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PHAINOMENA

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REVIEWS | RECENZIJE

Adriano Fabris: ETHICS OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES.

Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2018.

ISBN: 978-3-319-75511-3.

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In the era in which technologies determine new matrices of thought, of habits, and, indeed, of actions, what we now consequently find emerging are new ethical issues requiring extremely articulate reflection. Communication technologies used up until the last century have been completely replaced by others which are more immediate, more ubiquitous, technologies that have us believe we are living in the eternal present. Philosophical investigation, therefore, must rethink its ethical paradigms, overturning the traditional primacy of “general” ethics in favor of a more concrete approach, one requiring continual adjustment in tandem with the development of new technological systems.

This book reflects upon these important new paradigms, outlining them via an in-depth analysis. In the first section the author explains the basic concepts necessary in order to analyze these challenges. Firstly, he discusses the etymological distinction between technique and technology as well as the fundamental difference between information and communication. He then goes on to investigate a particular area of applied ethics with

its newly emerging problems for our contemporary society: the ethics of information and communication technologies. The author focuses on ethical and deontological issues concerning the use and level of diffusion of the most common information and communication technologies. He also discusses the challenges of the uninterrupted and interactive circuit which constitutes the relationship between the virtual sphere and the real world.

In the second and third section of the book the focus lies on two other specific areas: communication devices and communication environments. Every aspect is investigated from a methodological perspective with practical examples of considered, ethical choices. In the second part, in fact, attention is concentrated on the ethical issues of communication devices (computers, smartphones, and robots). Firstly, the author analyzes technological devices from a historical and structural viewpoint. These are the devices that we use in everyday communication and that are, as the author writes, “external” to the human being. Next, the focus is on our relationship, as human beings, with machines that enhance our ability to communicate and to access new environments, modifying our perception of space and time. All of these situations need to be addressed in an ethical manner. It is vital to raise awareness of the consequences that the use of these devices can have on our behavior and on our actions.

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From this analysis, several aspects emerge that pose multiple deontological and ethical questions. Choices and dilemmas come to light that human agents (manufacturers and users) are called to answer. Indeed, deontological codes established by various professional associations have already been drawn up for this purpose and, as such, are required to be respected by all association members involved in internet and computer processes. However, though these codes give precise indications, calling upon our sense of responsibility, they do not provide neither the concrete motivation nor the justification to force users to act accordingly. Thus, the author moves on to identify and justify ethical principles that would convince us to behave correctly in the technological contexts of information and communication in which we live, taking account of the relationship of the convergence between media. Another interesting

question, often underestimated, concerns what the author defines as the “impossible immediacy” in our relationship with apps, selfies, and our perception of space and time. The phenomenon of the selfie, in particular, can be understood as an attempt to remain within a pseudo-immediacy. Moving on to the relationship between robots, communication, and ethics, the author reflects on the possibility of an ethical code for those robots with autonomy of communication and action.

In the last section, the central topic is the ethics concerning issues of communication environments. Communication is intended here as something that we experience in the particular environment in which we move and interact. The “virtual” environment, which the new devices have created, opens up various possibilities, in the same way as does the “natural” environment with which it interacts. The author focuses our attention on issues concerning the relationship between ethics and virtuality. Particularly, the concept of the “virtual” is explained in its various nuances. “Virtus” in Latin means “virtue,” but it does not only indicate the characteristic that makes a human being a good person. It also indicates the “capacity that is proper to something.”

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Subsequently, the author turns our attention to ethics and the internet in relation to three aspects of the internet: firstly, the internet of net-surfers; secondly, the internet of social networks; thirdly, the internet of things. Regarding the first aspect, what emerges is an original reflection about the ethics of the internet and the ethics *in* the internet. The former is described as “the reflection on issues related to the impact of the Internet on society, the world we live in, our way of thinking, regardless of whether we actually relate to the Network professionally or not,” while ethics *in* the Internet “refers to the set of behaviours, considered good and right, which are taken on by those who work or, more generally, act within the Network.” Regarding the ethics of social networks, the questions are twofold: the transformation of the idea of “community” that social networks produce, as well as the issues concerning the treatment of personal identity. Two further questions arise. Can social networks really be regulated? Can social networks really offer horizontal participation? Finally, ethics and the internet of things, as intended by Ashton, refers to a relationship between devices other than computers. It is difficult in this scenario to speak of an ethics of the “thing.” The ethical issues that arise

here, are linked to the so-called Big Data. Hence, the author reformulates the ethical questions thus: “What should be done with all of this data? How can it be handled? Furthermore, is it legal to collect and store it?”

In conclusion, the author identifies the criteria and principles of behavior that enable people to move in these environments in a correct manner. People seem to forget that not everything related to the network is necessarily good. However, some questions necessarily remain open. The author believes that we consciously assume responsibility for that which we are not entirely responsible for. “How can we maintain our status of moral beings if we live in environments that are organised independently from our intervention and where we are no longer in full control over the consequences of the actions that are being carried out?”

Veronica Neri

Žarko Paić: TEHNOFERA I. ŽRTVOVANJE I DOSADA. ŽIVOTINJA – ČOVJEK – STROJ.

Zagreb: Sandorf/Mizantrop, 2018.

ISBN: 9789533510309.

Žarko Paić: TEHNOFERA II. “CRNA KUTIJA” METAFIZIKE: KIBERNETIKA I APSOLUTNO VRIJEME STROJA.

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The Advent of Technology

The comprehensive work *Tehnosfera (The Technosphere)* by the Croatian philosopher Žarko Paić that is scheduled to be released this year in its full five-volume format—from which the first two were already published in 2018—represents the height of a philosophical endeavor in the broadest field of our contemporary everyday life undertaken by Paić intensively and extensively throughout the last decade or so. It boils down to—as the title suggests—the complex notion of the technosphere, which we would like to discuss here in the context of the first two volumes of the oeuvre which deal with anthropology and cybernetics respectively. This is not, however, the first time that Paić deals

with the technosphere. As mentioned, in the course of the last ten or so years he consistently works on testing the possible applications of this concept to the field of political philosophy, contemporary art, visual studies, and digital aesthetics, just to name a few. With many international projects up ahead, the co-edited volume with Krešimir Purgar *Theorizing images* under the Cambridge Scholars Publishing exemplifies this with the article “Technosphere—A New Digital Aesthetics?” while there are also numerous entries in scientific journals by Paić, which testify to the rigidity of his task of thinking.¹

360 In *Tehnosfera I. Žrtvovanje i dosada. Životinja – čovjek – stroj* (*The Technosphere I: Sacrifice and Boredom. Animal—Man—Machine*) Paić dispenses with the straightforward introductory study of his main concept. There are two reasons for taking a deliberate *in medias res* approach. Namely, the concept of the technosphere itself is not a new invention, but a stage in the progressive autonomization of technology in our contemporaneity. As summed up earlier, it is also not a new concept in the thought of Žarko Paić, but rather a concept that should be taken intuitively as the radical summation of all our knowledge of technology and science to keep in mind while beginning to study through the first volume of the book. The technosphere is to be considered as the intensity of contemporary technology. By taking technology as a progression, we are not far from the truth in saying that every contemporary phenomenon can be considered as technology in its own sense (Paić 2018, I, 379). Most notably, paraphrasing Heidegger in the closure of the first volume, Paić states that “the essence of science is nothing scientific. It lies in the technical character of the way by which sciences relate to the world in emergence. To describe this ‘way’ means to walk in the articulation of the language of the technosphere.” (Paić 2018, I, 421). And as this volume deals with the human, its relations through repetition and difference, or through the subtitled triad of animal—man—machine, as well as through the notions of sacrifice and boredom, we are invited into a philosophical discussion of anthropology taken as the theme of contemporary culture as well as new techno-science, cybernetics, and

1 Cf. Žarko Paić: “Technosphere—A New Digital Aesthetics? The Body as Event, Interactivity and Visualization of Ideas.” In *Theorizing Images*, ed. by Žarko Paić and Krešimir Purgar, 121–143. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016.

communication theory. Namely, the radical question Paic' that poses with this book could be to discuss in which way can we preserve the notion of humanity when metaphysics, upon which it is grounded, becomes inept to conceive of a world made on the image of autonomous and hybrid technology of self-production of artificial life and artificial horizon of experience in general. The technosphere here means not only the intensity of technology, but the overall possibility of overwriting the notion of life, being, time, essence, etc., to its own informative agenda. This radical notion of the "*immanent transcendence*" of life in Paic' stems from Heidegger and Deleuze respectively and indicates in its own right not just a radical impossibility of life as nature, nurture, artifice, or artificiality. Immanent transcendence is a synthetic principle of the technosphere. As the reader carefully strolls through the introduction and the first set of essays in *Tehnosfera I*, this is more than evident. It is a constructive planning and calculating of life itself (Paic' 2018, I, 30). In the chapter on Hans Jonas and the conditions of possibility for ethics as applied humanity in the age of technology's reign Paic' recapitulates and provokes the Heideggerian *Gestell*: "Technology as the gage no longer exposes nature as essence (or being). It enframes nature in the state of being-at-disposal (or to be essentially relative) to drive the accumulation of knowledge, information, and energy for the global profit economy." (Paic' 2018, I, 277)

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The notion of the technosphere bears great importance in our contemporary technology-laden society as it reworks and substantially reconceptualizes the notion of technology itself. This is also why Paic' makes it a task of his own thinking to find possible ways of giving life to the notion of the technosphere through numerous contemporary philosophies, rediscovering technology as the true aesthetical overcoming of all contemporary issues, problems, and contradictions that lie in the notion of human, human life, being, and its metaphysical groundings. Life, intelligence, and biology give way to artificiality, virtual horizons, and neural networks capable not only of designing new life according to its own image, but more radically (re)designing the "lived" life to a world-image of pure hyperreal experiences. This is the technosphere, "the '*immanent transcendence*' of life that is no longer anything natural or artificial but is techno-genetically created as an autopoietic system." (Paic' 2018, I, 11) The first chapter of the book, "Creation without a Plan? From Creature to Thing,"

opens up the space for the thinking of autonomous technological objects and phenomena as the new stage in our conceptualization of technology that requires a completely new way of thinking, that is to say, we are in a historic situation where our standardized notions of human, technology, science, nature, society, etc., are becoming radically inept to deal with the world built on the foundations of information science and technology of exchange-governance over data.

