretation of the social world as a resulting and summarizing notion of his thought. This means that ontology of knowledge defined by him as phenomenological ontology gets fully expressed in the notion of the social world.

It is rightly pointed out in the works on Shpet's phenomenological project, that the social world foreshadows the theme of the lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) in Husserl's later works as well as the turn to the theme of sociality by Max Scheler and Alfred Schutz.

But it would be incorrect to interpret the social world by Shpet as an attention to the everyday life, although some researchers present it as such. It should be noted that Shpet also uses the notion of the sociocultural world alongside with the notion of the social world. For him, these two terms are synonymous. The core of the social world by Shpet is not everyday life, but sense, which is very clearly separated from the notion of meaning. Here, it should be pointed out that the sense in its formal aspect is fundamentally important for the structure of intentional consciousness and the word structure. The structure of consciousness is viewed by Shpet as a structure of apprehension of sense. Also, the internal form of the word is presented by Shpet as an *algorithm* of the creation of sense.

Husserl's understanding of the world as a horizon of potential experience turns out to be quite narrow for Shpet's concept of the social world. The relation

of experience and the social world is described by Shpet differently than by his teacher. For him, world, experience, and phenomenon are parts of a unified system, where all elements of Shpet's ontological concept—consciousness, word, language, subject, social world—are *homological*, i.e., they have the same formal aspect and existential status.

The key to understanding of Shpet's social world, as well as his concept as a whole, lies in the analysis and comparison of the structure of consciousness and the internal form of the word. This analytical strategy provides an insight not only into the concept of the social world, but also into other important notions of Shpet's phenomenological ontology, such as reality, subject, and culture.

Liana Kryshevska studied musicology and philosophy in Odesa and received her M.A. at the Odesa State Conservatory (2001). After completing several study and teaching fellowship, she moved to Germany in 2016. Currently, she is a Ph.D. candidate in philosophy at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. She is broadly interested in the phenomenon of art as one of the discourses of cognition, perception, experience, and representation of the world. In particular, her research interests are shaped by the problems of ontology of art and the functions of art in the sociocultural world, but also by problems of understanding and interpretation of the works of art. Her publications address the works of Shpet, Ingarden, Heidegger, Gadamer, Bakhtin, Mamardashvili, and also the problems of culture and modern art. Her current research considers the experience of art in the phenomenological aspect and is founded on the conceptions of early phenomenologists.

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Zixuan Liu

What is the Irreality of Social Reality?
Higher Visibility Transcendental Intentionality

Social reality embodies a paradoxical ontological status. On the one hand, nothing is more real than the work we do and the money we use every day in our living world. On the other, we cannot perceive an institution or promise in the same way as we perceive brute, physical reality. It is "irreal," but such irreality is neither fictional, eidetic, nor idealized; nor is it irreducibly imposed on physical objects.

Taking linguistic form as an example, I propose a transcendental, anti-naturalistic account: the irreality of social reality results from the higher visibility of intentional correlation, which is transcendental in the sense that it is not located within real spacetime, but encompasses the latter as a component. Such irreality is merely more evident in cultural items than in physical nature, but is not a superscription on the latter. Physical objects are also intentional achievements, but their irreality is less visible because the corresponding intentional activities are more passive.

This theory connects intentionality and the irreality of social reality, renews our understanding of information and meaning—a dominant sense of "meaning" in Husserl is "the intended as such" (*Vermeintes als solches*), opposed to "the object plainly" (*der Gegenstand schlechthin*)—, and upholds social ontology's commitment to description.

Within this framework, the article shows that mainstream accounts of collective intention (content, mode, subject, and relation) do not have to be mutually exclusive, and can in fact complement each other. Here, analytic

philosophers are often misled by linguistic difference.

Nonetheless, social reality does not necessarily originate from collective *objectual* intention, since we have pre-reflective plural self-awareness, for which I propose a mechanism in its most basic form: congruence with like-minded individuals (*meinesgleichen*) as a form of *non-objectual collective intention*. Such a non-objectual form of intentionality includes association and motivation, as elementary forms of intentionality, and tendency (*Tendenz*) between consciousness. I term it "consciousness-with" as opposed to "consciousness-about," which has an object opposed to us (*Gegen-stand vor-stellen*).

Our fear of the group mind is rooted in the metaphysical mystification of the mind-body relationship through naturalism, which rejects transcendentality in favor of an increasingly technological concept of humanity (*Technologisierung des Menschenbildes*). Such technologization of human image is well justified if limited within its boundary; but when we start to *define* the human being as a machine, that becomes our *Krisis*. And if Husserl answers with transcendentalism, my reply will be the same.

Zixuan Liu is an M.A. student at the Department of Philosophy of the Sun Yat-sen University (Guangzhou, China) and is interested in promoting in-depth interactions between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and other disciplines (neuroscience, biosemiotics, social ontology). "Husserl's generalization of the will" can, according to such a research direction, offer a new explanation for different types of pre-reflective consciousness and their intensity, as well as their correlation with the passage of time.

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Anthony Longo

Intersubjectivity, Mirror Neurons, and the Limits of Naturalism

One of the key debates in contemporary philosophy of mind is set between naturalistic and phenomenological accounts of phenomenal consciousness. In this debate, the question at stake is, to which extent phenomenal consciousness can be naturalized, i.e., be explained in terms of physical processes such as the neurological ones. This paper explores the possibilities and limits of naturalizing the experience of intersubjectivity. Traditional theories of intersubjectivity in the analytic tradition have explained the experience of "other minds" in terms of mental or cognitive faculties, i.e., either by attributing mental states to others or by relying on one's faculty of imagination. This paradigm was fundamentally challenged by the discovery of mirror neurons. The existence of mirror neurons, indeed, illustrates that an experience of intersubjectivity is already present on a more primitive, precognitive, and embodied level. A similar argument already had been made in the first half of the twentieth century by phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl. This motivated Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers of mirror neurons, and other philosophers to connect the functioning of mirror neurons with Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity as presented in his *Cartesianische Meditationen* (*CM*). In doing so, these contributions are at the same time an attempt to naturalize the experience of intersubjectivity. I argue that such attempts are grounded in an inadequate interpretation of Husserl's analysis. A close reading in the context of his other published works shows that Husserl's analysis in *CM* should be understood as a *reductio ad absurdum* and not as a phenomenology

of intersubjectivity proper. Attempts to naturalize intersubjectivity based on the analysis presented in *CM*, therefore, run into a circular argument. As such, they bypass a more primordial experience of intersubjectivity, which Husserl thematizes in *Ideen II* as the experience of an "expressive unity" and which resists any project of naturalization from within.

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Mark Losoncz

Marx's Phenomenology of Capitalism and Blindness

Although there were theoreticians who tried to combine phenomenology and Marxism (e.g., Tran Duc Thao), or to conceptualize capitalist everyday experience from the viewpoint of phenomenality (e.g., Karel Kosik), according to our knowledge, Marx himself was very rarely read as a thinker for whom the phenomenological perspective was decisive. It has to be pointed out that already the very beginning of Marx's *Capital* is marked by a certain phenomenological discourse: "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself *[erscheint als]* as 'an immense accumulation of commodities,' its unit being a single commodity." In other words, Marx focuses on how things appear in capitalism and also their *ratio manifestationis*. According to our view, Marx's phenomenology reaches its peak in his metaphorology of "blinding" and "blindness": "the blinding form of the money fetish," "blinding commodity," "the blinding form of money," etc. When Marx conceptualizes the specific hyperphenomenality of capitalist forms, he introduces a very rich and diverse metaphor—and he relies on all its dimensions (intensity, relation to practice, the servile acceptance of blindness, the semiotical machine). The focal point of the Marxian phenomenology is the "savage" or "wild" aesthetical experience of capitalism, in which the abundance of phenomenality hides deeper structures. As Kosik would put it, capitalism hides itself by hiding the structural characteristics of phenomena *as* phenomena. Contrary to certain interpreters, such as Jacques Bidet, we are going to suggest that phenomenology is a crucial and organic

part of the Marxian analysis. The Marxian phenomenology does also have serious consequences with regard to key questions, such as practice, ideology, or struggle. In capitalism, the "sole message is: 'What appears is good; what is good appears'" (Guy Debord). Marxian phenomenology is first of all a critical approach to this kind of phenomenodicy.

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Paul Marinescu

Blurring the Unbearable
Limits and Excesses of Displaying Violence

The blurring of images that capture scenes of atrocious violence has become a common phenomenon in the last 20 years, especially when such visual information is disseminated through accredited media. The laws in many countries prohibit the publication of images showing people who are wounded or in a state of extreme vulnerability. Thus, visual information about beheadings, war crimes, and terrorist attacks, among other violent events, reaches the public in blurred, truncated forms. When these kinds of images are broadcast unblurred in the spirit of rendering the truth of events, they cause public tremor. Obscuring the images that show violent content invites complex debates, because it raises epistemological, social, juridical, and political issues, and therefore involves various disciplines, from visual ethics to the sociology of violence. As a discipline of seeing, phenomenology can make an important contribution to this discussion. Blurred images in general, and those that obscure violence in particular, constitute an issue under-researched in the field of phenomenology. To better delineate this new domain, I will question the phenomenon that lies at its heart: the visually unbearable violence, in the name of which violent images are altered. What is specific to this experience, as I will try to show, is its being constituted around a fracture between the desire to watch violence and partial, altered exposition of what is visually unbearable. To deepen my analysis, I will refer to the phenomenological research documenting the shift from the real experience of violence to an imagistic one. In this sense, I will examine a phenomenon related to the experience of

seeing blurred violent images, that is the attenuation of unbearable content. I will, therefore, distinguish this from the neutralization of violence through aestheticization, since the attenuation implies the work of partial recognition and minimal reconstitution, by means of imagination and memory, of what is *irregardable*.

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Gintautas Mažeikis

Faustian Hope for Alterity
Bataille, Adorno, and Levinas

I view the phenomenon of ascending and descending transgression as violence against limits, as a struggle with the hegemonic norms, as the decline of the one-dimensional universality, and as a radical personal choice. Metaphorically, the phenomenon of ascending and descending transgression was represented in the image of the Jacob's ladder, along which angels descended and ascended.

G. Bataille considers sacred transgressivity, which overcomes all social certainty and reveals the abyss of perversion or mental pathology in the book *The Trial of Gilles de Rais*. The philosopher analyzes the case of the French marshal Gilles de Rais, an associate of Joan of Arc, the national hero and at the same time the mad pervert who perversely sacrifices children to the devil. Gilles de Rais plunges into the twilight of "Faust" before Goethe, into the world symbolized by the image of Bluebeard. It crosses all the boundaries allowed by society and the church and, in the end, does not expand the legitimate space, but narrows it, causing public fear and horror. There, we need to understand the radical difference, the alterity, between the traditions of Christopher Marlowe and Goethe as mutually exclusive: in the first case, Mephistopheles appears in the image of Satan of fall and perversion, and in the other case, Mephistopheles appears to us as a thinker, a cynic, a companion of Faust. Bataille's hero, Gilles de Rais, presents the case of Faustus in Marlow's sense: Satan opens an abyss for Bluebeard.

Adorno, in an extensive correspondence with Th. Mann, analyzes the musical part, and therefore the essence of the novel *Doctor Faustus*. Adorno

read not only *Doctor Faustus*, but also the novel *Mephisto* by Klaus Mann, which depicts that the Nazi totalitarianism rises as an image of Mephistopheles, the daemon of great, sublime seduction and fall. What is the greatness of the fall, the greatness of the abyss? In fact, Nazism repeats the transgression of Gilles de Rais, only on the mass scale of the Holocaust.