362 There is certainly no space for us to discuss the totality of the two volumes published in 2018 as they contain about twenty dense discussions spanning over more than thousand pages. What we can do, is debate the main precursors of these discussions as the conditions of possibility to even comprehend the importance of the volumes that are still ahead waiting to be published. The two presented books contain discussions and dialogues with authors, whom Paić has held in high regard throughout his philosophical life. Namely, Martin Heidegger as the pivotal point from where technology departs into contemporary warfare of information and techno-genetic science and gives consequential meaning of important distinction in Paić through triad of technics—technology—the technosphere (Paić 2018, I, 257). On the other hand there is also Franz Kafka as the prodigal writer of the age of the world picture which transfers—through the well-known text by Deleuze and Guattari on “the minor literature”—to the discourse on the technosphere or the world overrun by autonomous machinery in which human experience is one of paradoxical rationality of abundant everyday chaos, but Fernando Pessoa also, whose radical wish “I want to be a machine” remains a big motive in discussions undertaken by Paić. The mentioned technological triad presents a non-dialectic progression, but a synthetic state of cybernetic control in which we are presented with a world no longer bound by the metaphysical grounding of nominal differentiation of nature, culture, man, technology (Paić 2018, I, 8), but a world of technological states, in which man acts as an agent in the metastable state of being—human—animal—machine (Paić 2018, I, 72). What Paić undertakes here, is the overcoming of the problem Heidegger posed at the end of philosophy and the advent of cybernetics as the new metaphysics. Namely, to answer the question of what is thinking in the age of speed, synthetic and hybrid beings is to say that we are overrun with communication, or even more

ominous, we are overwritten by it in “the total acceleration of ‘the world’ and the transformation of thinking to the framework of computing, planning, and construction.” (Paić 2018, I, 9)

It is also important to note that the studies presented in the book interpolate specific vocabulary that is usually found in the information-communication sciences as well as in techno-scientific discourse of contemporary science. From artificiality, complexity, entropy, to metastability and feedback control, there surely are more than a few terms that deserve their own discussion or an engaged critical reader willing to combat his or her ordinary understanding of the capacity of certain notions. There are nine studies arranged into three chapters, each bearing its own conclusions that come together with preferred multiple rereading of the introductory remarks by Paić. This will be even more important in the second volume. Paić sets up to reconstruct the contemporary philosophical discussion with a hybrid language of post-modern philosophy and what we could have called—up to the most recent time—the minor philosophies of authors like Gilbert Simondon, Gotthard Gunther, and in our tradition often overlooked Albert Whitehead. The point is not just to try and preserve the notion of humanity fallen in between metaphysics and cybernetics of contemporary worldview, but to consider new outcomes of traditional philosophical problems in a contemporary setting.

In the second chapter of the book Paić deals exactly with the above discussed “technical” creation of man, or what we could call the emergence of “*technical humanity*” in the common sense of the word “technical” or “technicality.” It takes the largest portion of the book so we should consider giving it more space for discussion here. Paić begins with another Heideggerian question that pushes the discussion of the technosphere into the political-ethical debate on the grounding of freedom, which in this respect again takes on the notion of thought and its relationship to the essence of that which is human and animal “in the identity and difference over the essence of life itself” (Paić 2018, I, 182). If thinking is embedded in the human as a condition of possibility of metaphysical questions in general, then the epochal coming-of-age of metaphysics in cybernetics as its realization means that thinking radically transforms into computing (Paić 2018, I, 185). Why is that? “Cybernetics itself is neither philosophy nor science in the sense of theory on that which is real

and what is *essence*. Its role is to create the possibility of relationship between the system and environment from techno-genetic logic of formation of that which neither 'is' nor it is 'nothing'" (Paić 2018, I, 185) Dense discussion of Heidegger's notion of the world-environment differentiation as well as the man-animal distinction (Paić 2018, I, 202–3), cannot find its resolution without the question of what kind of space are we pushed into with the emergence of what Heidegger calls the "global" world state or a state of "*planetary technology*." And that is why common anthropology cannot give an answer to the essence of the human being as this answer lies in the vast space of fringe-humanity, the techno-science, and new artificial beings that exercise radically different and yet very familiar freedoms, lives, and even cultures. This brings about the crucial importance of two essays by Heidegger which we should keep in mind throughout *Tehnosfera I*, "The Age of the World Picture" and "The Question Concerning Technology." Discussing Sloterdijk's essay on *The Rules for the Human Park*, an important question remains in the title: "How to Think an Animal?" (Paić 2018, I, 215) which will bring us to the problem can techno-science with its synthetic and hybrid life formation and autonomization think the difference between human and animal? If metaphysics is embedded in the human, then humanism certainly remains metaphysical, and it is only from there that we can pose the question on the being of an animal. "We can no longer think the animal any more differently but cybernetically." (Paić 2018, I, 242) This chapter, as well as the following, are sound in their logic of deliberating on what sense our conceptions of life, human, world (as the totality of nature and history, as the dwelling of being) have when contested with the questions that spring out of new technology as well as with new relations it proposes and spaces it constructs. Nothing is comparable and everything is connected, nothing is genuine and everything replaceable in the planetary, global state of world technology. What makes the essence of technology is—as Heidegger noted—nothing technical, but it is a framework, the *enframing* (*Gestell*), which exercises power over human, nature, animal, being, and freedom by supplying them with states and depriving them of their difference in support of the total-life-project of contemporary technosphere (Paić 2018, I, 220–4). Once "framed" with technology, the most important questions become questions of the ontological difference from the framework of the decentered human,

namely, the human decentered by technology. This is also the way in which Paić recuperates Heidegger from contemporary critics and debates that label him an “anthropological dogmatic” (Paić 2018, I, 224–33). Heidegger’s thought is analogic, and by postulating the question of the animal, we are in essence questioning the human, nevertheless, in the broad sense of the relationship of modes of “being as life” and its relation to “being as such” (Paić 2018, I, 224): “[...] when philosophy itself at its end transforms into cybernetics [...] we encounter the question of a different mode of thought from which by necessity must emerge a different understanding of the human as well as the animal. All this leads through the lack of homeland in ‘life’ itself.” (Paić 2018, I, 235) It is in this way that the question of how to and from where to think the difference between the human, animal, natural, original, and artificial constantly reemerges as one of the main motifs for analysis in *Tehnosfera I* (Paić 2018, I, 140; 307; 373). The discussion of Heidegger continues throughout, and most notably in the second volume’s central chapter on cybernetics and nihilism (Paić 2018, II, 221–275).

The triad of computing, planning, and construction that comprises the transformation of thought in the age of the technosphere leads us to the question of creation, creative acting upon the world that is replaced with technical creation of life itself. If anything is to rise out of profound boredom, a work of art or speculative thought, with the mentioned advent of new technology we see our world immersed in a much broader and widespread, but shallow boredom which can only bring about the by now evident radicalization of culture and politics, but also, and maybe, even new means of “doing” life. The main premises of Heidegger and also Paić today have the uncanny character of obvious facts, analogies that are taken in the discussion throughout the book. Namely, the character of “planetary technology” is what is brought about with gadgetry of contemporary communication and information science. When Heidegger says that modern man is a slave of the oblivion of being and when Paić talks about the installation of the world as the construction of the world-picture we are certainly talking about a world, in which technology is as hidden as being (Paić 2018, I, 237–9), but with the uncanny character of their empty presence through screens, applications, services, and interactive communication. Contemporary

technology is the realization of Western metaphysics in the sense of this oblivion. In the form of cybernetics, it is the pure realized governance over all environments and systems, the “control of life processes” or the coming of technical life, the artificial life, and its intelligence. “They all became the actualization of the virtual from the logic of the technosphere.” (Paić 2018, I, 242) It remains equally evident that new synthetic and hybrid life forms will have an important impact on the contemporary understanding of ethics and human action in the world. The less we know, the better—can be the *modus operandi* for a sustainable life in the technosphere, and this is, namely, because it requires, if we are to understand new technology, its processes, and to act upon it, a loop of constant immersion into the control process of technology itself. This is the threat of the technological frame (Paić 2018, I, 285), because artificial life and its phenomena are a radically new step in the contemporary techno-science for they defeat the dominant Western notion of causal, effective, and purposeful use of technology (Paić 2018, I, 253). It is not just that artificial things are made, but that they defeat our relationship with technology through its increasing autonomization. While technology used to be dependent on the human—regardless of whether the human was used, or was it the user in the process—, the contemporary techno-science proves itself independent and regulatory for the processes in science, technology, and culture. Moreover, technology can be said to have its own culture, through its internal and external design, its intelligence, speed, automatization that is no longer observable to the conventional user.

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The book with its critical depth is an impressive collected set of distinctive studies regarding technology through the critical dialogue with all relevant contemporary philosophical sources, on the count of which *Tehnosfera* will become and remain a fundamental sourcebook for radical reconceptualization of our history embedded in the philosophical task of thinking from Heidegger onwards. By this, we mean that Paić utilizes Heidegger in a profoundly new manner exactly to bring about a renewed understanding of technology outside of the clutches of metaphysics and teleology, in such way that the remarks Heidegger made could even become, so to speak, the grounding for a post-metaphysical operation of the world as technical image of being. Privileging philosophical criticism over speculative confrontation, *Tehnosfera I and II*

remain highly instructive in-depth analyses of how we are to understand the extensive techno-scientific operation of our everyday life where understanding of the contemporary world depends on our ability to operate with hybrid terms and theory in what we could—anticipating the coming volumes of *Tehnosfera*—call techno-poiesis and techno-aesthetics. The concluding chapter of the first volume deals with Deleuze. Much as its theme is important, the conceptual progression from Heidegger to Deleuze is also a point to keep in mind as it comes as a particular novelty in the discussions of contemporary philosophy. The theme, however, concerns, especially in the concluding chapter of the book “From Chaos to Brain,” the “philosophical hybridization” proposed by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is philosophy?* Other than being just a mere reconceptualization of the notions of chaos and brain per se, the text brings us closer to a philosophical understanding of speed, entropy, complexity, and intuition. For Deleuze, chaos is closely connected to speed and transformation which are embedded in his notion of *virtuality* against *actuality*. Equally important is that Paić rightfully recognizes Baudrillard in this discussion as the source of the utmost important description of the hyperrational chaos within his own terminology, simulacrum, and simulation. With just a list of dealt-with concepts we can see that the conclusion of this volume opens up a space for something even more uncanny: the emergence of artificial intuition. The network (namely, the paradigm of the Internet) encapsulates speed, chaos of accelerated virtuality that is the substance of the “*livelihood*” of the artificial phenomena. It synthesizes, or naturalizes, the concept of space-time, something outside of our own cognitive capacities, and that is why Paić will conclude that—outside of the ordinary language and rationality—artificial phenomena represent the “irreducibility of the thought of the technosphere” (Paić 2018, I, 424). Such is the thought freed from “the chains” of “nature” and “life,” and the one which affirms the hybrid connection of mind and intuition in their artificial form of *blackboxing* and speculative design. On the other side, the threat of artificiality is not just “real,” but conceptual also, because there are very subtle ways of differentiating the simulation and the “real,” e.g., thought, intuition, intelligence. The artificial intuition hypothesis as “the constructive life of simulation” is the step beyond mere cybernetic aesthesis. It is the operation of multiple mediated realities that—as mentioned above—

overwrites and codes the human (and animal) in the technical sense of life and culture as autopoietic system, mediated environment of what we could call the ecology of the technosphere. Or: it could also be said that in Paić's conclusion of the first volume artificial intuition poses the final remark on the possibility of "thinking, action, and creation" from the "spirit" of the technosphere.

368 This is an important note to be made already when confronted with the title of the second volume of the work on the technosphere *Tehnosfera II. "Crna kutija" metafizike: Kibernetika i apsolutno vrijeme stroja* (*The Technosphere II. The "Black Box" of Metaphysics: Cybernetics and the Absolute Time of the Machine*). The notion of the *black-box design* and research indicates a stimulus-response relation and understanding of objects and processes in nature, science, and culture that comes about with the advent of binary input-output technology and communication theory. What remains hidden is often recreated using the primary method of science of the new age as Heidegger would suggest—experiment—, but more importantly here, by the usage of calculation, planning, and constructions in developing something we can only call by the dubious name of "original artificiality." This is also why the analyses undertaken in the second volume of *Tehnosfera* act as the necessary explanation of premises posited in the first volume regarding our own relationship with technology, and the way technology "operates" and "frames" the world to its own image. "What are we talking about when we talk of the essence of technology? Namely, about that there exists something in its being which comes into-the-world and makes it at the same time new and constructed, artificial and non-living [...] Technology is the total mobilization of enframing as computation, planning, and construction in the planetary age of the world. Strictly speaking, enframing of the world can only be the construction or the creation of the world as an image [...]." (Paić 2018, I, 236–7)

In the second volume, Paić begins with the philosophical discussion of the theory of relativity and its implication for metaphysics questioning the immanence of motion for the possibility of time and space in general (Paić 2018, II, 9 ff.). Radical premises begin with the consequences of understanding the role of information in physics and science of the 20th century. Namely, the acceleration of communication in the present age poses the question of the utility of information for the human mind with its

perceptive limitations: “people don’t communicate, but living machines do, thanks to the increase of cognitive capacity made possible by the growing expansion of ‘working memory.’ Speed and memory correspond to what was ontologically and traditionally named as being and time. Speed is the characteristic of cybernetical understanding of ‘being’ as information, and of memory as surpassing the unconscious mode of recollection of substance that transits into the state of steady duration (*durée*).” (Paić 2018, II) This is a direct continuation of the discussion at the end of first volume with the reference to Deleuze’s *chaos* hypothesis mapped over the ontology of digital computing which has data, speed/acceleration, (*random access*) memory as its substantial momentum.

An important thing to note with regard to the second volume is that it begins exactly where we left off at the end of the first volume’s “road to artificial intuition.” The encountered notions as black-box, theory of relativity, and information theory pave the way not only to introduce a vast list of contemporary philosophies of technology from Max Bense to Gilbert Simondon and Bernard Stiegler, but to open the space for a discussion of technology, science, and aesthetics that should be brought into play at any point where we concern ourselves with space and time, space-time as conditions of possibility of perceptions, experiences, and creation at all. The mentioned philosophers did not just pave the way for new concepts of understanding the world of contemporary digital technologies, but they also reach the height of discussion in the notion of aesthetics of information/data, digital aesthetics, and techno-aesthetics respectively. The chapter on Wittgenstein is instructive in that regard. The grounding for such a line of contemporary continental thought lies in the science of cybernetics which is the main theme of *Tehnosfera II*, from its beginnings in Norbert Wiener, information-communication theory, and developments of its socio-cultural and philosophical relevance through Gilbert Simondon’s *technogenesis* and *technological individuation*. Construction—in the book as well as in personal correspondence with the author—remains the main concept which synthesizes being and event as transformation of states. Not only are we for the first time in our philosophical socio-geography concerned with cybernetics and critical reevaluation of philosophical relationship with the

understanding of technology and its history, but we are also progressively moving towards aesthetics, art, and design as the black box of contemporary culture in general. No wonder that the infamous aphorism by Lev Manovich will prove to be an important side note towards the final volumes of the work on the technosphere, equal to the poetic importance Kafka and Pessoa possess in the first two volumes: to say that the designer is the prototype of our time should surely become more and more evident through our increasing interactions with autonomous, creative, speculative machines.

370 There are a few discussions in the book that require a specific address. Paić, namely, analyzes the notion of *entropy* and *feedback* in the context of information theory, and, more importantly, in the context of understanding information as the “essence of the technological age.” It is impossible to think contemporary technology, science, culture, and even art without grasping the complex language of techno-scientific information and communication processes of construction and computation. The “technotopy of information” in the chapter “Technotopy: Information and Construction” presents us with the notion of being immersed into the fluidity of networks against being rooted in a home-land, an inter-space or mediated space of the Internet (not to mention the ideas and consequences behind the phenomena of an Internet-of-Things), and the uncanny space of interactivity. Entropy stands in the center of the emptiness provoked with the disillusion of metaphysics in cybernetics where time is an illusion at the edge of the ever-present chaos at the end of our universe. Entropy in the cybernetic invention of Norbert Wiener remains one of the darkest notions of human existence, and Paić uses this notion to construct the means for the understanding of “integral reality” (Paić 2018, I, 300) that we are immersed into, a reality, or the world which—in its openness—harbors artificiality as the means of keeping the metastable chaos in place. Other than its reality being integral, this is the “intelligent world” we live in. The discussion of the “naked life” and the “naked gaze” (Paić 2018, I, 294–338) testify to this whilst introducing us with the notion of a problematic exchange between the animal and the human but keeping in mind also the exchange between the human and the machine, artificiality and the image.

Continuing on the Wittgenstein chapter, it is equally important for an understanding of the role of language as possible consolation for thought

both through Wittgenstein's own philosophical transformations and through culture, art, and life, in which essence becomes a fluid (word) play with nothing evident but everything quite performable. Paić concludes that the architecture of word-plays in Wittgenstein has the importance of architectonics of the pure reason in Kant. Even if that remark obviously brings us right to the end of the infamous *Tractatus*, the difference is subtle, because these architectonics belong to the grammar of language (or being, consequently of life forms in play of language-culture-art), and not to its logic and bear a great deal of importance in the linguistic turn as well as the pictorial turn in contemporary theory and art. The conclusion of the chapter brings about another turn, the "engineering" of art as (*techno-aesthetical*) life in a radical epitaph to be considered by the reader, but which we are not going to spoil in this review.

The second volume's overall agenda is to further develop, or to constitute a hybrid language for a possibility of the understanding of the technosphere. Namely, discussions regarding Gregory Bateson, Gilbert Simondon, and Bernard Stiegler are crucial pieces of investigation that will lead to another radical conclusion by Paić at the end of the book. The first of the four chapters of the second volume deals with the notions of cybernetics, information, entropy, and openness in the construction of the posthuman condition (Paić 2018, II, 88–91). Cybernetic constructivism against metaphysical foundationalism in one sense further develops this in the meaning of the "transubstantiation" of thought into information within all of the consequences brought up with the radically changed world of manipulation and computation of artificial negentropic natures. The radicality of this twist is, again, that of the furthering of the Heideggerian notion of representation as the *esse* of modern science: "In the milieu of the new cybernetic ('science') paradigm an epochal change occurs. Now the techno-sciences no longer reveal/represent anything because the notion of nature is constructed as 'artificial nature' of technically produced beings." (Paić 2018, II, 125) The human remains in-between—as the condition of planetary state of techno-science dwells between the world and the space—and requires a new determination outside of the 20th century human science. With the advent of planetary information networks, feedback control, and self-constructing machinery/intelligence, the information/communication code is determined by speed and memory that govern over the altering of states and programs of

machines via machines for which the human—as mentioned earlier—becomes inadequate. The sky over the “third order cybernetics” (i.e., the technosphere) is the color of the TV screen tuned to a dead channel, to paraphrase William Gibson’s introduction to the *Neuromancer* novel. If we cannot grasp the information code, communication becomes “white noise.” “Nothing is no longer understandable because chaos crept into the space between the signal and the message.” (Paić 2018, II, 137) Because of that, post-human environment will be—concerning the human as such—framed in the bio-genetic and bio-cybernetic enhancement and engineering of preservation, elongation, acceleration, and capacitive extension of human life (Paić 2018, II, 155 f.).