Levinas understands dangers of both the radical perversion and the rational totality that turn everything into a faceless one-dimensionality. He denies both possibilities: the Nazi sadistic transgression and the rational demolishing of differences and otherness. The philosopher is concerned with questions: how is the sacred possible as a deep transgression, and how is the sacred compatible with the acquisition of a face, that is, the otherness, and a place? In *Beyond the Verse. Talmudic Readings and Lectures* Levinas wrote that Jacob's struggle with the Angel means "to overcome in the existence of Israel the angelism of pure interiority." Levinas presents Israel as a power higher than the intelligence of angels. The image of Jacob's ladder reveals the fire of the Cherubs and the gift of love of the Seraphim by the upward movement of transgression. Nevertheless, the movement is not territorial. To overcome the Seraphim means to acquire the Promised Land. In this case, we have a double negation. The first utterance negates the concrete being in the world, the *das Man*, and the second negates the non-territorial utopia and maintains a new concrete philotopia, which is, in the case of Levinas, Israel.

Adorno notes that great art is transgressive in the sublime sense. We can interpret the artistic sublimation that overcomes the limits of empirical reality either as an ascending or a descending or the representing of the given, or as a cultural industry. In a similar manner as Levinas, Adorno negates both the Nazis' mythic transgression and the rational banality of cultural industries. However, the question is how can we know the direction of the Jacob's ladder, which side is ascending and which descending, if we have to break the facelessness of one-dimensionality? Adorno insists on the absence of a method of identification or of a strong rule how to recognize the direction of the Being. No one has any guarantees and everyone is responsible for their personal choice. The philosophical question of the role of transgression in the human Being does not allow neither an answer nor a method, nor a rule, but only phenomenological analysis of experiences, the critique of the forms of praxis.

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Krzysztof Mech

Community and Otherness
Józef Tischner's Ethics of Solidarity

My considerations will be based on the book by Józef Tischner, published in 1981 and entitled *Ethics of Solidarity*. The book was written during the revolutionary changes in Poland, and is directly related to ideas close to the Polish Solidarity movement. Solidarity was established in 1980 and was banned by the communist authorities in December 1981. Its re-legalization in 1989 marked the beginning of changes that covered the entire Central and Eastern Europe. The influence of Tischner's book, especially his idea of the solidarity of consciences, on the Solidarity movement, and indirectly on the changes that took place in Europe, is undoubted.

The aim of the lecture, however, is not to study the influence of Tischner's philosophy on the Solidarity movement, but to raise the question about the phenomenological foundations of the ethics of solidarity. An important element of the considerations will be the answer to the question: how the solidarity of consciences with its guiding motto—"Bear one another's burdens" (Gal 6, 2)—is founded on the phenomenology of the Other. The question, around which my considerations will revolve is then: what happens in Tischner's thinking between the phenomenology of the Other and the notion of a community founded on the idea of solidarity?

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Janko Nešić

Predictive Processing and Phenomenology of Autism

The goal of my talk is to connect predictive processing accounts of autism with phenomenology of social cognition, and see what can be gained for the understanding of the autistic spectrum disorder. It has been noted that there are parallels between notions of predictive processing framework and concepts of habitual anticipation and expectation found in phenomenology of Husserl, and a multidisciplinary account of autism was advocated by Bizzari arguing for the impairment of the habitual body (Merleau-Ponty). However, phenomenologists hold an anti-representationalist position and predictive coding/processing theories are mostly committed to neuro-representationalism. Predictive coding has come under criticism, and there has been a movement towards aligning the ideas of predictive processing with enactivism.

The enactive version of predictive coding moves away from the internalist vocabulary of "inference" and "representation" in favor of "attunement" and "affordance." Fuchs suggests that instead of postulating "hypotheses" and "prediction errors," there is a match or mismatch of neural forward models or open loops with the environment. The subjective body is an ensemble of all skills and capacities at disposal, a habitual body. Body memory is an embodied knowledge or know-how, the operative intentionality of the body.

Several predictive processing theories of autism have been put forward recently: HIPPEA, dialectical misattunement, and ecological niche construction. In the vocabulary of predictive coding, autism is characterized

by "high and inflexible estimation of precision of prediction errors," autistic subjects have "limitations in internal (precision) modeling," so they resort to suitable actions to reduce uncertainty. Ecological theory claims that "the other" for autistic subjects "will tend to be less generalized, which will result in highly formalized, conventional social responses to familiar environmental cues." Dialectical misattunement account explains that the "communication misalignments and weak interpersonal coupling in social interactions might be the result of increasingly divergent predictive and (inter-)action styles across individuals (cf. Predictive Processing and Active Inference)."

I will discuss what these theories claim about impairments in autism when translated to phenomenology. According to HIPPEA, autistic disturbances are in the body schema and habitual body. Dialectical misattunement hypothesis is of additional interest, because it presents a step towards an enactive-predictive account of autism, and, in phenomenology, it would relate to the notions of habit, intercorporeal coupling, and styles of intercorporeality.

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Daniel Neumann

Sharing a Realistic Future
Early Phenomenology and Sociality

In my talk, I want to consider the possibilities early phenomenology offers in terms of thinking a real, or realistic, social bond and a shared future. Especially of interest, here, is considering how a realistic phenomenological approach not based on subjective experience differs from standard accounts like the Husserlian *Appräsentation* or the Heideggerian *Mitsein*. I will proceed in two steps: 1) delineating broadly the realism of early phenomenology, especially as it relates to intersubjective knowledge; 2) considering how this realism shapes a shared future that might be more binding in nature than the transcendental position.

Ad 1) In the phenomenology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Edith Stein, and Gerda Walther, we find the notion that the phenomenological method is able to address the essence of reality itself, that is how reality appears by virtue of its *own* constitution as opposed to its being constituted by consciousness. This creates a different kind of evidence than the Husserlian method, which reflects on the *Leistungen* of consciousness. Realistic phenomenology lets the real phenomena unfold by themselves, affording a much more emphatic appearance of alterity. While in Conrad-Martius, this unfolding is mostly related to the question of knowledge of the reality of space and time in the broader sense and the constitution of nature in the narrower sense, Walther and Stein are more concerned with direct social phenomena like empathy. But the realistic attitude does not have to pertain neither to knowledge nor to sociality. When relating it to the problem of the future, it can be considered as the question of how we can anticipate a future, which is common insofar as we can relate to it as our reality.

Ad 2) The phenomenological realism of future can be considered on two different levels. The realism of knowledge: because knowledge, here, is not defined by being known by me, but by how the phenomena present themselves, the question of a common knowledge is one of the constitution of phenomena. Thus, the argument is not about subjective opinions or irreconcilable, individual positions, but about the different ways we are affected by the same, real phenomena. Here, a realism of sociality becomes thinkable. Based on the realistic position, intersubjective modes like empathy cannot be conceived as mere imaginations or representations of alterity. Rather than the problem of how one consciousness relates to the other, sociality is constituted by the reality of phenomena they refer to. And yet, this reality is not *an sich*, but is always already phenomenologically mediated. One of the challenges will be to bring out how a form of intersubjectivity is already operative in, and cannot be separated from, the realist outlook, with which the phenomenological method is concerned. A point of departure, here, will be the idea of an "ontological" community, found in Stein and Walther. But more than in a historical reconstruction, I will be concerned with how these realist notions of community are open to thinking a futurity, which is predicated on their very realism. The question then is: how can we phenomenologically address the coming of a common future?

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Tomasz Niezgoda

Society and Experiences of Transcendence
Eric Voegelin on the Diagnosis of Disorder

Human society, according to Eric Voegelin, is a "cosmion, illuminated with meaning from within by the human beings who continuously create and bear it as a mode and condition of their self-realization." In other words, society is an "order" that, on the one hand, provides its members with meanings, values, and schemes of action; on the other hand, society is created by man and is, therefore, subject to change. However, there exists a change like no other; a change that turns society (order) into its opposite—disorder. With the emergence of the Nazi regime and the *Anschluss* of Austria—not to mention the rise of the Soviet Union—Voegelin witnessed such an event. In and through it, the structure of social reality becomes deformed: not only the meanings and values providing the direction to human existence are reversed, but also the modes and rules of behavior and thinking change into their opposites.

Voegelin's both theoretical as well as existential endeavor was to find out how one can find order in the age of disorder. Mediated by the encounter with Husserl's phenomenology and Heidegger's existential phenomenology, the return to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle gave him the answer: experiences of transcendence are responsible for both making visible the order of reality and man's attunement to order (called "ordering of the self"). Voegelin argued that these experiences are nonobjective—meaning, among other things, that they are devoid of any content that can be grasped by the senses, and that, therefore, their manifestation is about their coming.

Although they have no content, he claimed, they are not meaningless: they reveal that man exists between the immanence of sensual world and the transcendence of beyond the world, platonic *epekeina*.

In my paper, I would like to show, firstly, how precisely Voegelin understood the experiences of transcendence, and, then, what he meant by saying that these experiences are responsible for the ordering of the soul. Secondly, I am going to show how these experiences, as well as the knowledge gained through them, translate into the possibility of diagnosing various types of intellectual and social movements (including totalitarian ideologies). According to the author of *Order and History*, the nonobjective experiences are not a private matter, they are, rather, social and historical events—political criticism can, as a result, be formed on the basis of a reflection upon them. For if man exists between immanence and transcendence (platonic *metaxy*), then any attempt to abolish this existential and thus ontological structure can be understood as a process leading to disorder and the disintegration of society.

Dr. **Tomasz Niezgoda** is a researcher at the Department of Philosophy and Sociology of Religion at the Institute for Religious Studies (Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland). His Ph.D. dissertation was devoted to the phenomenological and hermeneutic reading of Eric Voegelin's notion of the experience of transcendence. He is interested in the continental philosophy of religion, phenomenology of religious experiences, and the presence of eschatological issues in modern world.

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Daniele Nuccilli

Mitverstrickung
Wilhelm Schapp on the Narratological Structure of Intersubjectivity

Wilhelm Schapp was one of the first students of Husserl in Göttingen. His doctoral dissertation entitled *Contributions to the Phenomenology of Perception* (1910) was of some importance in the early reception of Husserl's thought, but he is best known for his "philosophy of stories," a trilogy of works (1953–1965), in which he interprets the question of lifeworld and of man's being in the world from a narratological perspective. In this talk, I will try to argue that the epistemological structure of his "philosophy of stories" can variously be applied to the analysis of intersubjectivity and the experience of alterity. After a brief overview of the ontological view of man that Schapp offers through his concept of "being-entangled-in-stories," I will explore another renown concept he developed: "co-entanglement-in-stories." I would like to show how this concept, which reflects the influence of the psychological notion of "empathy," is employed by the philosopher as an epistemic tool to explain the comprehension of alterity. This can be achieved through the projection of our stories into the other's story or by our "immersion" in the stories we all share, if only in very different ways and, sometimes, from opposite perspectives. In this sense, Schapp's work is effective on a double level: firstly, it brings out the importance of our past stories for the comprehension of others and of our own being in the world; secondly, it offers a solid basis to reverse the relation between stories and narratives, showing how a certain historical or even traumatic event may give rise to multiple narratives that represent different ways, in which the same story emerges from contrasting perspectives (e.g.,

in the case of the so-called "divided memory"). In Schapp's philosophy, the concept of "entanglement" in a way replaces the Husserlian one of self-givenness, i.e., the pre-given hermeneutical horizon, in which all experiences are embedded. Co-entanglement, then, means the pre-given openness to the others' stories. The ways, in which the story emerges, gives us different pictures of the times and events that the people involved in it have experienced. Against the background of this wide range of narrative possibilities, there arises the possibility of the encounter with the other, coinciding with all human beings as potential subjects of an emerging story.

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Žarko Paić

The Body and the Technosphere
Beyond Phenomenology and Its Conceptual Matrix

In the history of metaphysics and its transformation by Heidegger, the body cannot have emerged as an explicit issue, as it still hides today in neuro-cognitivism under the notion of an "incarnation of consciousness." It could not be mentioned separately, in its principal autonomy, because it had the status and feature of a small object with its corresponding features of matter and form (*eidos and morphé*). Considering the horizons of the intersubjectivity of consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty made the first and last step in the growth of metaphysics in terms of its way to the existential turn and openness of the body as an event. What has been recognized in the onto-pathology of the world as a marvelous disinfection of disharmony from the kingdom of the "phantom hand," is the discovery of the technological assemblage of human possibilities of an existence in the world.