372 We will conclude with three interconnected motifs of the second half of *Tehnosfera II*: Gilbert Simondon, Bernard Stiegler, and the “thinking-thing.” The two thinkers, as well as Whitehead, remained until now, “under the radar” of philosophical concerns in our region, while their novelty bears significant consequences in considering the state of contemporary technology, and that is why studies undertaken by Paić in this part mark him as one of the first thinkers at all to consider them as constitutional figures of a radically new approach to the task of thinking at the end-times of philosophy as such. The overall tone of these discussions is reflected by the opening statements regarding Simondon’s “task of thinking.” Namely, grounding his analysis in contrast to Heidegger’s questioning of the essence of technology, Simondon constructs a new way of considering technology in its *pr-e(s)ence*, or “to question the creation of the new way in which the world appears in phases from physical, biological, psycho-social, and technological” (Paić 2018, II, 278). Not only does a consequent discussion prove to bear significance in the understanding of the major influence Simondon had on Deleuze, but Paić also presents us with most of the relevant interpreters and commentators of Simondon’s philosophy in the present day as well as places him in dialogue with present day prominent philosophers of information, like Luciano Floridi and Bernard Stiegler. The analysis that emerges is one which confronts us with the operating within Simondon’s universe of philosophical technology, with concepts, such as metastability, states, modulation, etc. Such an analysis could also provoke a new reading of Deleuze by now considered mainly from the standpoint of ungrounded and pejorative post-modern perspective. For

Simondon, the task is comprises a presentation of an overall theory of the overcoming of traditional bounds of metaphysics by the introduction, not just of new concepts and themes, but also new steps and orders of categories, and by the creation of concepts and phenomena. Therefore, we no longer are dealing with being as one, but as a multitude which emerges within the framework of *technogenesis* over ontogenesis, with modes of techno-individuation, transduction, and trans-individuation of being (Paić 2018, II, 297–299), as well as with the condition of metastability, or the naturalized fringe state of perpetual transformations of beings, just to name a notion that will most notably be adopted by Deleuze. Unlike the “first wave” cybernetics of Norbert Wiener, we can, with Paić’s discussion of Simondon, see a turn in the understanding of its potential. While Wiener discussed the vast space of the application of cybernetics for the understanding, not just of technology and science, but of society as a whole, Simondon deliberates upon the need for a technological culture by means, not just of technological governance over human lives, but of an introduction of the notion of human into the planetary network of technology. The motive is no longer control, but a synthesis, no longer of something real and something artificial, but of nature and the new as such. Therein lies Simondon’s optimism in his own understanding of the human’s in-between status of a coordinator, conductor, and conceiver of machines that work by themselves, leaving out the possibility that they could be also working for themselves.

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And, thus, the question of a technical construction of consciousness remains last in discussing one of the most relevant French philosophers in the field of technology, Bernard Stiegler, with his three-volume work on *Technics and Time*. Paić valorizes his work from the standpoint of inventive “tertiary retention,” which is a culmination of the “transformation” of memory into a constitutive capacity of productive information: “against living remembrance [tertiary retention] brings about the traces of constructed reality of the digital age [...] time is no longer detachable from the technical dispositive” (Paić 2018, II, 335). The question is similar to the conclusion of the first volume. Namely, intuitive machines and things that think, autonomous objects and thought as thing, bear the same problems of understanding, at which point the speed, accelerated and extended capacity, brings the altered state of (digital)

technology to the fringes of “technological history” as the transference logic and constructive intelligence of new, artificial life forms. With a lot still left out in this review, we successfully emphasized the high points of discussions collected in the first two volumes of *Tehnosfera*, a critical investigation in anthropology, cybernetics, philosophy of techno-science, and digital technology in general.

The contribution rendered by Žarko Paić in *Tehnosfera I* and *II* can be—by way of a simplification—considered to be threefold: he introduces, 1), an original concept to, 2), bring together the unrealized descriptive and critical potential of numerous philosophers, philosophies, and concepts that until now remained out of the philosophical discussion, as well as, 3), he pushes for the radical steps in philosophical and speculative investigation of our everyday life inside the digital networking of life processes. While for Goya the sleep of reason produces monsters, with the conclusion of the first two volumes of *Tehnosfera* we can say that blackboxing of metaphysics produces thinking-things as this is the high-point from which we await the coming three volumes of the book.

Igor Mikecin: PARMENID.

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Djelo Igora Mikecina *Parmenid* osma je knjiga u filozofskoj biblioteci Matice hrvatske *Aletheia* te je, redomice, nakon knjige o Heraklitu, druga autorova knjiga u istoj biblioteci. O samoj knjizi, unaprijed, valja reći da predstavlja još jedan autorov izniman doprinos istraživanju grčke filozofije u nas. Na filozofijsku zahtjevnost i obuhvatnost ovoga djela upućuje naime već i podnaslov koji glasi: „Grčki tekst s hrvatskim prijevodom i filologijskim bilješkama, filozofijski komentar i rječnik“, ali zapravo i sama struktura knjige odnosno razdioba poglavlja. Tako u kvantitativnom pogledu skoro polovinu knjige zauzima Mikecinov filozofijski komentar Parmenidovog spisa poznatog pod imenom $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\ \phi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, dočim se u drugoj polovini nalazi „Napomena o predaji Parmenidovog teksta“ u kojoj Mikecin ukratko izlaže povijest prenošenja i tumačenja teksta i pritom posebno naglašava važnost Platonova i Aristotelova shvaćanja Parmenida odnosno njihovo „isticanje jednote i nepokretivosti sućega“ (138), jer su upravo ta shvaćanja „umnogome odredila sva kasnija tumačenja Parmenida“ (138), te ujedno ukazuje i na važnost

forme heksametra za „utvrđivanje izvornog Parmenidovog teksta i njegovo razlučivanje od okolnog izvještaja“ (140). Potom slijedi „Napomena o uspostavi i prikazu Parmenidovog teksta“ u kojoj autor navodi najvažnija imena za uspostavu grčkog teksta kao što su primjerice H. Stephanus i H. Diels, te daje napomene kako o prikazu teksta tako i o rasporedu fragmenata i redosljedu stihova. Nakon napomena slijedi precizan „Popis oznaka rukopisnih izvora, izdanja i filologijskih komentara Parmenidovog teksta u kritičkom izdanju“. Naposljetku dolazi sam „Parmenidov ep“ odnosno grčki tekst s kritičkim aparatom i hrvatskim prijevodom, te filologijskim bilješkama. Zadnja trećina knjige sadržava iscrpan „Rječnik“ svih „riječi koje se pojavljuju u sačuvanom tekstu Parmenidovog epa“ (209), a koji, osim objašnjenja tvorbe grčkih riječi i etimologijskog objašnjenja, donosi i „objašnjenje povijesne mijene i razvoja smisla grčke riječi“ (209), ali i „upućuje na osobit smisao koje riječi imaju u Parmenida“ (209). Cjelina knjige zaokružuje se „Kazalom izvora za fragmente Parmenidovog epa“ i „Bibliografijom“.

376 Vrijednost Mikecinove knjige o Parmenidu ne sastoji se, dakle, jedino u tome što donosi izvrstan prijevod grčkog teksta s popratnim pomno sastavljenim znanstveno-filologijskim objašnjenjima, nego isto tako i u filozofijskom komentaru koji svojom lucidnošću i prodornim uvidima otvara mogućnost za duhovni pogled u najdublji smisao Parmenidovog epa. Mikecinova knjiga, uvjetno kazano, počiva na dvije temeljne misli, a to su: misao jednote bića i mišljenja, bitka i uma, odnosno jednote sućega kao istote sućeg i uma ili umjenja kao „izvornog opažanja“, „umskog zrenja“, koja proishodi kako iz samog teksta (npr. *ono bo isto umiti je te i biti*, III.) tako i iz autorova *sumišljenja* s Parmenidom o onom sućem, te misao o nadilaženju prijepora između filologije i filozofije, odnosno jezika i filozofije, pjesništva i filozofije ili govora i bića, riječi i bitka, koja se zapravo oslanja na prvo spomenutu misao te se istom u cijelosti potvrđuje u Mikecinovom filozofskom tumačenju Parmenidovog epa. Polazeći stoga od prethodno navedenog pokušat ćemo u osnovnim crtama izložiti temeljne misli koje prožimaju poglavlja njegovog filozofijskoga komentara Parmenidovog teksta. Osim „Uvoda“ komentar sadržava sljedeća poglavlja: „Suće“, „Um“, „Red“, „Boginja“ i „Govor“.