Curvature, fractalization, and substitution only prove the fact that the body as a living machine appears in a very different way from the constant transformation of the Being as it has been described in the traditional metaphysics. We do not just have to ontologically start thinking about the body as Jean-Luc Nancy states in *Corpus*. Our task, however, is less apocalyptic-Messianic than the announcement of the end of history and metaphysics, upon which the apprehensive thinking of Being was based. Instead, it has to be compromised by the occurrence of the post-biological body and its permanent transformation. As interplanetary nomads in the wandering universe, which only comes to its fulfilment in the human species,

we encounter the uncanny "new nature" of the *technosphere* based on the logic of *calculating*, *planning*, and *constructing*. Hence, the *AI* activity requires the aesthetic shaping of "*A-life.*"

The body becomes a fluid and metamorphic object. But this is no longer an object in the function of a transcendental subject that decides *a priori* about his movement, form, and materiality in space.

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Fabio Tommy Pellizzer

The Things that Make Us
Thinking Sociality through a Phenomenology of Artefacts

Phenomenology offers very important tools to theorize sociality and to describe the manifold facets of social life. Whilst the emphasis on lived-experience and inter-subjectivity characterizes many approaches, in this paper I wish to explore a different path, asking whether and how a phenomenology of social world can be accomplished *via* a phenomenology of artefacts, and then how such an approach allows a better understanding of symbolic and cultural variability.

As I will show in the first part, the emphasis (in disciplines like archaeology and paleoanthropology) on "material culture" indicates that sociality as we know it has developed through a more and more complex relation with artefacts. Things extend and shape both range and form of the inter-subjective life, refracting the experience of others through the prism of materiality, projecting sociality into complex and highly variable paths. I will consider concrete examples of artefacts like signs, commodities, and ritual objects, and ask if phenomenology is able to explain their constitution and role with regard to social life. What artefacts are *for us* is always more than what they are in a basic sense. Archaeologists suggest that this "more"—e.g., values, meanings—emerges precisely in our concrete and inter-subjective engagement with things and materials (exchange of commodities, personalization of tools, "expressive" use of materials and things as colors and seashells). This idea of material culture poses a great challenge for philosophers and can be fruitfully addressed by phenomenology.

The hypothesis, presented in the second part of the paper, consists in focusing on human capacity of making and recognizing artefacts as *things that have an impact on minds*. Thus, I distinguish between two attitudes: 1) the use of *tools*, as things that have an impact on the world and, therefore, on minds; 2) the use *artefacts*, as things that have an impact on minds and, therefore, on the world. To explain the constitution of artefacts, I will first build upon the Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology and highlight the "indicative structure" of perceptual objects and tools as constituted through "pre-delineations," "indications" of meaning, and within "referential contexts." Then, I will ask if this view can account for artefacts like commodities, signs, and ritual objects. I call attention to a phenomenological feature of our experience of artefacts, i.e., the fact that they exhibit concrete, material "indications" of other minds. This "social salience" of artefacts will be discussed by reference to our use of signs (as described, for example, by Heidegger) and then by borrowing insights from ethnology, paleo-anthropology, and cognitive archaeology. The idea is that artefacts are not just *constituted by* indications or pre-delineations (as tools or perceptual objects); they are also (and essentially) *made* of concrete indications, i.e., material patterns of handiness that *display* human intentionality, making this available to individual and groups, exchangeable and transmittable between different generations and communities.

In the conclusion, I will consider some examples of artefacts, and suggest how a phenomenological approach can help understanding social complexity and symbolic variability.

Dr. **Fabio Tommy Pellizzer** is an independent scholar. He received his Ph.D. from Ca' Foscari University of Venice in 2019 with a thesis on Heidegger's interpretations of Kant (title: *The Unity and the Manifold. Heidegger's Interpretation of the Synthesis between Husserl and Kant*). From October 2020 to June 2021, he was Ernst Mach Fellow at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Vienna. His research interests include temporality and time-reckoning, relations between perceptual experience, imagination, and symbolic institution. Currently, he is working on the elaboration of an interdisciplinary approach to human production of signs, combining insights from phenomenology and cognitive archaeology.

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Sᴇʀɢɪᴏ Pᴇ́ʀᴇᴢ-Gᴀᴛɪᴄᴀ

Vɪᴏʟᴇɴᴄᴇ ᴀs ᴀ Fᴏʀᴍ ᴏꜰ Sᴏᴄɪᴀʟ Iɴᴛᴇʀᴀᴄᴛɪᴏɴ
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This work analyzes the phenomenon of violent social conflict from the viewpoint of transcendental phenomenology, focusing mainly on cognitive and normative aspects of different types of violent practices, understood as *habitual* forms of intersubjective interaction that can develop into cultural behavior patterns. The first part of my presentation offers preliminary remarks on the concept of violence. The second part presents a methodological adaptation of the "general scheme (*allgemeines Schema*)" of Husserl's phenomenology for the topic of violence as a form of intersubjective interaction. I proceed from the egological scheme "I have the lived experience of an appearing object (*ego—cogito—cogitatum*)" to the intersubjective scheme "we experience our own intersubjective interaction from diverse perspectives." Upon this basis, the phenomenon of executed, suffered, and/or witnessed social violence will be analyzed from the static and genetic as well as generative perspective. In the third and last part of this work, I make a brief critical commentary on Michael Staudigl's well-known study on violence *Phänomenologie der Gewalt*. This will shed light on the differences between the transcendental and the non-transcendental phenomenological approach to violence, and what we can learn from each of these approaches.

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Silvia Pierosara

Managing the Absent
On the Role of Nostalgia in Individual and Social Relations

This contribution explores the phenomenology of nostalgia and its relationship with personal and collective memory. Its starting point is related to a particular definition of nostalgia as a pathology of memory and of imagination. My hypothesis is that, far from only being a limit, the experiences of absence, loss, and oblivion are not the contrary of memory, but, rather, they are an integral part of its dynamics. This relation with absence is constitutive of the phenomenology of nostalgia, which can work towards the construction of an ethically good memory or, on the contrary, can act as an obstacle to a positive role of memory in building and enforcing personal and social relational environments.

This contribution is divided into three sections. First, I briefly reconstruct the origins of the concept of nostalgia and I focus in particular on Kant, who transforms nostalgia from the suffering from a lost place to the suffering from a definitively passed time. Nostalgia deals with time, not with spaces and places. I go on defining nostalgia as a feeling of something absent that the subject represents with the help of imagination. I point out that this feeling is addressed not only to the past, but also, and maybe to a greater extent, to the future as an attempt to build something that is not completely achievable. Nostalgia works with the remembrances that are unavoidably imagined and, to an extent, distorted. To the extent that it distorts events, it can be oppressive or liberating.

Second, I explore the relationship between nostalgia and memory from a phenomenological viewpoint taking cues from Levinas. The images, the traces, the narratives that nostalgia and memory construct are structurally interweaved

with absence, precarity, imperfection. Nostalgia can, thus, be considered as a particular feeling that humans perceive in front of absence, as an attitude towards the acknowledgment of an impossible totality. Nostalgia, like memory, can be open to indeterminacy or folded back on itself, can foster life or lead to death. Such a feeling is not unidirectional and has potentially the resources to work for the change and the flourishing of human beings and inclusive societies.

Third, I point out that nostalgia is neither good nor bad in itself. Rather, its ethical quality depends on the direction that it outlines and, consequently, of memory. If nostalgia is directed only to an impossible return to an imaginary and regressive state of fusion it mystifies memory, and uses it as a justification for a restoring or maintaining of the *status quo*—both personally and socially. In turn, if nostalgia recalls memory, questions it, addresses it in critical and reflective way, it becomes a means to compare, find out unheard voices from the past, give them the possibility to be heard. Defined as such, nostalgia is pacified with its impossibility to grasp totality and in its dwelling in the fragment.

I conclude by noting that suffering from something absent is one of the engines of memory, but the kind of reaction to such suffering makes the difference between a pathological and a safe nostalgia, an overloaded and a reconciled memory and society.

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Witold Płotka

Body, Empathy, and Joint Experiences
On Blaustein's Contribution to the Phenomenology of Sociality

This paper critically analyzes and explores the discussion of the theory of empathy formulated by Leopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [or 1944]) in his phenomenological aesthetics. Blaustein studied at Lvov University roughly between 1923 and 1927. After Twardowski's (and Ingarden's) recommendations, he studied under Husserl in Freiburg im Breisgau in the summer semester of 1925. He received a doctoral degree in 1927 (written under Twardowski), and in 1928 he published the dissertation as the very first monograph on Husserl published in Poland. The paper defends the thesis that Blaustein comprehends the body as the key phenomenon in empathy and social actions, such as, e.g., watching a movie in a cinema *together* with other viewers.

Blaustein understood sensuousness in his aesthetics in the broad context of bodily movements. This general concept was elaborated by Blaustein at three intertwined levels: (1) the body as the center point of aesthetic perception, which enables the constitution of the aesthetic object by the ongoing perception of it from different perspectives; (2) the body projected into the so-called imaginative world of art; finally, (3) the body of another subject, which is the basis for the empathic perception of the other's psychic life. Level (1) is connected with the spatiality of perceived art objects and, more generally, with the phenomenon of the perspectivity of perception. Blaustein emphasized that perception involves different perspectives, and this is possible due to the body of the viewer. He explored this problem in his *Przedstawienia imaginatywne* [*Imaginative Presentations*]. Level (1), thus described, corresponds with the most

basic experience of the body. It also determines level (2), i.e., the phenomenon of projecting the body (*rzutowanie ciała*) into the so-called imaginative world of art. Blaustein's idea of projecting the body describes the phenomenon of perspectivity inherent to artworks, including paintings, movies, or theater plays. Level (3) mainly concerns the phenomenon of perceiving the other's body—in Husserl's terminology, a physical or objective body (*Körper*)—, and the constitution of the other's psychic life *on the basis* of perceiving a mere physical body. In a word, level (3) concerns the phenomenon of empathy (*Einfühlung*). In the context of art, this phenomenon concerns the problem of understanding the characters represented in a work of art. Blaustein claimed that empathy is crucial for describing the aesthetic experience. In the paper, I will also analyze Blaustein's idea of "joint" experiences. For Blaustein, there are subjective aesthetic experiences, but there are also "joint" (*wspólne*) lived experiences, which can be determined in their intensity, quality, or time. For instance, in a radio broadcast, this phenomenon is possible *not* because of a joint aesthetic object, which is subjective through and through, but because of a joint emotional attitude, which is built in joint actions, such as the applause heard in a radio broadcast.

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IRINA POLESHCHUK

THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF CHRONIC PAIN
DESPAIR, GUILT, AND SUFFERING

In *The Absent Body*, Drew Leder writes that the phenomenological lived body is both the existential as well as the experiential body, and it forms the very core of subjectivity concentrating specifically on presence. Leder also notices that, being a foundation of almost all experiences, the living body continuously tends to recede from direct experience. Our embodied sensibility is the most solid and unescapable form of being present, it is also essentially characterized as the "absent body." The "absent body" operates in health instances and is widely present in biomedical discourse, however, it has been criticized in phenomenology. The phenomenon of chronic pain renders visible a gap between the "absent body" and sensibility of embodied experience, which opens an inter-affective dimension.