Tako već u „Uvodu“, osim što iznosi osnovne momente i strukturu epa te njihov filozofijski smisao, Mikecin rabi prevedenice nekih grčkih riječi

Parmenidovog teksta kao što su primjerice *umiti*, *umjenje* (νοεῖν) za ono što se običava prevoditi s *misлити*, *mišljenje*, jer riječ *umiti*, kako se navodi u „Rječniku“, „označava opažanje koje prethodi mišljenju, ali i opreci osjetnog i nadosjetnog“ (255), odnosno „ukazuje na s-vijest koja mišljenju prethodi kao sama njegova bit“ (256), ili glagolska imenica *bitje* (εἶναι) za glagolsku imenicu *bitak*, ili pak *suće* za grčki particip εἶόν, a namjesto uobičajene riječi *biće*. Parmenidov ep prema Mikecinu nije drugo doli pri-kaz puta, putovanja, na kojem putnik kao „tražitelj istine“ – uz presudnu pomoć Heliada – putuje iz privida tame prema svjetlu istine bitja, tj. sućeg. Putovanje je stoga „povratak iz tame nevida na svjetlo vida“ (7), odnosno „uspon iz privida k istini“ (8). Na samome su pak putu, kako primjećuje Mikecin, „naznačeni njegovi predjeli“ (7), a to su: „*domovi noći*“ (δῶματα νυκτός) kao ishodište puta, „*dveri putova svjetla i tame, dana i noći*“ (πύλαι νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματός εἰσι κελεύθων) kao mjesto razlučivanja oblasti mnijenja i znanja i „*svjetlo*“ (εἰς φάος) kao svrha putovanja. Drugim riječima, ep ima tri glavna dijela koja, s obzirom na „istinovanje kao raskrivanje“ (57), Mikecin opisuje sintagmama „*raskrivanje iz skrivenosti*“, „*ne-skrivenost sama*“ i „*neskrivenost skrivanja*“, a s obzirom na „odnos između mita i zbora u Parmenida“ (98) sintagmama „*privid istine*“, „*istina sama*“ i „*istina privida*“. Nakon što putnik koji istinski umi, a to znači koji umi istinu bitja kao istinu vlastitog bitja, prođe „dveri putova dana i noći“ te time napusti „domove noći“ kao oblast privida, mnijenja, protivnosti svjetla i tame, on susreće bezimenu boginju koja je „ustvari boginja istine“ (8). Prošavši dveri putnik se zapravo vratio „doma iz tuđine“ (8) jer taj dom nije samo „dom boginje“, nego i „putnikov vlastiti dom“ (8) kao „dom istine“ (8), odnosno kao „povratak uma iz svoje ne-istine svojoj istini“ (8). No putovanje se, uz poučavanje, poticanje i pozivanje boginje, zapravo nastavlja i to kao „put bitja“ koji ipak valja razlikovati od „neprohodnoga puta nebitja i od povratnoga puta“ (8). Put nebitja, nesučega, mnijenja, je „posve neispitiv i neprohodan“ (15), pa „zapravo i nije nikakav put“ (15), dok je povratni put onaj put na „kojem neumno mnijenje ne luči bitje i nebitje“ (8). Put bitja ima dva dijela od kojih prvi „vodi kroz istinu bitja“, a drugi „kroz istinu privida“. Istina bitja sastoji se u tome da je suće nepokretivo, a objavom istine kretanje ili putovanje zaustavlja se i preobražava u „savršeno kruženje koje odgovara blagokrugosti istine“ (11). Istina privida je u tome što je privid takva mješavina svjetla i tame

u kojoj se oboje razdvajaju umjesto da se vide kao „jedinstvo smjese svjetla i tame“ (13), jer privid u svojoj istini nije drugo doli privid istine. S druge strane, putnikovo putovanje je „neko poslanje, a nije samovoljno odabrano, niti je njegov ishod unaprijed predodređen“ (10). Putnik se upušta na putovanje „jer slijedi svoj usud“ (10) koji se očituje i kao spremnost „na obraćenje istini bitja“ (10). Putovanje kao „raskrivanje istine sućega“ (11) je stoga „povratak u ono u čemu putnik već skriveno boravi“ (11). No, prema Mikecinu je i samo umjenje neko upuštanje i „dopuštanje onomu umljivom da se objavi“ (10), štoviše umjenje je „u svojoj biti pomno paženje“ (10), odnosno slušanje kao „opažajuće puštanje“ (10). U konačnici umjenje „kao slušanje je odgovaranje nagovoru onoga što se ima umiti“ (10). Time se samo potvrđuje prethodno navedeno određenje umjenja kao onog što prethodi kako mišljenju tako i razlici osjetnog i nadosjetnog. Mikecinovo poimanje Parmenidovog *voeiv* treba stoga shvatiti prvenstveno pod vidom zahtjeva za nadilaženje metafizičkog razlikovanja i razdvajanja onog osjetnog od onog nadosjetnog, odnosno tzv. više od niže spoznajne moći i tomu slično, a koje se pojavljuje već u Platona i Aristotela.

378 U „Uvodu“ filozofijskog komentara Parmenidovog epa Mikecin, dakle, jasno naznačuje temeljne misli vodilje vlastitoga prijevoda i komentara i to o istini sućega kao istosti sućega i uma koja nije „tek slaganje misli i onog mislivog, nego je istina bitja kao istota uma i bitja, a još prije toga jestina kao neutaja bitja“ (14), kao i o unutrašnjem jedinstvu govora i bića, riječi i bitka, jer je naime „cijelo kazivanje puta jedan jedinstveni kružni put istine bitja, koja dolazi do sebi primjerene riječi“ (17). Obje misli, posebice misao istote sućega i umjenja, opetovano se pojavljuju u Mikecinovom filozofijskom komentaru Parmenida i to na različite načine, tj. u raznim inačicama i misaonim sklopovima.

U poglavlju naslovljenom „Suće“ Mikecin pojašnjava filozofijske i filologijske razloge za uporabu imena *suće*, te razmatra odnos sućeg i nesućeg, kao i odnos sućeg i onog jednog. Polazeći od toga da u Parmenida riječi *ἔστιν* (jest), *εἶναι* (biti), i *ἔόν* (suće) kazuju isto, Mikecin na filološki mjerodavan način dolazi do uvida o njihovoj međusobnoj povezanosti koja zapravo „krije odnos između glagola i imenice“ (25), tj. onog glagolskog i onog imenskog. Pritom upravo riječ *ἔόν* čuva smisao praodnosa između imenskog i glagolskog, odnosno ona je „ono ime koje ih sjedinjuje prije njihovog razdvoja“ (25). S obzirom na to da je *ἔόν* particip prezenta glagola biti (*εἶναι*), Mikecin upozorava da *biće* kao

imenica nije dokraja primjerena hrvatska prevedenica za grčki particip $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{o}\nu$, već je prikladnija prevedenica za grčko $\tau\acute{o}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{i}\nu\alpha\iota$. Stoga $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{o}\nu$ treba prevesti s riječju *suće* koja je arhaični hrvatski particip glagola *biti* u jednini srednjega roda. Isto tako ni glagolska imenica *bitak*, za razliku od glagolske imenice *bitje*, „ne može prenijeti puni glagolski smisao grčkog poimeničenog infinitiva“ (21). Prema Mikecinu presudno je to da se $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{o}\nu$ kod Parmenida „prevodi kao *suće* stoga što se njime iskazuje bitje koje prethodi razdvoju bitja i onoga što jest“ (25), odnosno to da „Parmenidovo *suće* prethodi razlici između nekog sućeg i bitja“ (26), a također i razlici esencije i egzistencije. Tako u konačnici $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{o}\nu$ u Parmenida u „strogom smislu riječi uopće nije particip“ (25), nego „predgramatičko zborenje“ i „predlogičko umjenje“. Drugačije kazano, riječ *suće* najprimjerenije prenosi smisao Parmenidovog $\acute{\epsilon}\acute{o}\nu$ jer, između ostalog, riječi nisu niti sredstvo ni „puko oruđe“, a niti je izbor riječi neka takoreći izvanjskost, tj. pitanje konvencije. U riječi *suće* valja dakle prepoznati određeno sadržanje koje „ne dopušta razlučivanje onoga što jest i bitja“ (23). Štoviše, jedino sadržanje sućega sa sućim „omogućuje uprisućivanje sućega kroz prisuća“ (26), jer kao što *suće* nema počelo, tako ni ono samo nije počelo ili temelj mnoštva, nego je „ono zajedno ($\xi\upsilon\nu\acute{o}\nu$) svima“ (27).

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Nadalje, odnos sućeg i nesućeg prema Mikecinu nije odnos suprotnosti i razlike, jer počiva na „predontologičkoj istoti bitja“ (27) na kojoj se ujedno utemeljuje i ontologičko počelo identiteta. No *suće* se može odrediti jedino „u lučbi spram nesućega“ (28), odnosno „nijekanjem nesućega“ (*kojino puti traženja jedini umiti jesu / onaj kako jest te kako nije ne biti*, II. 2–3). Takvo „posredno zborenje“ o sućem ukazuje na to da je *suće* istodobno i „neizrecivo“ i „zborivo“, ali također i na to da znanje naspram mnijenja nije samo „vjerno znanje istine sućega, nego i znanje vjerodostojnoga privida sućega“ (29).

Međutim pitanje o jednoti sućega obuhvaća, ipak, centralnu ontologijsku problematiku Parmenidovog epa. S obzirom na to da na samo jednome mjestu u epu stoji da je *suće* jedno (*jer sada jest ujedno sve jedno sadržno*, VIII. 5–6), postavlja se pitanje koji je krajnji smisao jednote sućega. K tomu, kako primjećuje Mikecin, u povijesti tumačenja Parmenida se, već od Melisa, ustalilo mnijenje da je jednota najvažnije svojstvo sućega. No Parmenidova jednota sućega nije jednota koja isključuje svaku razliku, kako to primjerice tumači Aristotel. Isto tako nije ispravno niti ono tumačenje koje iz odnosa

jednote i onog svega zaključuje da *privid* u Parmenida uopće nikako nije (Platon). Drugim riječima, jednota sućega nije „u tome da je ono ukupnost i cjelina svih bivajućih“ (30), niti je suće „nešto opće“ ili „rod“, nego je suće u Parmenida „takvo jedno koje ne isključuje mnoštvo kao nešto nejesuće“ (30). Suće je „jedno koje objedinjuje sva koja jesu“ (31), što uključuje i suprotnosti. Pritom za Parmenida „ona mnoga“ jesu na način nastajanja i nestajanja, rađanja i umiranja.