The paper discusses data-driven verbal and visual narratives of mothers experiencing chronic pain. Chronic pain experience rises various questions of the normativity of responsibility and the validity of moral acts in intersubjective relation. Trauma engrained in chronic pain reformulates meanings of intimacy, care, and modalities of female embodiment. The converse of chronic pain sharpens even more the dualism of body-present-in-illness/body-absent-in-health, which is uttered by contemporary phenomenology of medicine. The paper seeks to articulate an ethical relation in chronic pain (especially, the ethical temporality of the mother-child relation) and to sample multiple voices of narratives, which contribute to understanding of complexity and diversity of female subjectivity in pain. Elaborating the transitivity of responsibility

launched by specific structure of temporality of chronic pain, I wish to draw attention to the "how" of the social context, in which the illness narrative is constructed, told, and interpreted. Particularly, I wish to sharpen the gap between the medical discourse on disease and the individual traumatized experience of pain made visible in such modalities as guilt, shame, anger, and despair (often read as morbid experiences in the "absent body" paradigm).

The research data represent the narratives of women, which are collected from interviews, comments on social media platforms, and session of art therapies.

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Delia Popa

Phenomenology between Community and History

Meditating on Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity in *The Visible and the Invisible*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty sketched unique insights into the problems of human community and history as key concepts for the phenomenological investigation. Marc Richir attentively explored these philosophical insights over several decades, and remained deeply influenced in the development of his own phenomenological theory by Merleau-Ponty's subtle reading of Husserl. In my paper, I will examine Richir's reading of Merleau-Ponty in the 1990's, in order to clarify his understanding of the problem of the phenomenological community and of its history. I will start by discussing Richir's paper "The Meaning of Phenomenology in *The Visible and the Invisible*" with the scope of highlighting the general direction of Richir's reading of Merleau-Ponty. I will focus next on Richir's study "Community, Society and History in the later Merleau-Ponty," in order to compare Merleau-Ponty's and Richir's viewpoints on the problem of the phenomenological community. I will end by returning to *The Visible and the Invisible* to discuss the problem of sense-sedimentation in a savage history.

For Richir, Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy offers unique elaborations of this historicity of meaning revealed for the first time in Husserl's theory of passivity. While Husserl's late phenomenology speaks about the plurality of horizons involved in every perception, Richir highlights the *uncontrollable* character of this plurality, ultimately related to a plurality of different worlds, which are contingently intertwined in their manifestation. Merleau-Ponty's

late phenomenology is, thus, a guide in thinking the contingent character of human encounter and the cosmic historicity of its phenomenological meaning, exploring the chiasm as the core of an experience whose ownership is ever disputable, as the sense of my experience can only be discovered by the other, while their own take on experience starts to make sense only when I participate in it as well. The "communitization" (*Urgemeinshaftung*) of experiences captures the ever-reversible process of sense-making, in which I cannot possibly understand myself without the other. Yet, the reversibility of the human encounter depends on the substitutability of its meaning, in its uncontrollable propagation and mutation, made possible by the hollows that are articulating the connection of my life to the life of the other, by an inner lacuna that never perfectly corresponds to the lacunae of the other. What we are lacking, thus, creates a contrast with what the other is lacking, generating a "perspective multiplicity," motivated by the way, in which the hollows of my life—zones of lack, of self-ignorance, or of neglect—get projected into the hollows of the life of the other, making possible movements of mutual curiosity articulated in the "connective tissue" contingently created by each human encounter from the shreds of absence we passively gather and confront.

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Fabián Portillo Palma

Isolation and Loneliness as Categories of Social Being
Arendt and the Origin of Totalitarian Movements

On the last pages of her monumental work *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt asks herself the following question: how was the rise of totalitarian power possible? She finds a precise answer to the problem in certain kinds of affection as a way of being related to the world. The latter are mainly two: isolation, felt by the majority of population in the modern times, and loneliness, which undoubtfully marks the point of no return from the dangerous spiral that leads to totalitarian domination. Isolated is the individual when he or she turns to be a part of the mass, who is brought to the side of all common life in terms of political autonomy and right to participation, while the individual is lonely only when it becomes, as a result of its isolated condition, numb to itself. The first possibility can be considered as a denial of the *vita activa* in terms of the political and social construction of the inhabited world. The second one is the abdication of the capacity of thinking inherited by all human beings.

What makes Arendt's analysis relevant, is precisely that she does not refer to these two factors as historical events but as ways of the social life of human beings. Even by denying ourselves as autonomous subjects, as citizens in the strong sense of the word, we are still assuming a specific way of common life. In this sense, her study on totalitarian movements and totalitarian domination can be seen as a phenomenological approach to the phenomenon of social life, which under totalitarian domination presents itself through the reality of the mass with its two main features: isolation and loneliness. It is not a question of the past, but rather a matter of our current existence: totalitarianism is the

type of social control and mass domination that results from a specific way of being in the world, of being related to others, and of being related with oneself.

We are convinced that her categories are still meaningful to develop a comprehensive thinking, which would enable us to understand the origin of the new authoritarianism, internally tied to conspiracy theories and pseudo-knowledge, that we are facing nowadays. This paper does not aim, however, to summarize Arendt's ideas, or to compare the reality described by her with ours. Its purpose is rather to initiate a deep and philosophically relevant reflection on the type of human existence that wishes for such a form of political organization and domination. This is, in our opinion, one of the most important tasks nowadays.

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Sociality in the Husserlian Cave

Husserl's philosopher leaves the cave by, paradoxically, remaining in it, but no longer shares the beliefs of his silent, inactive neighbors. Unlike their attachment, the phenomenological inhabitant of the cave will reflect the degree of the justification of his beliefs, but at the same time he will come out of his individuality, varying his individual ego in accordance with various variations of himself that open with the temptation of otherness. In order to get rid of the cave limitations, it is not necessary to leave the cave ambience. It is enough to change our attitude. Husserl's idea of sociality examines the intersubjective constitution of the subject, including theories of strangeness and otherness. If we come to our senses, let us be convinced that the experience of a foreigner has already done its job. The rationality of phenomenological politics becomes detectable by recognizing others in oneself. Its peaceful assumption rests in recognizing others, even strangers, as variations of myself. The capacity to acquire enemies is largely neutralized by such an approach.

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Iaan Reynolds

Distance and Detachment in Phenomenology and the Sociology of Intellectuals

If philosophical insight implies a distinctive distance from natural or lived experience, the relationship between this form of knowledge and the conditions fostering social change presents an important thematic for study. This paper investigates this thematic by considering the ambivalences between detachment and social immersion found in works of phenomenology, and in the social philosophy of intellectuals from the early 20th century. Reflecting on the similarities and divergences between their methodological approach to distance and detachment, I show the way, in which phenomenology and critical sociology of intellectuals can supplement each other's understanding of the social responsibilities entailed by theoretical knowledge.

I begin with a treatment of distance and detachment in the phenomenological tradition, highlighting the latter's ambivalence. On the one hand, phenomenologists since Husserl have treated the reduction as a bracketing of the natural attitude, and a separation of this attitude from philosophical inquiry. Phenomenological methodology, as exemplified in Eugen Fink's and Merleau-Ponty's later elaborations, for example, begins by taking distance from natural and scientific attitudes. At the same time, this mode of philosophical inquiry is also conceived as a departure from contemporary scientific thinking specifically due to the latter's rigid separations and methodological objectifications, whether exemplified in psychologism, behaviorism, or positivism. While phenomenological methodology demands a critical distance, it also offers a perspective, from which apparently similar

forms of separation in other fields may be criticized. I suggest in this section that we understand this ambiguity through a recollection of the constant crisis conditioning phenomenology's mode of inquiry.

In the second section, I bring these insights to the field of sociology of intellectuals, beginning with Karl Mannheim's reflections on intellectuals. In these texts, intellectuals are characterized both by the way, in which they are able to take distance from their social and political history, and by their simultaneous embeddedness in the social world. In some of Mannheim's experimental essays from the early 1920s, this connection is conceived in explicitly phenomenological terms. In these texts, I suggest, we find an important account of the paradoxical position of intellectuals with regard to social and political commitments, with a morphological similarity to the ambivalence noted in the first section. I close with some reflections on the problems this similarity opens up in the realm of intellectual and political life, with some reflections on Merleau-Ponty's "The War Has Taken Place" and Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain*.

Dr. **Iaan Reynolds** is an Adjunct Instructor of philosophy and ethics at Villanova University, where he completed his Ph.D. in 2021. His dissertation studied the relationship between ideology critique and the intellectual contexts, in which it is carried out, through an examination of the social theories of Theodor W. Adorno, Karl Popper, and Karl Mannheim. His current research carries this line of inquiry further by analyzing the conditions allowing for the cultivation of critique, and the changes in political theory resulting from the shift from a diagnostic method of critique to critique as an educational process.

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Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl

Love and Disagreement

At first sight, tackling with the topic of love and disagreement is confronted with two serious objections. On the one hand, the status of love as a moral emotion is highly controversial. This is due to the fact that love is directed towards particular objects. Yet, with regard to demands of impartiality, universality, or objectivity love's commitment to particular objects has been considered either as a thoroughly problematic implication or, as Bernard Williams argued, as a significant clue for being suspicious of any ethical theory that revolves around demands of impartiality, universal validity, general principles, and the like. On the other hand, love seems unsuited for drawing up unequivocal and substantial arguments concerning disagreement. Lovingly attending to another person means to bestow positive appraisal. It, therefore, excludes disagreement in terms of an all-things-considered negative judgment upon their beloved one. Yet, on a broader scale, lovers may nonetheless get involved in disagreements, both on the social and practical implications of their loving relations and all sorts of other issues. Contrary to this view on love as part of people's real and messy lives, philosophers may focus on the pure nature of love as a specific type of intentional experience, leaving aside all kinds of contingent circumstances that invite disagreement. Love, thus conceived, cherishes relations to various objects that mark the very opposite of disagreement by striving for satisfaction, harmony, and unity, or unification, respectively. The present paper focuses on the intentional structure and feeling qualities involved in love as a specific emotional experience. It argues that

ambivalence and disagreement carry through the visible manifestations of love to its deeper levels, both in terms of a person's character and the complexity of love as an emotion whose reality reveals itself according to different types and different layers of loving. The author explores a deep level intertwinement of love and disagreement, which allows for facing disagreement in a generous and conciliatory manner, thereby making up love's radiating social and moral power. As will be shown by inquiring into Dietrich von Hildebrand's conception of love as a *supervalue response* and by developing a new account of *love-respect*, disagreement in a certain sense is part of love's in-depth structure. The outcome of this inquiry is twofold. First, establishing different types of love and different levels of investigating love enables us to gain a better understanding of the range of disagreement in human consciousness and human lives. Second, the significance of love as a moral emotion is determined by transcending first-level object directed instances of love in favor of a deep-level account of love-respect. By doing so, we may then reassess the above-mentioned quarrel between advocates of universalism and particularism.

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revolve around a systematic conception of how emotion, person, and ethical theory could be intertwined on a phenomenological basis.

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Fabio Rovigo

Husserl's Phenomenology of Sociality
From Social Acts to Communities

In this paper, I reconstruct Edmund Husserl's account of communicative social acts and their role within the personalistic attitude. Such reconstruction is based on Husserl's original manuscripts for *Ideas II*. After illustrating Husserl's notion of personalistic attitude, I discuss the distinctive features of communicative social acts in contrast with empathy (*Einfühlung*). Against that background, I address communicative acts at an individual and a collective level. I go on to outline the role of communicative social acts and mutual agreement in different types of communalization. Finally, I address some important implications of Husserl's analysis of social acts for the concepts of objectivity and normality, suggesting that it offers a fruitful account for debates on the relation between communication and objectivity.

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MARCO RUSSO

SOCIAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF ECCENTRICITY

It is well known that Helmuth Plessner placed the notion of eccentricity at the basis of his anthropology. The notion evokes a dialectic between being and having, the visible and the invisible, the internal, external, and common worlds. It is a dialectic without synthesis, describing an irreducibly ambiguous way of being, where personal identity is the precarious result of opposing drives. The "I" is not the center of subjectivity, just as the "we" is not the center of sociality, since both are traversed by an impersonal sphere, which is a center of mediation, but also of estrangement and, therefore, of conflict.