Mnoštvenost nije sućemu nešto izvanjsko, ono je uprisućivanje samog sućeg u ona prisuća. Jednota sućega dakle u sebi uključuje razliku, jer se suće „svakako i posvuda prema rasporedu razlučuje i slučuje kroz prisuća“ (33). Jedno kao sve i sve kao jedno počiva „na sebeodnosu sućega“ (33). Taj je sebeodnos sućega, kako kazuje već i samo njegovo ime, „sadržanje samoga sebe“ i „prianjanje samomu sebi“. Iz sebeodnosa prvotno proizlazi odnos sućeg i uma, a potom i „dvojstvo sućega kao takvog i prisućih kao onih mnijetljivih“ (33), kao i mogućnost *privida* kao pričina koji prema Mikecinu i nije drugo doli „prikrivena istost bitja i uma“. Jer mnijenje mnije da su ona prisuća i odsuća kao prisustvovanje i odsustvovanje sućega uvijek u stanju razdvojenosti, dočim istinito umjenje zna za jedinstvo suprotnosti istih. Istiniti pak um dopire do sućeg „kao onog po sebi umljivog“ (33). Sebesadržanje (συνέχεσθαι) i prijanjanje (πελάζειν) sućega su prema Mikecinu načini „kako suće omogućuje ono drugo samoga sebe ostajući u samome sebi“ (34), a sebesadržanje je povrh toga porijeklo njegove neprekidnosti. Lučenje jednote sućega proizlazi dakle iz prvotne mogućnosti njegova udvajanja putem uma. Ta prvotna mogućnost predstavlja ujedno i porijeklo kako *privida* kao pojave ili uprisućenja samog sućeg tako i *pričina* kao mnijenja koje mni da su „prisuća i odsuća međusobno razdvojena“ (37). S obzirom na to da suće ima mnogo znamenja, a „znamenja znamenju jednotu sućega“ (36), znamenja sućega su: nerodivost i nepropadljivost kao svojstva nevremenitosti; cjelovitost, nedjeljivost i jedinstvenost kao svojstva homogenosti, neprekidnosti i istolikosti; istost kao posljedica savršenosti i dovršenosti i nepokretivost kao svojstvo nepromjenjive istote.

Poglavlje „Um“ donosi Mikecinova tumačenja odnosa između uma i zbora, uma i sućeg i uma i mnijenja. Štoviše, to je poglavlje, zbog navlastitih misaonih uvida, iznimno važno poglavlje Mikecinova filozofijskog komentara

Parmenida. Jer ne samo što pojašnjava bitne aspekte praiskonske jednote bića i mišljenja, nego u podpoglavlju „Zbor i um“ sadržava i Mikecinov autentični filozofijski doprinos tumačenju međuodnosa zborenja ili govora, jezika, umjenja i sućeg. Kao što je prethodno već napomenuto, Mikecin umjenje shvaća kao „izvorno opažanje“ te samim time nadilazi tradicionalni metafizički horizont unutar kojeg opstoji razlika između osjetnog opažanja i umskog ili razumskog mišljenja odnosno onog osjetnog i onog nadosjetnog, subjekta i objekta, bića i bitka itd. Umjenje je prema Mikecinu takvo opažanje koje je najprije „unutrašnja umnost samoga sućeg“, a potom i „umsko oprisućivanje onoga sućeg“ (41). Gledano iz smjera fenomena, umjenje je „primajuće paženje onoga što se pojavljuje“ (42), a to znači da ono ima kako ontološki tako i gnoseološki karakter; jer pomnost, pažljivost kao temeljno svojstvo umjenja uključuje zamjećivanje, motrenje i čuvanje kao pretpostavke bitja onoga što se pojavljuje. Sebeodnos kao sebesudržanje sućega je stoga svojevrsno „umsko“ praopažanje sebe samoga kroz sebe samog, odnosno, to je umsko *oprisućivanje* sućega kao primajuće paženje te potom i *uprisućenje* sućega u onim prisućima kao onom drugom samoga sebe. S obzirom na to da umjenje nije tek neka od ljudskih moći spoznavanja, valja naglasiti da istost uma i sućega ne znači da su um i suće jednaki već supripadni i zato odvojivi. Time se otvara i mogućnost neistinitog umjenja. Neistinito umjenje kao mnijenje, puko osjetno zamjećivanje i pričin razdvaja um i suće, dočim je istinito umjenje kao „umsko zrenje“ (λεύσσειν) i „neskriveno umjenje“ zapravo „pronicanje onoga umljivog“ (42) i „sjedinenje s njime“ (43), odnosno ono je znanje kao „neskrivena istost uma i sućega“ (43). Umjenje, kako izvodi Mikecin, na poseban način pripada čovjeku jer u njemu „um umuje bitje osvjedočen u samoga sebe“ (43). Isto tako, čovjek je i ono mjesto „u kojem sveprožimajuća umnost bitja dolazi do svoje sebesvijesti i u kojem se luči istina od neistine bitja“ (42). Drugačije kazano, bez čovjeka nema sebesvjesnosti sućega. Stoga u konačnici istinito umjenje nije drugo doli „čista otvorenost bitja i na tome počivajuće svjedočenje da bitja ima“ (43).

Umjenje i zborenje (λέγειν) su, prema Mikecinu, neraskidivo povezani, štoviše oni su „dvije strane istoga“ (43), tj. očitovanje sućega. Odnos uma i zbora je odnos istosti (supripadnosti), pa kao što nema umjenja bez zborenja, tako nema niti zborenja bez umjenja. U razlici spram umjenja kao „čuvajućeg opažanja onoga sućeg“, zborenje je „razabiruće sabiranje“, „čuvajuće slušanje

istine sućega“, odnosno izvorno lučenje kao „prvotno biranje između sućega i nesućega“ (45). Zborenje se tiče kazivanja i govorenja, odnosno slušanja i sluha. Ali, kao što je umjenje supripadno onomu sućem, tako mu je supripadno i zborenje. Iz takvoga odnosa sućeg i zborenja proizlazi mogućnost otuđenja govora od sućega u kojem je govor tek puki, lažni govor, a ne tvorbeni govor „koji odgovarajući zboru tvori i s-tvara istinu bitja“ (45), a ta je istina zapravo istina kao „neutaja sućega“. Umjenje pak, kako primjećuje Mikecin, nije u Parmenida „najviši vid zborenja“ kao što je to slučaj kod Heraklita, nego je „zborenju supripadni vid s-vjesnosti (osvjedočenja) i obistinjenja onoga sućeg“ (45). Suće, dakle, u Parmenida nije sam zbor, pa je zato zborenje, zapravo, „bit mišljenja i govora“. Umjenjem naime suće dopijeva do svijesti ili osvjedočenja o samome sebi, a po zborenju se „suće sabire u svojoj sabranosti kao ono jedno i isto naspram mnogih“ (45). Međusobno uvjetovanje zborenja i umjenja nema prema Mikecinu puko kauzalni ili čak kronološki karakter, već proizlazi iz njihovog živog jedinstva u kojem je umjenje kao opažanje ujedno i sabiranje sućega ili „čuvajuće opažanje onoga sućeg“, dok je zborenje kao sabiranje ujedno i paženje ili „čuvajuće slušanje istine sućega“. Mikecin stoga uviđa da je odnos umjenja i zborenja analogan odnosu slušanja (sluha) i gledanja (vida). Zbor i um se u konačnici susreću u istinitoj vjeri kao „vjeri istine“, jer istina sućeg nije „obrazloživa“ i „dokaziva“, već „proizlazi iz samoga uma koji mu izvorno pripada“ (46). Suće je nešto „samoizvjesno“ jer se „neskriveno objavljuje“ i pokazuje tako „da se u to ne može dvojititi“ (46). Neskrivenost sućeg daje snagu vjeri kao uvjerenosti u nedvojbenu istinitost sućega, tj. omogućava kako istinitu vjeru tako i „vjernost sućemu“.

Sučće, zborenje i umjenje se u Parmenida nalaze u „izvornoj unutrašnjoj svezi“ (46). Njihova istost ima karakter supripadnosti koja ne ukida razlike. Tako su primjerice um i suće supripadni na takav način da se *sudrže*, odnosno tako da se u „svojem dvojstvu jedno drugome pružaju“ (47). Premda bitje i um stoje u iskonskom zajedništvu (*ono pak isto umiti je te i ono radi čega jest umnja / jerbo bez onog sućeg, u kojem je iskazano / nećeš naći umjenje*, VIII. 34–36), valja napomenuti da bitje uvjetno kazano prethodi umu zato što se zbori kroz um te „može biti istinski i nestinski zboreno“ (46), dočim samo umjenje može biti istinsko umsko zrenje kao poistovjećivanje samoga sebe sa sućim ili neistinsko zabludno mnijenje, odnosno, zabludno ili vjerno opažanje

onog sućeg. Tu nije riječ o ontološkom prvenstvu sućeg nad umom, nego o izvornom sudržanju sućega i uma. Mikecin zato zaključuje kako nema uma bez „sućega u kojem on samoga sebe raskriva i objavljuje“ (48). Drugačije kazano, „suće kao ono umljivo i umljenje kao objavljivanje sućega su isto“ (49). Upravo je, dakle, sam *odnos* supripadanja ili sudržanja ono što na osebusni način prethodi i sućemu i umu kao navlastitim konstitutivnim momentima.

Ako je bitje odnosno suće supripadno umu, onda iz njihove razlike proizlazi kako mogućnost „udvajanja bitja i uma u čovjeku“ tako i „razlikovanje uma i mnijenja“ (54). „Sebeudvajanje uma kroz mnijenje“ je pravi uzrok nužnosti privida (δόξα). Privid i nije drugo doli „nužna od-sutnost istine“ te ne proizlazi samo iz uma nego i iz samoga sućeg. Kada se pak mnijenje odvoji od uma, tada započinje preobrazba uma u neistiniti um kojemu je istota sućega i uma skrivena, pa time privid istine postaje njezin pričin. Razlikovanje privida i pričina se, prema Mikecinu, u osnovi može svesti na razliku između privida kao drugotnosti onog sućeg i pričina kao zaborava te drugotnosti. Drugim riječima, „privid je razdvajanje istote bitja i uma, a pričin je prikriivanje toga razdvajanja“ (62). Za razliku od privida kao tek pojave sućega, mnijenje razdvaja suće i njegove pojave, tj. „drži da i nesuće jest, a suće mu je ono što je uistinu samo privid sućega“ (56). Pritom mnijenje nije puki umski umišljaj, nego moć koja je svojstvena smrtnicima kao takvima, a tiče se uspostave „rasporeda bivajućih kao cjeline privida“. Po mnijenju naime „nastaju i opstaju pojave sućega“ (56). S druge strane, istinito umjenje je providanje privida kao privida onog sućeg, odnosno putovanje ili „uspon iz privida k istini“. Istinski umiti znači raskrivati iskonski odnos istine i privida, a to se raskrivanje najprije odvija kao spoznavanje istine iz privida, potom kao spoznaja same istine i u konačnici kao spoznavanje privida iz istine, jer „prividnost privida počiva na pojavljivanju onog sućeg samog“ (61). Izostanak istinitoga uma stoga implicira razdvajanje sućega od sebe samoga, tj. pričin, dok prisustvo istinitoga uma, kao momenta sebeodnošenja sućeg, omogućava da se ono prividno providi u svojoj istini, tj. da se providi kao prisuće sućega.