My contribution aims to highlight the phenomenological and hermeneutical potential of the eccentric model with regard to sociality. To this end, I will consider the topic of embodiment (*Verkörperung*) and aesthesiology (*Ästhesiologie*), and then give an overview of a social dialectic of eccentric life. In the first part, I examine the relationship between body and role by outlining a kind of *social aesthesiology*, i.e., a public scene where, alongside the verbal exchange, also appearances, atmospheres, tastes, rituals, and artifices have a decisive function in giving form and meaning to collective life. In the second part, I highlight the ethical-political sense of the eccentric dialectic, where conflict and ambiguity are a resource, but also a constant threat to the balance of advanced societies.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. **Marco Russo** currently teaches theoretical philosophy at the University of Salerno (Italy). Taking into account metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical aspects, his main research topics concern the concepts of humanity and

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Alexey Savin

Is the National-Socialist State the Truth of Heidegger's Philosophy?
The Transformation of the Interpretation of Heidegger's Philosophy in the Soviet Marxism

The aim of the talk is to reveal the logic of the transformation of the interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy in the Soviet Marxism. From my viewpoint, the struggle for or against Heidegger's legacy in the Soviet Marxism has three stages. The first stage is constituted by the orthodox Stalinist (naturalistic) position of Bernard Byhovsky, the first Soviet philosopher to write about Heidegger. According to him, the national-socialist state and its misanthropic (Schmittean) political theory are the truth of Heidegger's philosophy. The second stage originated from the crypto-Hegelian-Marxist position of Georg Lukács during his Thermidorian period. From his perspective, Heidegger's philosophy is not a fascist, but pre-fascist (*prä-faschistische*) one because of his estimation of Heidegger's ontological difference and formal indication. According to Lukács, they are the obstacle for the transformation of Heidegger's political fascization into a philosophical (metaphysical) one. Nevertheless, in his works *Existenzialismus oder Marxismus* and *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft*, Lukács demonstrates that Heidegger's substantiation of anxiety (*Angst*) and boredom (*Langweiligkeit*), and, consequently, their dehistorization, as well as his aristocratic theory of knowledge, contribute to the formation of the atmosphere, in which Nazism was formed, and the subsequent legitimation thereof. The third period is the "censored Soviet neo-Marxism" of the Soviet philosophers of the Thaw (*Ottepel*) period. They consider Heidegger's philosophy to be a significant criticism of the capitalist culture (*Kulturkritik*). Specifically, they consider it to be the criticism of the

reification of the human species-being (*Gattungswesen*) and the fetishization of time. The talk demonstrates that the transformation of the interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy in the Soviet Union takes place against the background of the degeneration of Soviet Marxism. This process determines the weakening of the radicalism of the Russian criticism of Heidegger's philosophy and, at the same time, the legitimation of Heideggerian studies in the late USSR and the post-Soviet Russia. The meaning of the discussion in the Soviet Marxism, especially the Byhovsky-Lukács controversy, is reactivated with the Habermas-Di Cesare polemic on the metaphysical nature of Heidegger's National Socialism.

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Max Schaefer

Inhuman Ethics
Dancing in the Strange Beauty of Life with Clarice Lispector and Michel Henry

This paper investigates the nature of life and what a robust understanding of it means for the field of ethics. Through a critical study of Jewish-Brazilian-Ukrainian writer Clarice Lispector and French phenomenologist Michel Henry, I argue that life is at heart inhuman, affective, and worldly in nature, and that a proper understanding of inhuman life can undo sharp distinctions between human and other, beauty and ugliness, good and evil. In light of this, I suggest that the work of these two figures paves a way towards an ethical cosmopolitanism of flourishing, which involves hope and love for life as a whole.

In drawing out the insights into life that may be gleaned from these two thinkers, I find that Lispector's work challenges and helps correct what numerous commentators have correctly regarded as Henry's limited or otherwise problematic understanding of life as essentially first-personal and non-worldly in nature. That is, Henry insists, for one, that life is always the life of someone, and, as commentators have pointed out, he does not address whether life might function in an impersonal third-person manner, or whether his conception of life also applies to non-human entities. By construing life as a radical immanence that does not admit any distance or relate to anything other than itself, Henry also endeavors to separate life from the transcendence of the world. In conceiving of immanent life as the foundation of the transcendence of the world, though, Henry's own analyses do not support this conclusion, and in fact call for a re-conception of life as open to the transcendence of the

world. By analyzing Lispector's account of G.H.'s encounter with a cockroach in the servant's quarters in her apartment in *The Passion According to G.H.*, I show how this experience reveals to G.H. and us the underlying impersonal character and essentially worldly nature of life.

Following this, I lay out how G.H.'s experience of the inhuman through her encounter with the cockroach forces her to rethink her relation to the world and living beings. By compelling her to leave *her* world and enter what Lispector refers to as the "primary world," the incident with the cockroach alleviates the sharp, hierarchal divisions between human and other, beauty and ugliness, good and evil, and enables G.H. to see that life exceeds such trappings of human thought. In so doing, G.H. comes to understand that, at heart, there is a strange beauty to all life, one which cannot be captured in human conceptions of beauty and ugliness, and good and evil.

That being said, I maintain that Lispector does not describe how one comes to experience and understand this strange beauty in sufficient detail. In my view, Henry's work can supplement Lispector's account of this matter. For Henry finds that the contents of the world, such as forms and colors, do not merely function as aspects of an object, which appear to perceptual consciousness as objective forms and colors and which, as a result, are known in terms of what they mean or signify within the individual's worldly context of significance. According to Henry, the sensible elements of the world also appear in an immediate and non-representational manner as an affective tonality that is produced within the flesh of the individual. Rather than being restricted to the meanings that appear to contain them within the individual's objective world, Henry observes that the contents of the world can exceed these parameters and be experienced and known in terms of the affective tonalities they arouse within one's flesh. In my view, these findings account for how G.H. comes to experience and know the cockroach, not as a cockroach, but as a strangely beautiful living being.

Together, I maintain that the works of Lispector and Henry point toward an ethical cosmopolitanism of flourishing. In analyzing the accounts of strange beauty that are provided by these two figures, I argue that what comes forward is that a part of what is enjoyed in this experience is the sense of mystery and uncertainty it arouses in us, and, by extension, the hopeful feeling that the

matter at hand may offer something of value, though we cannot grasp what that is, or whether this feeling will be confirmed. The hopefulness that strange beauty inspires is, thus, one that, far from convincing the living being that she can overcome or correct the horrors of life (as Nietzsche argues), attunes her to its terrible truth (i.e., the possibility of suffering, meaninglessness, death) and to its possibilities for flourishing. In both Lispector and Henry, I maintain that these possibilities for flourishing are communal in nature. By focusing on the account of community that emerges in these two writers, I demonstrate that the experience of strange beauty gives birth to a hope in life's communal possibilities for flourishing, and to a desire to pursue those possibilities. In so doing, I maintain that the hope strange beauty inspires can give rise to an ethical cosmopolitanism of flourishing, in that it motivates love, understood as participation in ongoing processes of becoming-in-relation, wherein living beings desire to create new possibilities for flourishing by supporting and learning from one another in their respective pursuits.

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Markus Seethaler

The Epistemology of Disagreement and Moral Disputes

The central question in the epistemology of disagreement concerns the rational reaction to learning that others hold opposing beliefs to oneself. I argue against one-size-fits-all solutions to this question and for an approach that puts strong emphasis on contextual factors. According to this view, disagreement provides us with evidence for an error in our reasoning. The question regarding the rational reaction to this evidence depends on its strength in the concrete situation and does not allow for a universally valid answer. Applied to moral disagreement, this approach shows that we need a nuanced understanding of different kinds of moral disputes.

In the debate about the epistemology of disagreement, we commonly find two idealizations that sometimes contribute to too simplistic approaches to the relating phenomena. One is the concept of peerhood, the other the focus on disagreements between just two individuals. Given the fact how demanding it is to define and identify epistemic parity, endorsing a more realistic and less idealized conception of epistemic peers seems more promising. Regarding disagreement between more than two individuals, it is usually assumed that beliefs of others are only relevant if they are formed independently. I will outline why this assumption is wrong and dependent beliefs are always relevant for peer disagreements, if the individuals are not simply parroting the beliefs of others. Investigating these two factors with a more practical orientation, speaks against strictly steadfast and conciliatory approaches to peer disagreement. Instead, I argue that there is something right about both. While steadfast views

emphasize the worth of self-trust and the first-person perspective, conciliatory ones have the plausible assumption on their side that disagreement makes us aware of our fallibility. Therefore, I suggest an approach that acknowledges the general significance of disagreement while still emphasizing the importance of contextual factors.

Applying this approach to moral disagreement and combining it with the plausible observation that morality is a complex and complicated area, calls attention to the need for a nuanced understanding of moral disagreement. I argue that one aspect that needs more consideration is their level of resolvability. Some moral disagreements are resolvable by pointing out the mistakes one involved party made. Others are not resolvable in this way, because they are faultless and involve different weighting and balancing of moral values. Still others are not resolvable at all, because they are deep and combine local moral disagreements with disagreements about foundational epistemic principles and doxastic practices. This nuanced picture of moral disagreement helps to identify and deal with important differentiations that otherwise would get lost.

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Tatiana Shchyttsova

"The Solidarity of the Shaken"
Revisiting Patočka's and Havel's Ideas from the Perspective of the Belarussian Protest Movement 2020–2021

Taking my bearings from Jan Patočka's *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* and Havel's *The Power of the Powerless*, I am going to focus on structural, affective, and ethical preconditions of the unprecedented experience of solidarity we observed in the Belarussian protest movement. Both Patočka's understanding of the shaken as well as Havel's vision of the existential-political perspectives of those who dare to live against the oppressive ("post-totalitarian") system seem informative for a comprehension of the genesis and development of the massive non-violent protests in Belarus. However, their approaches and notions are not relevant *stricto sensu* for the Belarusian socio-political crisis at issue. In my talk, I would like to show that and how the basic ideas caught in the concepts of "the solidarity of the shaken" and "the power of the powerless," respectively, have been re-appropriated and re-interpreted in the Belarusian social-cultural and political context of 2020–2021. The purpose of the paper is to inquire into various constitutive elements of solidarity in question, since it is a shared experience that presupposes a characteristic intersection of "I" and "we," that of individual's being-shocked (traumatized) and collective (shared) emotions, of personal awareness and collective intentionality. In particular, I will focus on how ethics precedes and informs political articulation of solidarity. Furthermore, a link between the *genesis* of political solidarity and its *manifestation* will be explored.

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Evgeniya A. Shestova

Phenomenology of Reading Communication in the Text Space

In my talk, I propose a phenomenological analysis of reading conceived of as communication in the text space. It is based on H.-G. Gadamer's and M. Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of the functioning of language pertaining to reading.

E. Husserl comes to the conception of language as being formed and functioning within the intersubjective dimension. The problem, however, arises: how is it possible to analyze language in a situation of missing communication, such as reading?

I propose to consider reading as a quasi-dialogue. Such a concept of reading allows to avoid the problem of reality of "the dialogue partner." Instead, I intend to investigate, what produces the effect of request to the reader and of communication through the text.

I start with the examination of Gadamer's "logic of question and answer." Gadamer namely writes: "it [the text] puts a question to the interpreter." This does not mean a real dialogue with the text or author. But there exists an aspect, which provokes such a description. The question put forth by the text is a request as a structural part of an expression. This request is experienced as "to be addressed" (*Betroffensein*) by the text. I propose to interpret "question" and "answer" as two aspects of sense, which are contained interwoven in every expression: the negative and the positive.