U poglavlju koje nosi naslov „Red“ Mikecin se upušta u interpretaciju kozmologijskih aspekata Parmenidovog epa, odnosno razmatra vrijeme, prostor te svjetlo i tamu, jer su to svojstva supripadna onomu sućem kao cjelini onih bivajućih.

Iako je suće nepokretivo i nedjeljivo, to ne znači da je lišeno kretanja uopće, nego samo tjelesnog kretanja u smislu preinake, nastajanja, nestajanja, rasta i premještanja. Kretanje sućega je „savršeno kružno kretanje“, tj. samokretanje ili sebekretanje, kao „jedinstvo kretanja i stajanja“ (69). Kao što se kugla okreće oko svoga nepokretnog središta, tako se i suće okreće u sebi samome „ne mijenjajući mjesto i ne trpeći nikakvu promjenu“ (69). To unutrašnje samokretanje sućega je zapravo samokretanje uma. Po Mikecinovu shvaćanju Parmenida, upravo je istinsko ili neprosto kretanje sućeg izričita pretpostavka za prividno ili prostorno kretanje onih bivajućih, koje i nastaje uslijed ukidanja jedinstva kretanja i stajanja. Pritom valja imati na umu da „suće sadrži privid kao kugla oplošje“ (72). Nepokretivost kao znamen sućega vezana je uz njegovu nevremenitost (*nit' ikad bje niti će biti, jer sada jest ujedno sve / jedno sudržno*, VIII. 5–6). Suće stoga „nije ni bezvremeno ni sjevremeno, nego je predvremeno“ (74). Suće naime izdržava u onome sada tako da „jest sve sada *ujedno* i *odjednom*“ (75). Drugim riječima, predvremeno bivanje sućega je takvo samokretno sudržanje koje implicira nepokretivost, jer se suće „kreće tako da samo sebe kreće ostajući u istome“ (75), ali koje ujedno omogućava i temporalitet kao razlikovanje prošlog, sadašnjeg i budućeg vremena.

Prostorna protežnost sućeg usporediva je s kuglom kao savršenim tijelom odnosno „mirujućom cjelinom“ koja počiva na savršenom sumjerju i ravnomjerju središta i oplošja, ali samo suće nije kugla već prvenstveno ono kugloliko, tj. „odnos između središta i krajeva kugle“ (82), jer je „oblik kugle prilika reda cjeline bivajućih i kao takav pojava u sebi jednog sućega“ (77). Kugla i krug su prispodobe jedinstva suprotnosti onog kružnog i onog ravnog, odnosno jedinstva početka i kraja koje se naime ostvaruje u svakoj točki oplošja. Stoga je kugla tek slika savršenosti sućega, dok zaobljenost kugle „odsljkava uvraćenost sućega u samo sebe“ (79). Isto tako je i „prostorna kugla“ tek slika kugle kao reda cjeline bivajućih, koja je pak „samo umom opaziva“. No usprkos svojoj savršenosti, nedjeljivosti i neprekidnosti suće ipak ima „krajnje međe“ koje se održavaju po pravdi, nuždi i sudbini. Za razliku od protežnih tijela, suće ima unutrašnje međe koje omogućavaju njegovu stalnu istotu. Iz istote pak sućega proizlazi to da suće „u vidu svoga privida izlazi iz sebe u drugo samoga sebe“ (80), odnosno u prostornu protežnost. Prostiranje prostora je u konačnici, kako primjećuje Mikecin, neposredno vezano uz „izvorno protezanje sućega“.

Osim prostora i vremena kao konstitutivnih elemenata privida onog sućeg, valja spomenuti i svjetlo i tamu kao počela privida s obzirom na ona bivajuća, prisuća. Sve pojavno počiva naime na osnovnoj suprotnosti svjetla i tame, tj. njihovom omjeru u svakom pojedinom bivajućem. Pritom se, po Mikecinovom uvidu, svjetlo i tama – nasuprot Aristotelovom tumačenju – ne mogu izjednačiti s bićem i nebićem, jer to nisu dva razdvojena počela već sklop ili jedinstvo suprotnosti koje jednako ispunjava sva bivajuća, mnijetljiva. Svjetlo i tama su, kako primjećuje Mikecin, „način pojavljivanja istine u prividu“ (84). Drugačije kazano, svjetlo i tama kao likovi privida, a također i mnijenje, na nužan način proizlaze iz sućega, pa stoga nisu svojevoljno od ljudi postavljeni. Stoga zabludno mnijenje ili neistinito umovanje putem „rastavljajućeg postavljanja likova“ zapravo razdvaja i suprotstavlja svjetlo i tamu i time uspostavlja pričin, dočim istinsko umjenje „nadilazi razdvajanje svjetla i tame“ (86).

U poglavlju „Boginja“ Mikecin razmatra odnos *sućega* i boginje, te značenje bogova u Parmenidovom epu i smisao onog demonskog, demona, kao onog božanskog u čovjeku. U skladu s razdiobom epa na tri dijela, odnosno, shvaćanjem epa kao putovanja iz privida „domova noći“, kroz „dveri putova dana i noći“, prema svjetlu istine, Mikecin konstatira da je, nakon uvoda, cijeli ep zapravo „govor boginje“. Boginja kazuje istinu sućeg koje naime nije bog, nego ono prvotno ili ono božansko (τὸ θεῖον). S obzirom na to da je boginja neimenovana, ona je ustvari boginja istine kao „neskrivene istote bitja i uma“, čija je objava moguća isključivo kao „samoobjava umom“ (89). No već i samo „ime“ bezimene boginje (θεά) upućuje na unutrašnju povezanost boginje s čistim, umskim zorom, tj. umjenjem kao zrenjem „koje prozire ono jedno, sva u jednome i jedno kroz sva“ (90). Bezimenost boginje upućuje dakle na božanskost onog prvotnog, sućeg, štoviše ona je „glas uma koji se uzdigao do uvida u ono suće kao ono božansko“ (90). Tako je u konačnici boginja istine „umski zor kroz koji se objavljuje istina bitja“, dočim se smrtniku boginja ujedno „ukazuje time što u njemu sviće istinski um“ (91). Tu stoga nije riječ o objavi od boga čovjeku, nego o samoobjavi božanske istine kroz čovjeka.

Rasipanje pak onog sućeg kao onog božanskog u mnoštvo bogova nije drugo doli „različiti načini pojavljivanja onog sućeg u prividu“ (92). Bogovi, strogo gledano, proizlaze iz jednote same boginje, jer „jednota boginje

odgovara jednoti onoga sućeg“ (92). Drugačije kazano, bogovi su naspram boginje istine, tj. onog sućeg, tek mnogostruki likovi jedne boginje odnosno pojave kao privid sućega samog.

S druge strane, put kojim putnik putuje prema svjetlu istine sućega je demonski put. Demon, kako tumači Mikecin, nije ni boginja Pravda, niti bezimena boginja istine, nego ono božansko „koje se dodjeljuje (δαίωμα) čovjeku kao njegov udio i usud“ (94). Biti na demonski način znači biti na, takoreći, nadljudski način, tj. u stanju entuzijazma ili obuzetosti onim božanskim. Ono demonsko je takav način bitja u kojem se susreću bog i čovjek kao „dva supripadna očitovanja onog božanskog“ (94). Putnik stoga nije „niti bog niti puki čovjek“ (95), već „božanski čovjek“ koji time što razotkriva ono božansko u čovjeku ujedno i nadilazi samoga sebe. Spoznaja pak istine bitja nema isključivo božansko ili ljudsko porijeklo, nego se zapravo odvija u umu kao onom „uistinu demonskom mjestu susreta boga i čovjeka“ (95–96).

386 Zaključno poglavlje Mikecinova filozofijskog komentara Parmenida ima naslov „Govor“, a razmatra odnose mita i zborā, zborā i imenovanja te smisao heksametra kao nužnog oblika Parmenidovog epā. Suprotstavljanje i razdvajanje mita od zborā, kao i filozofije od pjesništva, počiva na poimanju mita kao pripovijesti ili alegorije i zborā kao znanstvenog mišljenja, a to razdvajanje prema Mikecinu svoj vrhunac u Grka dostiže u Aristotelovoj filozofiji. Iz takove filozofske tradicije proizlazi nadalje i mnijenje da prvi ili uvodni dio i treći dio epā imaju karakter alegorije, mita ili pjesničkog govora, dok je jedino u drugome dijelu prisutan logički govor. I Platon isto tako, kako primjećuje Mikecin, smatra da je mit neistinit govor, usprkos tomu što za „filozofijski mit“ ustvrđuje da je vrsta zborā i da sadrži nešto od istine. Naspram uvriježenih predrasuda prema kojima je, između ostalog, uvod epā slikoviti govor o nečem neosjetnom, u Parmenida je zapravo „sveza između načina kazivanja i onog mišljenog nužna“ (99). Premda je i u mitskom pjesništvu primjerice Homera i Hesioda riječ, mit (μῦθος), neka neupitna božanska objava, odnosno mit je „kao riječ ujedno i ono riječju rečeno“ (99), te unatoč tomu što i Parmenid koristi većinu riječi iz epske predaje i određene epske obrasce i slike, Parmenidov ep nije mitska božanska objava zato što se u njemu „onim mitskim u govoru ponajprije objavljuje smisao odnosa između onog sućeg i njegovog privida“ (100). Drugim riječima, blizina u kojoj se nalaze Parmenid

i Homer skriva zapravo njihovu presudnu razliku, odnosno sukob između „istinskog umjenja bitja i bogoslovnog pjesništva“ (100). Parmenidov je govor kao „kazivanje istine sućega“ stoga znamenovanje, jer u „sebi objedinjuje zbor i mit“, prethodi razdvoju logičkog i mitskog, dok su riječi znamenani „kroz koje se suće pokazuje“ (101). Mit i zbor nisu „dva zasebna načina govora, nego jedan te isti govor u svoja dva vida“ (104).