Following Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of language as gesticulation in *Phenomenology of Perception*, I trace the function of question, or the negative

aspect of sense, in the communication. In *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty denotes by "geste" the expressive emotional gesture. A facial expression is not only intersubjectively formed, but also addressed to the other. The theory of emotions named "the behavioral ecology view of facial displays" proposes to conceive of facial displays as communicative requests and tools for influence: smiling means not happiness, but "influence interactant to play or affiliate," and so on. In general, a "question" outlines the open possibilities of sense. Speaking marks the gap between the spoken word and something that is to speak—it marks a lack of sense.

In his late works, Merleau-Ponty expands the meaning of language gesture to the "practical" gesture. He re-interprets Husserl's concept of the "significative intention" and accentuates the meaning of a tendency, of a void that is to be fulfilled by the reader. The text conveys neither sense nor signification, but a significative intention. It is a request addressed to the reader from the "other" who is regarded as the "owner" of the intention. The latter is described by philosophers as the "author" or the "text"—who becomes a "dialogue partner." I propose to consider it as a "quasi-author" that formulates an unavoidable part of every act of reading. It denotes that the significative intention does not belong to the reader, but comes from an "other," and requests of the reader to adequately transform his/her sense medium.

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Paulina Sosnowska

The Wounds of War and the Scars of Culture
Simone Weil and René Girard on Sociality of Violence

The philosophical discourses on violence developed in the 20th century can be grasped in two fundamental paradigms: the paradigm of force (Simone Weil) and the paradigm of domination (Horkheimer and Adorno). The paper is a part of a bigger project of reading modern discourses on violence within these two paradigms. This contribution aims at situating the theory of culture by René Girard within the paradigm of violence as immediate force, stemming from Simone Weil's phenomenological description of force in *The Iliad*. Simone Weil can be read as a model for modern reflection on violence in different ways: one of them can be the identifying of her interpretation of *The Iliad* as a starting point for the critique or even the unmasking of blind reifying violence through philosophy of culture: an example of this kind of translation can be found in Girard and his analyses of the figure of the scapegoat and rituals of violence (sanctioned within myth), transferring violence into the sacral sphere.

The pivotal point of comparison is the concept of *kydos*, "the triumphant fascination of superior violence," developed by Girard in *Violence and the Sacred*. The Greek term, which connects violence understood in the mode of immediate force with the magical and sacral dimension, serves as a key concept for the comparison of the two thinkers' conceptualization of force. It allows an interpretation of the conceptual tenets of Girardian theory, such as unanimity, symmetry, mimesis, and myth in the light of key concepts of Weil, such as reification, symmetry, unawareness, and the blind mechanism of force. It also

allows us to point out the discrepancies between the two conceptualizations (above all, the tensions between the rationality and the irrationality of violence), and to grasp Girard's theory as a philosophical commentary to Weil's insights. This is going to fill a spot on the map of modern discourses on violence.

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Nerijus Stasiulis

The Ontology of Sociality

The questions of social relations presuppose ontological questions. First of all, what is—or between whom exists—a social relation? If it is between individuals, then how *can* they and *why* do they come into a social relation? The possibility and cause of a social relation is presupposed by and is thus prior to individuals of the relation. In Heidegger's philosophy this presupposition is termed *mit-Sein* (Being-with). The *mit-Sein* is very rich in its characteristics, because it further presupposes (or is "equiprimordial" with) the spatiality of Dasein. Secondly, social relations are relations of mutual influence and exchange thereof, of mutual coming-together and separation. In fact, they are *aetiological* relations. How is this *aition* to be conceived of? Martin Heidegger offers an analysis of the ontological origin of *aetiology* and the historical change of the notions of *aition* and *cause* alongside the history of Being (*Seynsgeschichte*). The notion of space that we have come to have as a result of the scientific (Cartesian) revolution and the notion of causality that we have come to have as part of the same process of the birth and maturation of modern science have come together in the modern situation where the world is structured according to the technological principle. The world, in which we find ourselves today, is the outcome of the Cartesian understanding of space. This is also the space of social relations. Hence, the characterization of *mit-Sein* takes place at the junction point of space in the Cartesian and space in the Daseinian sense.

The question of the technological structurization of our space and/of social relations inevitably has a political aspect. However, for Heidegger politics

is but a "curvature" of time-space: that is, it is a derivative of ontology. The German thinker does not provide much more than a description of the general structure of Dasein as a normative, or guiding, notion. In this presentation, I will also try to supplement Heideggerian thinking on social relations with ontological notions taken from a Lithuanian thinker Arvydas Šliogeris (1944–2019) who called Heidegger his teacher. His ontological notion of *esmas* ("is-ness" as opposed to nothing-ness) serves as a powerful critique of the medialization of the world in the time of technology, and points to our bodily existence necessarily attached to our senses and direct, immediate experience. In the final analysis, the Heideggerian notion of space and social relations also points to bodily existence.

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Michael Staudigl

A Phenomenology of Negative Sociality

With the concept of "negative sociality," I intend to discuss an eminently problematic issue that confronts our traditional phenomenologies of intersubjectivity, sociality, and symbolic interaction with a severe objection. This syntagma, in fact, bears witness to the suspicion that inherently negative experiences—ranging from mistrust, discrimination, and contempt to all forms of violence—cannot be cancelled out or integrated by a community or a society that is characterized by responsibility, justice, discursive deliberation, or reciprocal recognition. This suspicion confronts us with the necessity to critically assess and perhaps fundamentally revise these concepts, eventually the concept of the social as such.

Against this background, I will present the thesis that the social, under these conditions, cannot be consistently brought under the rule of law or be pacified by the rules of coexistence, but has to be taken seriously in its protean and unforeseeable, normatively undeterminable character, thus pointing us to Nietzsche's "beyond good and evil." Consequently, the classical orientation of phenomenology that was based on the teleological assurance of perceptual harmony (Husserl) and universal compossibility (Merleau-Ponty), etc., is presented to be in need of correction. "Negativity" hence must not be misunderstood as a phenomenon of contingent deficiency that could be caught up with discursively, mediated dialectically, or overcome procedurally. If, however, it is not to be understood in such terms as a contingent deficiency of justice, trust, responsibility, communalization, solidarity, communication,

as tends to be assumed by the mainstream of social philosophy, founding ideas of unity (harmony, *concordia*, *homonoia*, universality, the "reciprocity of perspectives," the "non-violent discourse," or the "ideal communication society') lose their foundational and integrational significance for the understanding of social phenomena.

This paper (1) outlines the idea of "negative sociality," and (2) discusses the socio-political consequences of a phenomenological outlook on this kind of negativity that is neither willing to sacrifice experiences of negativity to a socio-technological quest for unity and order, nor to hypostatize them as the presumed other of reason and order as such. In conclusion (3), I will argue for a diacritical hermeneutic phenomenology that is able to describe social phenomena in their irreducible ambiguity, that is, as being constituted in an interplay of order/disorder, violence/counter-violence., etc., which must not be resolved in a one-sided fashion since this would imply violence, too.

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Jan Strassheim

The Other within Myself
Schutz, Husserl, and Nishida on Intersubjectivity

Alfred Schutz's lifelong aim was to clarify intersubjectivity as a fundamental condition for the social world. In 1929, he learned that Husserl had a similar objective and started working with phenomenology. When he published the results in a 1932 book, Husserl was impressed and offered him to become his assistant. However, Schutz was critical of the transcendental approach to intersubjectivity as later developed in more detail in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*. In Schutz's view, an access to an Alter Ego presupposes an experience of alterity present within the Ego from the outset. To capture intersubjectivity, he argued, we need to specify a worldly application of the transcendental framework, termed by Husserl a "phenomenology of the natural attitude."

The central element in Schutz's approach was the concept of "types," which he later refined with the help of Husserl's concept of the same name. When shared and handed down within a culture, types shape experience across a plurality of subjects. Types are dynamic in a way that strict rules or ideal essences are not. A type can be created, changed, or abandoned; where applied, it is open to individual modifications and exceptions. Without this variability, types would render us unable to understand a person from another culture, recognize an "atypical" individual, or even get to know people beyond their typically expected traits. But if types shape our experience, the problem of the Ego's access to an Alter Ego returns in a different guise: What motivates me to question the types I have relied upon so far, to modify them, or to deviate

from them? Schutz points to "problems," which cause our typical expectations to fail and force us to reconsider our types. But such cases do not reflect the spontaneity, with which we can (in principle) experience the alterity of others.

Schutz died without finding a solution. Had his friendship with the philosopher of law Otaka Tomoo not been cut short by Otaka's return to Japan and his own emigration to the USA, Schutz might have benefitted from the ideas of his friend's former teacher, Nishida Kitarō, the founder of modern Japanese philosophy. In a 1932 essay, Nishida, too, treated the problem of intersubjectivity in terms of the encounter between an Ego and an "other." But unlike Husserl and Schutz, he stressed that this encounter involves a radical "discontinuity" within experience, which, according to him, escapes many "Western" thinkers with their traditional bias towards "continuity." Only this discontinuity, which Nishida compares to my "death" within my own experience, allows me to find an "other within myself," and thus to open myself to the other before me. In the light of Husserl and Schutz, Nishida's often religiously influenced terminology can be understood as a potential solution to a phenomenological problem. Conversely, this solution brings to the fore comparable ideas in both Husserl's and Schutz's unpublished manuscripts of the period.

Dr. **Jan Straßheim** is a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Hildesheim (Germany), where he established his DFG funded project *Towards an Anthropology of Relevance* in 2020. His work at the intersection between phenomenology and social theory is informed by a critical reading of Alfred Schutz. Focusing first on philosophy of language ("Relevance Theories of Communication," in *Journal of Pragmatics*, 2010), Straßheim systematically developed Schutz's concept of "relevance" in his doctoral thesis at the Free University of Berlin (published as *Sinn und Relevanz*, 2015), applied it to fields such as emotion and aesthetics and co-edited the multidisciplinary volume *Relevance and Irrelevance* (2018). Based on research done at the Keio University (Tokyo, Japan), his recent work aims at an anthropological and intercultural foundation of a philosophy of relevance that builds on Schutz, Kant ("Kant and the Scandal of Intersubjectivity," in *Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Phenomenology*, 2021), Helmuth Plessner, and Nishida Kitarō.

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Karol Tarnowski

Individuality and Community
Phenomenological Considerations

The tensions between individuality and community are notorious and inevitable. The heart of the matter is that an individual cannot exist, that is, think and act, without a community. We are in a dialogical relationship with others and also become elements of communities. Does a community deprive us of individuality, or does it instead express it? To what degree can we identify with a community? Can, and sometimes must, we make sacrifices for the community? To what degree can its laws demand this of us? On the other hand, will identification with a community deprive us of the ability to maintain our own individuality and perception (and recognition) of a separate individual or community? Perhaps the problem rests in the dichotomy of openness and insularity of both the individual and the community. Openness and insularity always mean otherness: can we respect it in its otherness, or do we instead want to usurp or destroy it? The dichotomy of totalitarianism and democracy rests somewhere here, as well.

Prof. Dr. **Karol Tarnowski**, philosopher and pianist, is professor emeritus at the Pontifical University of John Paul II in Cracow (the former Pontifical Academy of Theology), where he headed the Chair in the Philosophy of God. He was also a lecturer at the Jagiellonian University as well as the Jesuit University Ignatianum in Cracow (Poland). He deals with questions related to philosophy of God, philosophy of faith, and post-secular philosophy. Tarnowski is inspired by phenomenology in the broad sense and by the French philosophy of the spirit; recently, he has also been interested in the

metaphysics of Platonic origin. He has authored numerous books, including: *Usłyszeć niewidzialne. Zarys filozofii wiary* (*To Hear the Invisible: An Outline of the Philosophy of Faith*, for which he received the Father Józef Tischner Award and the "Feniks" Award of the Association of Catholic Publishers), *Człowiek i transcendencja* (*Humanity and Transcendence*), *Wiara i Myślenie* (*Faith and Thinking*), *Bóg Fenomenologów* (*The God of the Phenomenologists*), *Tropy myślenia religijnego* (*The Tropes of Religious Thinking*), and, most recently, *Pragnienie metafizyczne* (*Metaphysical Desire*). He was also the editor of two series at one of Poland's biggest publishing houses, Znak: "Biblioteki Filozofii Religii" ("The Library of the Philosophy of Religion") and "Teologia Żywa" ("Living Theology").