Tako se primjerice prvi dio epa (*prooemium*) ne smije, kako primjećuje Mikecin, shvatiti doslovno ili alegorijsko-metaforički, nego se ono što dotične mitske slike (konji, kola itd.) iskazuju „mora dovesti zajedno s onim na što one ukazuju“ (103). Pritom valja istaknuti da je u uvodu epa – u razlici spram drugog i trećeg dijela, kao „istinitog mita“ i „objave istine onog prividnog“, gdje vlada neskriveno jedinstvo zbora i mita – još uvijek na snazi skriveno jedinstvo mita i zbora.

Jedinstvo mita i zbora očituje se dakle kao „zboreći govor istine“ sućeg, pa se tako ono mitsko odnosi na nužnost samoobjave sućega, a ono zbarsko na lučenje sućega i nesućega, kao i na sabiranje i razabiranje u govoru i riječi govora. Odnos mita i zbora, privida i istine, sućega i nesućega, otkriva se kako u ustrojstvu epa kao jedinstvenog puta sastavljenog od tri dijela tako i u „kružnom kretanju epa“. Štoviše, Mikecin ustvrđuje da je sama suprotnost skrivanja i otkrivanja koja „vlada u biti istine“, ono što se zapravo „očituje u suprotnosti zbora i mita“ (109). Mit i zbor se stoga ne nalaze ni u odnosu „međusobnog isključivanja“, niti „uzajamnog prevladavanja“, nego su oni „u Parmenida dva iznutra supripadna vida jednoga jedinstvenog kazujućeg zborenja istine sućega“ (110).

Razlikovanje zborenja (λέγειν) i imenovanja (ὀνομάζειν) ne počiva na nekoj vrsnoj razlici, nego na tome što zborenje, kao bitstvo, prethodi kazivanju, govorenju i imenovanju. Istinito imenovanje, po Mikecinovom uvidu, „sabire ono imenovano“, a neistinito imenovanje, premda se zapravo nesvjesno odnosi na suće, „razdvaja i suprotstavlja ono imenovano“ (110). Riječ kao ime ili znamen onog imenovanog može stoga odgovarati zboru sućeg, ali ga može i skriti, prikriti, čak nijekati, i to time što prešućuje ono suprotno. Jedino na „putu nesućega“ nema imenovanja, jer je taj put bezimen. Drugim riječima, istinito imenovanje odgovara „putu sućega“ i to u dva smjera, tj. kao „govor sućega“ koji, „polazeći od sućega samog“ (111), imenuje ona prividna kao

prisuća i odsuća, te kao „govor istine privida“ koji, ukazujući na suće, „u svemu prividnom provida ono suće“ (116). Dočim neistinito imenovanje uspostavlja pričin u kojem je ime „ukočena oznaka“ koja „razdvaja i uposebljuje ona prividna“ (111), pa se time ujedno negira i samo ime, imenovanje kao znamenovanje sućega.

Međutim i „varljivi govor“, kao neistinito imenovanje onog mnijetljivog, dovodi do toga da „mnijenje uzima ona prividna kao nešto odvojeno i ne provida ih u jedinstvu sućega“ (112). Jedino onaj govor koji proizlazi iz zbora, zborenja, a riječi, imena, rabi kao znamenue sućega, može „pripadati sućemu i njega u njegovoj ne-skrivenosti pokazivati“ (112). Takav je govor zapravo svojevrsno odgovaranje „uzmicanju onog sućeg kao onog po sebi neizrecivog, ali u cijelosti zborivog“ (113).

Kao što ime nije rezultat dogovora i neka proizvoljnost, već „način istinovanja u govoru, te očitovanja i obistinjenja onog sućeg“ (114), isto tako i zborenje nije puko prosuđivanje i govorenje, nego „sabiranje, objavljivanje, davanje sućemu da se obznani“ (115). Štoviše, sama se „supripadnost uma i sućega događa kao zborenje“ (116).

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Mikecinov filozofijski komentar završava raspravom o smislu daktilskog heksametra kao nužnog oblika Parmenidovog kazivanja. Parmenidov ep nije, kako primjećuje Mikecin, „poučna pjesma“ ili nauk prikazan u pjesničkom obliku. Tu je na djelu takav način govora u kojem je „nemoguće razdvojiti sadržaj od oblika“, odnosno u kojem vlada „izvorno jedinstvo mita i zbora“ (117). Tvorbenost Parmenidovog govora očituje se kako u načinu njegovog „kazujućeg zborenja“ tako i u tvorbi istine sućega pomoću riječi i imena čije je porijeklo u zboru.

Usprkos sličnostima, primjerice u metrici i epskim prizorima, između Parmenida i Homera i Hesioda, valja naglasiti da je Parmenidovo preuzimanja nekih epskih slika kao što su putovanje kolima ili putovi dana i noći ujedno i njihovo preinačenje i preosmišljenje. Tako putovanje kolima u Parmenida nije samo pjesništvo kao „opijevanje pobjede u nadmetanju“ (120), nego „mudrosno tvorbeno kazivanje“, tj. put kao „uspon u spoznaji“. Isto tako, niti putovi dana i noći nisu vezani isključivo uz nevid ili Aid, kao što je to slučaj u starom epu, nego uz put demona odnosno putovanje putnika od tame privida prema svjetlu ili istini sućega.

Međutim, najvažniji aspekt Parmenidova „tvorbenoga kazivanja“ se odnosi na sklad, ritam, te obrate riječi, glasa i rečenice u samom epu. Heksametar ili šestomjer je naime „namijenjen za odmjereno kazivanje naglas i slušanje, katkad i uz pratnju glazbalom“ (121), a nije upitna niti njegova „izvorna vezanost uz ples“. Tvorbeni je govor prema Mikecinu „strogo uređen ritmom“. S obzirom na to da heksametar započinje dugim slogom, kao onim napetim, teškim, nepokretljivim, on „daje ugođaj čvrstine i snage“ (122), a potvrdu o tome daje primjerice i Aristotel u *Poetici* gdje heksametar naziva najpostojanijom i najtežom mjerom. Ritam stoga, može se reći, odslikava različita duševna stanja. Nadalje, na smisao stiha utječe kako položaj riječi u stihu tako i upotreba jednake mjere ritma. Jednakomjerje, osim što prikazuje suodnos istine i privida pomoću „sumjernog ukrštanja stopa“, prikazuje i „ravnovjesje među onim suprotnim“ (123).

Glazbenost ritma Mikecin prepoznaje u Parmenidovom načinu razdiobe stiha, prema stankama, na članke, pa tako primjerice u tročlanom stihu dugi slog odgovora polutonu u glazbi, dok je kratki slog četvrtina tona. No glazbeni smisao imaju i same riječi, tj. odnosi između glasova u riječi. Ritmičko ponavljanje, ukrštanje, glasova i riječi nije dakle puko očitovanje sumjernosti ili suglasja u određenom izričaju, već ujedno ukazuje i na dublji smisao koji je u njemu položen. Zato se glazbenost heksametra u konačnici sastoji „u tome da riječi, usprkos stankama, nisu odijeljene jedne od drugih, nego se kao u kolu jedna za drugu drže i nižu“ (129).

Povrh toga Parmenidov govor obiluje dvosmislenostima koje, kako primjećuje Mikecin, imaju svrhu „da se razlikuje površni i dublji smisao izrečenoga“ (128). Pritom „površni smisao pripada mnijenju, dublji istinitomu umjenju“ (128).

Parmenidov ep je stoga, kako zaključuje Mikecin, „namijenjen za kazivanje naglas i slušanje“, a ono „što se pri tome sluša nije samo sadržaj govora, nego i glazba govora“. Dočim je sam govor istine sućega „tvorben i glazben, jer kroz njega do riječi dolazi ritam i harmonija samoga sućeg“ (130).


Kao što je, već na početku ovoga osvrt, ukazano na neupitnu iznimnost i vrijednost Mikecinove knjige o Parmenidu, tako i sada, završno, te nakon izlaganja osnovnih stavaka Mikecinovog filozofijskog komentara, možemo tek potvrditi sve ono što je početno iskazano. S druge strane, po sebi je

jasno da prijevod i komentar Parmenidovog epa, osim filologijskog i povijesnofilozofijskog poznavanja teksta, uključuje i neminovno upuštanje u misaoni dijalog odnosno sumišljenje s Parmenidom. Mikecinova knjiga *Parmenid* u cijelosti je stoga, kazano bez ustezanja, jedno uspješno svjedočanstvo upravo takvoga nastojanja. Svojevrсна „izvanjska“ potvrda za prethodno navedenu tvrdnju je uz ostalo i Mikecinov stil pisanja u kojem, kako na razini rečenice tako i na razini podpoglavlja i poglavlja, možemo prepoznati metodu *savršenog kružnog kretanja* koje je svojstveno upravo istinitomu umu kao „demonskoj“ moći raskrivanja istine bitja, tj. neporecive jednote sućega i uma.

Tomislav Škrbić

phainomena


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
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