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Ruth Rebecca Tietjen

Fear, Fanaticism, and Fragile Identities

Fear, anxiety, and uncertainty play a crucial role in the genesis of antagonistic political emotions and movements. For example, extremism is described as a reaction to uncertainty and claimed to involve the perception of an out-group as an intrinsic threat to one's ingroup; fundamentalism is claimed to be a reaction to the threats of modernization and the disconcerting erosion of traditional identities through the processes of globalization and secularization. Perceived threats to one's own or one's group's identity, self-esteem, or very existence are identified as characteristic or even defining elements of group-centered hatred, fanaticism, or right-wing-populism.

However, the exact nature of fear and anxiety in this context remains unexplored. Although the experiences in question are namely sometimes identified as affective, they are usually not explored from the perspective, and with the tools of philosophy of emotion. This is true even for the literature within philosophy of emotion, which mentions phenomena of fear and anxiety, yet is mainly concerned with exploring other affective phenomena, such as hatred, resentment, or the affective mechanism of fanaticism. My talk aims at filling this gap by providing an analysis of the nature and role of perceived identity threats in the genesis of fanaticism. Thereby, I draw on philosophical literature as well as on results from neighboring disciplines, especially social psychology, sociology, and political theory.

In the first part of my talk, I provide a preliminary definition of fanaticism, according to which fanaticism involves both the loving, wholehearted, social

identity-defining devotion to a sacred object or idea, and a hostile antagonism towards the outgroup, renegade members of the ingroup, and problematic aspects of oneself. What binds these two components—loving devotion and hostile antagonism—together is fear. In the second part of my talk, I offer a detailed analysis of the role of fear and anxiety in the genesis and maintenance of fanaticism. I argue that each of the aforementioned three forms of hostile antagonism corresponds to one form of fear or anxiety: fear of the outgroup, fear of renegade members of the ingroup, and fear (or self-reflexive anxiety) of problematic aspects of oneself. The fanatic answers these fears with violence and fraternity-terror. In each of the three forms of fear and anxiety, what is at stake for the fanatic are both his sacred values and his individual and social identity. In the third and final part of my talk, I turn to the question of what grounds the fanatic's fears and anxieties, arguing that the latter ultimately express his aversiveness to and flight from the existential condition of uncertainty itself.

Dr. **Ruth Rebecca Tietjen** is a postdoctoral researcher at the Center for Subjectivity Research of the University of Copenhagen (Denmark), where she is employed in the FWF-project *Antagonistic Political Emotions*. Her research is situated at the intersection of philosophy of emotion, philosophy of religion, anthropology, ethics, and political philosophy. She feels committed to the idea of a critically engaged philosophy: philosophy that addresses pressing problems of today's world and aims at making an existential or political difference. Particularly, she is researching religious zeal, fanaticism, fundamentalism, and populism. Moreover, she is working on existential phenomena, such as religious feelings, mortality, eternity, anxiety, loneliness, and melancholy, and exploring the edges of language. She is currently finishing two book projects on fanaticism: the monograph *Philosophische Variationen* über *den Fanatismus oder: Kalliope im Spiegelkabinett* and, together with her colleagues from Vienna, the edited volume *The Philosophy of Fanaticism: Epistemic, Affective, and Political Dimensions* (under contract with Routledge).

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Peter Andras Varga

The Phenomenological Gathering in 1929
A Social Episode from the History of Phenomenology and Its Lessons for Contemporary Phenomenologists

There exists a special type of sociality peculiar to phenomenology, namely, that which is exemplified by intersubjective connections between the historical figures of the phenomenological movement itself, or, respectively, by their reflections on the social dimension of the history of phenomenology. In the first part of my paper, I intend to develop a case study, namely the public commemoration of Edmund Husserl's seventieth birthday in 1929. I draw on a wide range of historical sources—including not only the minutiae of celebrations recorded in letters and recollections, but, first and foremost, the occasional sources (e.g., newspaper articles) that document the perception of the nascent phenomenological movement by its contemporaries—, in order to reconstruct intricate intersubjective situations, their perceptions, as well as various *metaphilosophical standpoints* inextricably interwoven both in the interpersonal relations as well as the various public and semi-public images of phenomenology.

In the second, theoretical part of my paper, I argue for philosophical conclusions on the basis of my historical case study. It seems that the history of phenomenology is capable of providing a rich and complex field of phenomena that has not yet been capitalized on by phenomenological research itself. In this regard, one might say that phenomenology—especially, the classical Husserlian phenomenology—is better suited as a source of non-trivial sense structures of simultaneously historical and theoretical, (meta)philosophical nature, rather than as a source of explicit phenomenological reflections (given

that Husserl's phenomenological reflections in this regard are rudimentary at best; especially, if one distinguishes the specific phenomenology of the history of philosophy from the phenomenology of the history in general). According to this interpretation, the relevant phenomenological analyses of Husserl are to be found in his phenomenology of (philosophical) vocation, including his meditations about its possible ruptures (which, in fact, took place due to his philosophical alienation by Martin Heidegger and other fellow phenomenologists), as well as in some of the sophisticated facets of the phenomenology of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction (i.e., the so-called mundanization or psychologization of the transcendental reduction).

What these observations imply, is, for our way of writing the history of phenomenology, the use of sophisticated historiographic methodology (e.g., microhistory, *Konstellationsforschung*, non-standard types of historical sources, etc.). Similar methodologies have been successfully applied to other streams of thought in the history of philosophy (e.g., Dieter Heinrich's work on German Idealism, Martin Mulsow's work on early modern philosophy); it is now time to bring these methodologies to the history of phenomenology as well. Far from being a subordinated issue for the historians of phenomenology, this recognition calls for a fundamental shift in phenomenology's own understanding of history that was, for far too long, conceived of along simplistic teleological categories (e.g., "overcoming"). Ultimately, this sophisticated understanding of its past could help phenomenology become a full participant in contemporary debates about society and history in its own right, relying on its specific contribution regarding these phenomena.

Dr. **Peter Andras Varga** is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy of the Research Centre for Humanities in Budapest (Hungary). He is one of the founding members of the Central and East European Society for Phenomenology (CEESP) and also the co-organizer of its first general conference in Budapest in 2015. He also serves as a scientific director of the Hungarian Archives of Philosophy. He is the author of three books in the Hungarian language and of several papers (published in, *inter alia*, the *Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology*, *Husserl Studies*, *Brentano Studien*, *Meinong Studien*, *Phänomenologische Forschungen*, etc.) on the history of phenomenology, on the 19th- and 20th-century German, Austrian, and Hungarian philosophy, as well as on the theory and historiography of the history of philosophy

in general. He is especially interested in sophisticated methods of writing the history of philosophy and its reverberations for the present-day understanding of philosophy. Currently, he is working on a biography of Edmund Husserl.

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Uldis Vēgners

The Displaced Appearance of the Coronavirus
The Future in the Present

The coronavirus is a microorganism that is undetectable to our sense organs; therefore, its presence in our surrounding environment originally remains hidden. As such, the coronavirus forms a part of what can be called an invisible everyday environment. It is impossible to directly tell if the air I breathe, the door handle I touch, or the cake I put into my mouth is contagious or not. However, if the coronavirus would be completely invisible to us, it would hardly be a phenomenological problem. What makes it phenomenologically interesting, is the way it appears in our experiential lives. My aim is to argue that the coronavirus as an invisible entity originally appears in our experience in terms of spatial and temporal displacements, and as such creates uncertainty, which erodes the line between the dimensions of the future and the present. I will argue that, from the perspective of our everyday lives, the coronavirus originally appears through a spatial displacement. The virus without special technologies and tests is not visible to us, but as it has the potential to make us ill, it has the potential of becoming visible in our bodies, making our bodies the site where the invisible appears or becomes visible. This spatial displacement, in which the invisible environment becomes in-visible or visible within, is accompanied by a temporal displacement. Because there is an incubation period before the symptoms appear, the appearance of the invisible virus in our bodies occurs with a delay. At the moment the symptoms of COVID-19 appear, the viral environment that infected our bodies might already be gone. The presence of the viral environment within our bodies is the past of the viral environment outside of our bodies.

These spatial and temporal displacements that constitute the original appearance of the coronaviral environment put us in a position of experiential uncertainty, a condition already described by phenomenologists, such as van Grunsven as well as Carel, Ratcliffe, and Froese. I cannot be sure, without special technological means, if I am in the viral environment at a specific moment or not, and this leads to a significant shift in our temporal experience, which changes the way we live and interact with each other. Instead of projecting the future alongside the present, we project the future into the present, and therefore act as if what is possible is already a fact. For example, physical distancing, mask-wearing, and hand sanitizing all imply that we act in a way as if what is possible is already the case or even has already happened.

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Antonia Veitschegger

Art Experience and Disagreement

We often disagree regarding the evaluations inherent in our art experiences. In this talk, I will call such disagreement "aesthetic disagreement," referring both to disagreement about whether a work of art possesses certain valuable qualities and disagreement about the work's overall value. First, I will present examples of aesthetic disagreement understood in this way, in order to better make sense of what it is that we disagree about in such exemplary cases. I will then turn to a structural analysis of the object of art experience: it is, I argue, a complex whole with a threefold structure, consisting of what I call art thing, art work, and art object.

The art thing is the spatiotemporal ontic foundation of the art work, the real thing, through which the art work is manifested. The art work, then, is what Roman Ingarden calls the "schematic formation," or "skeleton," which is identical throughout different art experiences. As a schematic formation, the art work involves both determinate aspects and "spots of indeterminacy" (Ingarden), which are meant to be filled out and concretized by the experiencing subject, according to the possibilities offered with respect to its determinate aspects. The art work is meant to be concretized, to present itself "in the flesh" in art experience. Apart from that, it can also be thought of, analyzed, and discussed. The art work does not cease to exist apart from individual experiences of it; this is the reason why people can share their thoughts on the same art work across time—and have disagreements about it. Finally, the art object is the experiential ontic foundation of the art work.

It is the body, with which the "skeleton" of the art work is provided within art experience. The art object is a synthesis of a manifold of concretized aspects of the art work. It correlates to a synthesis of perceptive, cognitive, emotional, evaluative, and imaginative states of the experiencing subject. The art object possesses aesthetically valuable qualities, such as being elegant, sad, exciting, banal, comic, and the like. The aesthetically valuable qualities are the founding qualities of the values, which in turn determine the art object's overall aesthetic value.

Following this analysis, I will argue that recognition of the threefold structure of art thing, art work, and art object helps us identify three basic kinds of aesthetic disagreement: first, disagreement stemming from more or less conclusive awareness of the art thing, second, disagreement stemming from more or less legitimate understanding of the art work's schema, and, third, disagreement stemming from differing values of concretized art objects. While distinguishable in analysis, these kinds of disagreement are necessarily entangled, as are art thing, art work, and art object. The analysis offered, I conclude, allows us to develop strategies for dealing with aesthetic disagreement, which can benefit future art experiences and self-understanding.

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Ginta Vēja

Constraints and Connections
Phenomenological Notes on the "Bo(u)nd Body" in the Times of the Pandemic

The mundane and at the same time invisible presence of a COVID-19 infection has "bracketed" habituality in its unreflected reliability, reminding us of the simple and, simultaneously, constantly repressed anthropological axiom: we are rational, but also vulnerable and "dependent animals" (McIntyre).

The constant risk of infection has made us acutely aware of our embodiment—moreover, in a mode of threat, uncertainty, and insecurity. At the same time, the conditions of social distancing have radically transformed intersubjective and intercorporeal encounters with others.

The descriptions of the "bound body" partly follow and overlap with Havi Carel's phenomenology of "the locked-down body," emphasizing the limiting and destabilizing aspect of the bonds: affected by "prohibitions," the body is experienced as being "tied up"—constrained and incapacitated (restrictions fetter one's movements and gestures), as well as subjected to a repressive self-monitoring and struggle for self-recovery from the Other's objectifying gaze (e.g., the anonymous "eye" of a video camera). Moving from the "face-to-face" proximity to the "staying-at-home in the facemask" has shattered the confidence in bodily ability to converse with other body-subjects.

Besides being chains and shackles (*constraints*), bonds are also lived as *connections*—links, roots, fastenings, bandages, and alike. Connections as commitments restore and strengthen the sense of security and trust in the world. The pandemic crisis—both in terms of losses and unexpected

benefits—rediscovers the ontological intertwining of bodies, and unlocks the generosities of caring and interdependence, based on recognition of our common and singular vulnerabilities.

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Velga Vevere

Social Geometry and Social Distancing

The problems of social geometry in the sense of spatial constellations and intersubjectivity have been addressed by a number of phenomenologists and sociologists: E. Husserl (*Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*; *The Origin of Geometry*), A. Shutz (*On Phenomenology and Social Relations*; *Social Reality within Reach of Direct Experience*; with T. Luckmann: *The Structures of the Life-World*), G. Simmel (*The Stranger, Sociology of Space; On the Spatial Projections of Social Forms*), J. Aho (*The Things of the World. Social Phenomenology*), and others. However different these approaches may be, they have something in common, namely, the recognition that there, within societal relations, exists an element of strangeness and/or distancing (in Husserl's life-worlds, Shutzean social reality, Aho's phenomenological anthropology). This aspect becomes especially significant in the situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. The current article aims at researching the phenomena of spatial constellation and social distancing in the light of the current crisis. The questions, here, would be the following: What does it mean to be a stranger while being together? What does it mean to be together while being remote from others (like working remotely)? What does it mean to be a stranger to oneself? What effect does the act of physical self-isolation have upon our self-perception? In order to answer these questions, I propose to look into G. Simmel's conception of the stranger. To identify someone as a stranger, he or she must be familiar enough to make a difference. If there is no distance, then the difference, otherness, foreignness disappears, we see only the already known, the familiar. On the other hand, if

the distance is too great, the stranger merges with the landscape, disappears, becomes unknown, unthinkable, remains outside the field of individually existing or potential experience. The stranger, insofar as he is accepted, still retains the indelible mark of otherness. Consequently, otherness (strangeness/difference) is inherent in all human relationships to a greater or lesser extent. Other important concepts to be analyzed are A. Shutz's direct *we*-experience and J. Aho's descriptions of the social phenomena from the *I*-perspective, the goal of which is to reduce the individual experience to the prototypical experience, to the ideal essence. Thus, the structure of experience is defined by the relations *I-me* (introspection), *I-us* (introspection), *I-you* (otherness, intersubjectivity), and *I-it* (experience of the things of the world).

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Ugo Vlaisavljević

Husserl's Theory of Socialization and the Unrealized Prospects of a Transcendentally Grounded History of Mankind

In his Vienna lecture of 1935, Husserl sketched a theory of socialization that provides an account of both the philosophical-scientific community building process as well as the genealogy of the European community of nations. According to this theory, the first Greek community of philosophers initiated an incremental and irresistible process of socio-cultural change that will affect many nations and make them part of the European mankind. In the beginning, there were only a few "isolated personalities, like Thales, et al.," who were first to take up a theoretical attitude towards the surrounding world, but this new way of thinking brought about "a special type of man" and "a novel form of community living": a philosophical kind of man and a philosophical kind of community.

Philosophy has its inherent social or communal form, originating from the strictly personal, profoundly transformative, and liberating experience of setting foot on new ground after the theoretical *epoché* has been performed. The theory of European socialization has its correlative "geological" side: it is depicted as a massive colonization by the European settlers of the land discovered by the first "philosophic man," which results in a constant enlargement of the "New Continent."

However, the fact that European history ended up in a deep social or communal crisis reveals that the ground reached through the theoretical attitude (considered as a mere "reorientation" [*Umstellung*] of the natural attitude) is still not firm enough or entirely reliable. Husserl's re-grounding of philosophy

or science through a more radical theoretical *epoché*—he sees himself as the first explorer on the true European mainland—implies a re-socialization of all the Europeans. Therefore, the core-community of the European communal life, according to Husserl, is the community of phenomenologists, as in the preceding epoch initiated by Thales it was the community of philosophers. However, the condition, for Husserl, is that these phenomenologists stand firmly on the transcendental ground.

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Dario Vuger

Circumlocution as Method
Heidegger and the Possibility of Philosophy as Praxis

In the paper, I will explore the possibility of reading Heidegger's work as a methodological tool for a certain philosophical praxis. The main concept, by which a new interpretative value of his main work *Being and Time* will be presented, is the notion of circumlocution and circumstance as well as circumventing and circumfusing, or their respective reconceptualization in the manner of Heideggerian philosophy. By such a re-reading of his work, the possibility of a new understanding of Heidegger's philosophical aims emerges: pushing forward the idea that thoughtful engagement with the world will, in fact, provoke new forms of behavior and relation to being. Once more, I stress the overwhelming importance of the notions of care and being-there in Heidegger's philosophy outside the scope of *Being and Time*, especially in his shorter essays and presentations *The Age of the World Picture*, *The Question Concerning Technology*, and *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking*, to name just the three of the most important ones. Circumlocution points to the central importance of going-about or being-present through one's language, finding confinement within it, and bringing from within it the possibility of understanding phenomena. As such, circumlocution has a lot to do with vernacularism in Heidegger's philosophy. It also gives us pointers for a methodically different understanding of other contemporary philosophies that build upon the legacy of Heidegger.

I will attempt to provide reasons for the necessity of this conceptualization. These reasons lie in the general disposition of Heidegger's philosophy that

can, to an extent, be understood as a radical overcoming of the western philosophical tradition towards a certain "realization" of philosophy, a "destruction" of metaphysics as well as a providing of new views and considerations of phenomenology as fundamental ontology. The ever-growing scholarly research surrounding Heidegger's legacy seems wildly inappropriate and superfluous with regard to the task of his own philosophy, since Heidegger himself already implied in *The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking* that any further advancement in philosophy will only be the result of the growing cynical disposition of academic work, which can to a large extent be understood in terms of the capitalist mode of production, information, and cognitive capitalism. Heidegger's own relation to philosophy and thought of his own time must be central to the understanding of the aims and the prescribing of the uses of his philosophy for a new conceptualization of such a mode of being that goes beyond the stalemate of binary dispositions of thought and action, theory and practice.

By this reconceptualization, a new intellectual map of philosophy as *praxis* emerges in the history of 20th century.

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Jaroslava Vydrová

The Encountering of Husserl and Plessner
A Reconsideration of Sociality

The aim of the contribution is to follow the convergence of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and Helmuth Plessner's philosophical anthropology with regard to the issue of intersubjectivity and sociality. Our approach is framed both historically and philosophically. While the main strategy of the phenomenological approach towards intersubjectivity is to uncover the relations and connections "I—the Other—World," the Plessnerian view brings into play the configuration "organism—persons—culture." Against this background, we try to find new challenges and new ways to tackle the social reality of the human being.

The advantage of this kind of an approach is, firstly, that it brings to focus the genealogy of the problem of sociality. It returns us to the roots of the research on intersubjectivity, which set the course for later philosophizing (subjectivity is intersubjectivity, the first-person perspective, living body). Secondly, thanks to the wide scope of Plessner's work, we can find a thematically diverse and rich field of investigation—from eccentric positionality to political anthropology. Finally, we are able to develop several insights concerning human appearance in the public sphere, adoption of roles, relations to others, and the context of the agency and power as a reconsideration of sociality. Several phenomena, such as mask, face, armor, and examples of their manifestations in the philosophical context as well as in the context of art, may be better disclosed by these insights.

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Anna Yampolskaya

"Now is the Night"
Deixis in Hegel and Maldiney

I discuss Henry Maldiney's critique of Hegel's approach to deixis, which lies at the core of the analysis of sensuous certainty in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Specifically, I analyze Maldiney's claim that deixis should not be considered separately from common sensuous and affective experience of the shared world, and therefore from communication. In the first section, I study Erwin Straus' influence on Maldiney concerning the communicative character of sense experience. The second section exposes the logical structure of Hegel's experiment with writing down the statement "now is the night." This experiment is related to the question, whether the adverbs "here," "now," as well as the personal pronoun "I," have a general linguistic function discovered by Husserl, Jakobson, and Benveniste. It transpires that Maldiney's analysis is incomplete; missing links to fix his argument are supplied. The last section is devoted to Maldiney's treatment of deixis and his concept of subjectivity that emerges when deictic expressions are used. I show that deictic expressions have certain features of a performative speech act. It is the explosive power of deixis that makes a simple communication exceed the framework of information exchange and become an encounter where a new subject and a new world are born.

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She is the author of a book on Levinas ("Le prix Leroy-Beaulieu" in 2012) and of a monograph on the phenomenological method (2013). Her most recent book, *The Art of Phenomenology* (2018), explores the links between phenomenological aesthetics and Russian Formalism.

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Michal Zvarík

Socrates and Polis in the Thought of Hannah Arendt and Jan Patočka

The contribution will address Jan Patočka's and Hannah Arendt's reflections on the relation between Socrates and the city. For both thinkers, Socrates in a certain sense represents a kind of a paradigm of the philosopher and of philosophizing. In comparison, similarities between Patočka's and late Arendt's considerations arise. Socrates is a thinker of problematicity/negativity, who subjugates every positive opinion to philosophical scrutiny, in order to test its coherence. And if the protagonist of a dialogue is not able to prove such coherence, as is usually the case, the given opinion is refuted. Both authors claim that Socrates points to a unity of life, which is a task yet to be attained, a unity, in which there exists a harmony between words, on the one hand, and between words and deeds, on the other.

Patočka and Arendt, however, differ in answering the question of how Socratic philosophizing relates to the *polis* and its institutions. The issue is not merely of historical significance, because the relation between Socrates and the city is seen on the wider background of the problematic relation between philosophy and politics. For Patočka, the openness towards the non-given, wherefrom Socrates's examination stems, brings the possibility of a spiritual renewal of the political sphere, the authentic option of ascension from decadence, which is grounded in the alleged certainty of a positive, non-problematic meaning. For Arendt, on the other hand, the Socratic examination presents a permanent threat for the political sphere and actions within it. Action is dependent on *doxai*, that is, on positive opinions. Socrates, who for Arendt embodies the

paradigm or model of thinking as an end in itself, by the means of questioning inhibits and removes these opinions, and for this reason paralyzes all positive action. Thinking is not able to prescribe a course of action, it rather warns and calls for non-participation, since it cannot legitimize a positive opinion. For this reason, a thinking person can become a political actor only indirectly and in a negative manner. Such situations happen at times of political crises where the disengagement from politics is seen as threatening.

The root of differences we can observe in the answers to the question of relation between politics and philosophy can be tracked to the problem of givenness and especially the givenness of the world as a kind of transcendence of limited viewpoints. For Arendt, the world is co-constituted as a space of visibility, which arises in-between the actors with their manifold, yet limited *doxai*. The thinker adopts a detached stance from the world, but attains a self-relation, the self-appearing in an inner dialogue instead. Between the thinker and the actor, the self-appearance and the appearance of the world exists a rift. For Patočka, on the other hand, the world is a transcendence in the sense of a non-given, all-encompassing horizon, which is the source of problematicity and, thus, threatens the opinion, which is inevitably finite.

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